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PORTUGUESE COLONIAL POLICY:
A STUDY OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS
IN THE OVERSEAS PROVINCE OF ANGOLA

by

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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read,
and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
for acceptance, a thesis entitled PORTUGUESE
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the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

Portugal has been a colonizing power for almost five hundred years. The nation has been a part of Africa since 1483, performing a "Christian civilizing mission" in Angola and Mozambique. In 1961, Portuguese Angola erupted into civil war, as African and Portuguese fought each other in the northern part of the province. After four centuries of solitude, ignorance, and isolation, the cry of independence and self-determination came from the colony. The Portuguese still do not understand the nature of the revolt, its background, or why the African would suddenly rise in arms against the homeland. This study attempts to survey the revolutionary movement in Angola.

The first objective is to attempt to understand Portuguese colonialism. This is accomplished in Chapter I. All the concepts, tenets, justifications of Portuguese colonial policy are investigated, and an effort made to apply these to practice in Angola.

The present trouble in the West African province resulted from an accumulation of grievances that had been building up within the African for four hundred years, and the added burden of enduring a Portuguese dictatorship which came to Angola in 1932 when Dr. Antonio Salazar became Prime Minister. Chapter II then investigates the New State in Angola, and considers its contribution to the rise of revolution.

Subsequently, in Chapter III, the revolutionary groups themselves are outlined. Their early beginnings, their organization, their goals, are investigated. A distinction is made between the two distinct types of revolutionary nationalism in the province --

African, on the one hand, and European, on the other.

Chapter IV then takes the question further, investigating the efforts of both the Portuguese and the Africans to secure support for their cause in Angola. A resume is given of the aligned participants for each side in the struggle, and a summary of the issue before the United Nations is recorded. A concluding section of the chapter surveys the possibility of nationalist success against an established European state such as Portugal.

The concluding Chapter V attempts a future look at the Angolan scene. The question is posed whether Portugal will be forced to relinquish control over an area that has remained a part of its national patrimony and consciousness for so long. But no definite conclusion is reached, because none can be. The factor of time can only decide a winner in Angola.

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I would also express my appreciation to Dr. E.J. Hanson and the Department of Political Economy, without whose financial help, in the form of a graduate assistantship, I could not have undertaken the project.

The Secretary of Information at the Embassy of Portugal in Ottawa has been especially cooperative in providing me with articles and magazines, and he was the primary source of all the speeches of First Minister Salazar. Dr. E.K. Herkovits, curator of the Africana Collection at the Northwestern University Library, corresponded regularly with helpful suggestions, and furnished much information on Portuguese Africa that I could not find elsewhere.

The editorial content of the thesis is the work of the author, who must take responsibility for errors, omissions, and misinterpretations in the text.

Robert E. Garland

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT -----	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -----	iv
CONTENTS -----	v
EDITORIAL FOREWARD -----	vi
CHAPTER I Portuguese Colonial Policy -----	1
CHAPTER II The New State: Background to Conflict -----	40
CHAPTER III The Revolutionary Movements -----	86
CHAPTER IV White Against Black: Portugal Before the World -----	166
CHAPTER V Conclusion: Whither Angola? -----	229
EPILOGUE -----	263
APPENDIX A Decree Number 18:570, July 8, 1930 Portuguese Colonial Act, Chapter II -----	267
APPENDIX B Extracts for the Report Written by Henrique Galvao, January 1947, on Conditions in Portuguese Africa -----	269
APPENDIX C Voting Record on United Nations Resolutions Relating to the Portuguese Territories -----	271
BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	276

EDITORIAL FOREWORD

A word must be said at the outset concerning the technique used by the author in certain sections of this thesis. In many instances, the terms "province," "colony," "territory," "area," or "country" have been used in reference to Angola. In the Portuguese Constitution of 1951 Angola is designated as an "overseas province" of Portugal, a status it shares with all the other overseas areas of the metropolis. Prior to 1951, Angola was a "colony." The two terms are frequently used interchangeably. The author has used the other terms in the same capacity, and does not attempt, through the use of them, to connote anything other than that they are synonymous.

In certain parts of the research, original Portuguese source materials have been used. Where these were not available, the English translations were incorporated. All Portuguese translation was done by the author, using Spanish as a base in many cases, and errors, omissions, or misinterpretations in the translated Portuguese are the responsibility of the author.

Certain words were incorporated into the thesis intact without an English translation. It was often the case that an English word would not suffice for the chosen Portuguese word, and the latter was therefore not changed.

In several places, mention is made of the Portuguese empire. This creation no longer exists. Portugal is a republic with a prime minister and a president. But because of the expanse of areas under the Portuguese flag, the term "empire" is often used generally. This was the case in sections of this thesis.

Portugal has been called colonialist, but in answer to this, we prefer to quote the words of an outstanding Portuguese: 'There is no colonialism where there are no strategic benefits, either of an economic or a financial nature, and when the metropolis has the burden of the installation and upkeep of all the services. No land can be considered a colony where the standard of living is the same for everyone, with equal cultural standing, without differences in public rights and with the same individual justice for all in the eyes of the law. There cannot exist any degree of colonialism when the peoples are part of the nation and where the citizens cooperate actively in the life of the State, on equal terms.'

Julio Garcia Lourdes, Mexico
November, 1962

CHAPTER I

PORTUGUESE COLONIAL POLICY

Part I: The Colonial Myth

In the sixteenth century, Portuguese statesmen created the "civilizing mission" as a justification for Portugal's overseas expansion:

this part is Christian Europe, more advanced and more renowned alike in its governance and its might than the others. Here is Africa, Asia, and America, still grasping after the things of this world, uncivilized, full of savagery. . . . Look over the whole vast world and see how everywhere it is the home of legions of infidels.¹

In the twentieth century, Portugal still clings with a stubborn and forlorn pride to its hopes and illusions of a bygone age -- to an amalgam of colonial tenets which might have been modern three or four centuries ago. As recently as 1961, the Minister for Overseas, Adriano Moreira, said:

The courage of a people depends to a large extent on their certainty that their cause is just, and the unparalleled example we are giving expresses the firm conviction of a people who are certain of their rights and of their mission. . . . We consider it a serious offence to doubt the genuineness of our policy.²

¹Thomas Okuma, Angola In Ferment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 23.

²Adriano Moreira, Vigil of Arms (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral Do Ultramar, 1961), p. 20.

The idea of a civilizing mission overseas is indeed not a unique Portuguese justification for and explanation of colonialism. To a greater or lesser degree, all colonial nations have capitalized on the same theme.³ What is unique to the Portuguese is the conception of and dedication to this ambiguous goal on the part of Portuguese colonialists for such a long period of time. The "mission" has remained as such an integral part of the Portuguese national consciousness that even conservative and liberal elements in the present regime, both inside and outside the metropolis, advance the proposition that Portugal's history abroad is a unique experience characterized by a "sublime idealism."⁴ Also, despite polite cries to the contrary, it is apparent that the majority of the Portuguese have always considered their overseas experience as a sharing of "spiritual values." While any "civilizing mission" in the contemporary world may sound absurd to foreign ears, Portuguese statesmen have exploited this phenomenon throughout Portuguese history as a compensation for both the relatively insignificant world position of the mother country, and its subsequent impotence following the great explorations of earlier centuries. Portugal has created its own colonial myth, often more legalistic and more theoretical than prac-

³At the height of their imperialism, the English took upon themselves the "White Man's Burden" in Africa and Asia, and revelled in the aura of Kipling and Rhodes. The French disguised their objectives with the "Mission Civilitrice", and the Russians marched under the banner of "Pan-Slavism."

⁴James Duffy, Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 11.

tical. But this myth, nevertheless, "protects her position."⁵

The "civilizing mission" has remained as an intrinsic dogma of Portuguese colonial philosophy, for in fact it is bolstered by historical norms which did exist in the Iberian Peninsula between 1400 and 1800 -- the period of Portugal's greatest expansion. Apologists are quick to seize upon this often-neglected fact to strengthen their case.⁶ During those four centuries, Portuguese political and judicial ideas still possessed characteristics of the Middle Ages. Portuguese society of the time identified itself with a community of nations which was Christian, aiming for an organic, moral, and political unity under the supreme governorship of the Pope. Portugal, the argument goes, in carrying out its tasks as one of the temporal nations of the European continent, was to implement and extend this community throughout the world. As the visible head of Christianity, the Pope was the chief of the international society of potential Christians, and the Portuguese "mission" was thus a veritable command.⁷

⁵Donald L. Wiedner, A History of Africa South of the Sahara (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 463.

⁶Dr. Marcello Caetano deals at some length with this theory in Portugal e o Direito Colonial (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional Da Informacao, 1943).

⁷There seems to be a semblance of historical logic involved here, dating back to the explorations of Henry the Navigator. Before his time the great international crusade had failed, leaving the eastern Christian frontier weaker than ever before. The Byzantine Empire was tottering, and during Henry's lifetime it was to collapse before the Ottoman Turks. The Church itself was in danger, having been rent for years by the Great Schism, as rival popes at Rome and Avignon had made the Papacy lose caste in European eyes. Although the election of Pope Martin V ended the schism in 1417, the flagging energies of Christendom needed to be revived. For an ineffectual in-

This "mission" of colonial expansion developed early in Portuguese history, and from its very beginnings one can find an example of the notions and misconceptions which have been indicative of Portuguese colonial policy down to the present. In 1498 at Calicut, when asked what had brought the Portuguese as far as India, a member of Vasco da Gama's company explained that they were in search of "Christians and spices."⁸ This time-worn remark surprisingly contains more truth than rhetorical fancy. As a Catholic nation (on occasions Portugal is proclaimed the most Catholic of nations, a distinction that it may well share with Spain), Portugal forged a Christian nationalism early. It gave a fundamental identity to its personality. The concept of the cross and the sword had a real significance in the East, and was later to play a comparable role in Africa. In the fifteenth century, the insularity of the Portuguese nation tended to impart to Portugal's Catholicism a provincial dogmatic quality which, ironically, was to be strengthened rather than weakened by an ultramarine experience. This dogmatic quality appears unique to Portugal among the Catholic states of Europe; if, therefore, there was a peculiar missionary effort attached to Portuguese colonization,

ternational crusade, backed by an impotent Church, Henry decided to substitute the national effort of loyal, religious Portugal. This is one motive discussed at length by Charles R. Beazley in two articles, "Prince Henry of Portugal and the African Crusade of the Fifteenth Century," and "Prince Henry of Portugal and His Political, Commercial and Colonizing Work" in American Historical Review, vols. 16, 17 (1911, 1912), pp. 11-23, 252-267.

⁸H.V. Livermore, Portugal and Brazil (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 185.

it was only the logical expression of this national characteristic. Diogo do Couto, the official chronicler of Portuguese India, does not find fault with the sailor's remark; rather, he confirms this idea of "making Christians." In 1612, Couto declared that the kings of Portugal always aimed in the conquest of the East at "so uniting the two powers, spiritual and temporal, that the one should never be exercised without the other."⁹ Later, Francis I, who alone had criticized the division of the colonial world into Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence, resorted to the civilizing mission in an attempt to explain the settlement of Brazil; he declared the Amerindians to be "savages living without the knowledge of God or the use of reason."¹⁰ Dutch depredations in the Spice Islands and the systematic slaughter of "Redskins" and "Blackfellows" by English colonialists and their descendants in America and Australasia, he claimed, amply attested to the fact of the religious and racial intolerance of their perpetrators.

This genuine belief in a Portuguese "mission" even continued to survive the 1961 loss of Goa, the center of the former Portuguese "State of India." The invasion of this small enclave, a prestige showpiece of empire in the East, was viciously denounced throughout the Portuguese provinces, and the resultant national and moral defeat

⁹"Three Historians of Portuguese Asia," Boletim do Instituto Portugues de Lisboa, vol. 1 (Lisbon, 1948), p. 20.

¹⁰Lewis Hanke, The First Social Experiments in America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935), p. 16.

merely renewed and strengthened the historic Portuguese assumption that their nation

. . . though militarily and economically weak, possesses a peculiar spiritual strength to enable her, alone among European nations, to remain in Asia and Africa in the furtherance of a non-racial, Christian civilizing mission.¹¹

The questions can be asked: How can the Portuguese sustain a belief in such an unrealistic objective? What supports this faith and determination? The example of Camoes might suffice. This epic poet, more so than any great monarch, explorer, or missionary of Portugal, sang his countrymen's achievements for all generations to come. He gave to Portugal an epic literature, a modern language, and a legacy of nationalism -- all of which have been used to enhance the missiao ultramar. His great poem, The Lusiads, provided both the glorification and the epitaph of imperial Portugal when it was written in the first half of the sixteenth century. But it continued through the years to furnish the Portuguese with a consolation for the long centuries of national obscurity that were to follow the few generations of glory that had so quickly passed.

Camoes' great theme is the noble history of Portugal and the people whose heroic deeds reached their climax with the discovery of India. He intertwines the model of Virgil's Aeneid with the voy-

¹¹James Duffy, Portugal In Africa (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962), p. 9. The author is quoting a news article in the London Daily Telegraph of December 20, 1961.

ages of Vasco da Gama, and presents the Portuguese as an enlightened "chosen people" with even the ancient gods as compatriots. A section from his first canto (on the approach of da Gama to Mozambique):

The gods from Olympus take note of what the Portuguese are doing, and with Jupiter presiding, hold a conference to consider the matter. Bacchus is the enemy of the Lusitanians, for he fears that his own exploits in the Orient will be overshadowed if the Portuguese are allowed to go there. But Venus, the mother of Aeneas [and hence the patroness of the Romans], is very fond of the Portuguese, who resemble the ancient race. Even their speech reminds her of the beloved Latin. She speaks out strongly for Vasco da Gama and his countrymen, and she is supported by Mars, who applauds the warlike qualities of the Portuguese.¹²

The narrative continues in a similar vein through the remainder of the voyage up the East African coast. The Portuguese are persecuted by Bacchus, who comes to earth in disguise to incite the Moslems against them, but da Gama and his company are saved by Venus. Camoes cleverly works the Olympian deities into the actual experiences of da Gama with the hostile Africans and provides an explanation of his varying fortunes based upon their supernatural interventions. He concludes by having Jupiter send Mercury to guide the Portuguese to the friendly African city of Malindi, where, in actual history, Vasco da Gama procured the pilot who conducted the ships across the Indian Ocean to Calicut.

¹²This free translation is offered by Charles E. Nowell, A History of Portugal (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1952), p. 131. Perhaps the best account of the poet and his works (in English) is Richard F. Burton, Camoens, His Life and His Lusiads, 2 vols. (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1881).

Of course it is possible to overestimate the importance of the man and his work in the Portuguese mystique. Dante meant a great deal to Italy, as did Shakespeare to England and Cervantes to Spain. But not one of this great trio fills quite the place in his country's history that Camoes does in that of Portugal. Part of the reason, perhaps, is that Italy, England, and Spain produced other literary geniuses, approaching if not equalling the stature of these giants. Portugal, on the other hand, has only this one contribution to make to the small section of literary geniuses. Camoes was completely a national poet, and his masterpiece from beginning to end is devoted to the story of his country. It helps to explain why he continues as a living force wherever the Portuguese tongue is spoken. He sang of a Portuguese glory which had departed forever, and it was he who embodied the heroism of the Portuguese and their cause. Some would assume that he has but a minor importance to colonial policy, but to misinterpret the contribution he made to the building and the continued maintenance of the colonial mystique would be to judge prematurely. Camoes' legacy has reappeared many times in Portugal Overseas, just when it was sorely needed and when it proved to be extremely useful. The literature of a nation often contributes to the nationalistic traits inherent in its peoples, and, similarly, The Lusiads is the greatest contributor to the Portuguese myth of national superiority. But it is by no means the only instrument through which the Portuguese maintain a faith in their overseas mission.

The most ardent supporter of this colonial philosophy is, logically, the Church. Always an enthusiastic defender and advocate of overseas expansion, it continually claims that Portugal's colonial policies have been misunderstood in Europe from the inception of Portugal as an imperial power. The thought of a colonial "problem" in Portuguese territories is dismissed by the Church with the argument that only Portugal has the correct spirit of colonizing. Difficulties which beset other powers are due to the fact that they have not imitated Portugal, and are still unwilling to learn from them. Other powers, of course, did not understand the sacred mission -- Europe was responsible for civilizing backward countries; Europe's mission was to bring Christianity and morality to the heathen. But Europeans insisted on granting democracy and self-government to their colonies, thus losing them without fulfilling their civilizing mission. This idea again was derived from the peculiar insularity of the Church in Portugal, and contributed to a further misunderstanding abroad about the goals of the mission.

Church and State theoreticians use the British system as an example of what went wrong with other colonial powers. Both assert that England has sought to emancipate collectively in its colonies, but that the "Portuguese prefer to bring the indigenous peoples to adulthood individually."¹³ The claim was that the Portuguese did not seek to perfect Africanism or Asianism as such, but rather sought to educate the Africans and Asians (and even the Brazilians,

¹³Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 181.

for a time) individually for assimilation into the Portuguese character and culture. Colonial officials say that the goal is to raise the indigenous peoples gradually and en masse. John Hughes, the African correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor, was told by one such official:

We do not believe in encouraging Africans individually to reach great heights. They only become displaced persons of no use to their own people or to us. We must adapt them to civilization very slowly. Otherwise they become gorged.¹⁴

In the missionary field, this objective would seem to be at variance with the Catholic Church's policy of baptising what is best in indigenous cultures and traditions, and "accommodating" itself to native characters, needs, and aspirations. However, the Portuguese rationalization was always advanced that the case first ought to be heard and understood against the background of the multi-racial ideal and the sense of missionary purpose before casting judgment.

It was the Church which had a profound influence on early Portuguese colonialism: Church policies were instrumental in producing the Tordesillas demarcation,¹⁵ and Church-State collusion on colonial matters have always been apparent, particularly in the internal administration of the colonies. Clearly, the "Christian

¹⁴ John Hughes, The New Face of Africa South of the Sahara (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1961), p. 122.

¹⁵ In 1494, the Treaty of Tordesillas between Portugal and Castile (Spain) divided the world in half by establishing an imaginary line running approximately along longitude 46° west, 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. To the east of it, Portugal had exclusive rights of discovery and conquest, and to the west, Spain. The agreement gave Brazil, all of Africa, and India to Portugal. Earlier agree-

civilizing mission" was, and still is, a cooperative undertaking carried out jointly by various accords between Church and State. The most recent is that of 1941, embodied in a Concordat of the Portuguese Government with the Vatican. By this, the State recognizes the Catholic Church as "an instrument of civilization and national influence" and has given it a controlling position in all state schools (usually established for the indigenous population). The Church agrees to teach the African the virtues of "productive effort", and Article 68 gives it the responsibility for

moral uplift . . . it being understood that by moral uplift is meant the abandonment of indolence and the preparation of future rural and industrial workers who produce enough to meet their own necessities and fulfill their social obligations.¹⁶

The "civilizing mission" was even expanded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to include the slave trade; at times, it has been cited as justification for the present forced-labor system. The latter is conceived of as the inculcation of the Christian vir-

ments in 1493, the Inter caetera and the Dudum siquidem promulgated by Pope Alexander VI, were vetoed by Portugal on the grounds that Castile was intending to forestall Portuguese competition in both hemispheres. The Treaty of 1494 was signed only after a Portuguese war threat, and both nations agreed that neither one would try to seek release from this compact by appeals to the Pope or anyone else.

For a discussion of this agreement, consult Charles E. Nowell, "The Treaty of Tordesillas and the Diplomatic Background of American History," Greater America: Essays in Honor of H.E. Bolton (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1945), pp. 1-18.

¹⁶ Lord Hailey, African Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 231.

tue of industriousness into the indigenes , who would otherwise be guilty of the sins of idleness and sloth. The Church has thus always theorized much of Portuguese colonial policy and has bolstered the "mission" of Portugal overseas.

Added to the conviction of this righteous mission are the values of "heroism, racial tolerance, and human fortitude." Such values, the Portuguese claim, have obviously been a visible part of colonial policy from the very beginning. The heroic element is a natural derivative of the Portuguese character -- they have always been inclined to look back to their great days and idealize them. Far more than other Europeans, the Portuguese dwell upon, and even live in, the past. It was in the past that Portugal acquired its greatness, and it was the past which for centuries moulded its imperial consciousness:

In Portugal we now feel that we are so much the legitimate heirs of a great tradition that the generation of today is entitled to invoke the past, not as a remembrance of dead things, but as a source of inspiration for the future.¹⁷

Portugal's historical reverie in colonialism forgets most of the pioneers of discovery, and concentrates on the empire-builders -- Mousinho de Albuquerque, Diogo Cao, Francisco de Almeida, Dias de Novais -- who brought Portugal to the peak by the seventeenth century. It was the empire-builders who initiated the romantic myth

¹⁷Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 150. The author is quoting from a speech of the Minister of Colonies in 1930, Armindo Monteiro.

of Portugal as a "small nation in Europe, but a great nation in the world."¹⁸ It was also they who created another romantic myth -- the conception of "heroism" as a relationship similar to that a father possesses towards his children. It is the latter that has been refurbished by twentieth-century Portuguese into the image of a paternalistic administrative government similar to the relationship of the learned to the ignorant, of the "advanced" to the "primitive", of the Christian to the pagan:

The evocation of our epic as sailors and warriors, the ancestral memory of an astonishing gallery of discoverers and builders, who, moved by a sacred mission and impulse, carried to the ends of the world our ships, our dominion -- and our faith. In this heroic element is contained the most noble sentiment of our mission as a chosen people, as an evangelizing people, since our task of civilizing must have, above all else, a spiritual content.¹⁹

Contemporary apologists of the Salazar regime have resurrected this heroic mission in the colonies into "neo-imperialism" and the concept of the "Third Empire." Both new additions claim to stress the spiritual cohesion of the colonies, and both advance the vision of a Pan-Portuguese community, widely-scattered, but held together by spiritual bonds peculiar to Portuguese culture. As Dr. Salazar puts it: "By the same national criterion, without distinction of geographical situation, we administer and direct the Portuguese colonies. We are a judicial and political unity."²⁰ This sense of

¹⁸Ibid., p. 151.

¹⁹Okuma, op. cit., p. 22.

²⁰Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 152.

existing unity between colonies and the metropolis does, in fact, have genuine foundations in past colonial history. The sentimental ties with Brazil are still cited as the best example of this attachment. Of course, this aspect of the Portuguese personality has been magnified to serve several political purposes: to arouse interest at home in the overseas provinces, to assure Portuguese colons that they would remain first-class citizens in the eyes of the metropolis, to compensate for the slow material progress of the colonies, and, later, to counter the advocates of colonial autonomy. While the values inherent in neo-imperialism supposedly stress liberalism, the emphasis, in fact, is on force. It is impossible for the Portuguese to visualize empire and liberty as compatible concepts, as their past colonial history bares witness. Empire is construed as meaning authority. There can be no authority where power is divided and diluted by liberty. Since the underlying motive of Portuguese colonial policy is the establishment of the force of power, Portuguese statesmen have had to seek recourse to the power-concepts of the past and to apply them to the present. The authoritarianism of the imperial period is, however, sugar-coated. Salazar himself is convinced that "unrestricted liberties are self-destructive"²¹ when applied at home or abroad, and therefore, they are "conditioned." But, in the same breath, he excuses the administra-

²¹Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, "Realities and Trends of Portugal's Policies," International Affairs, vol 39, no. 2, (April, 1963), p. 173.

tive abuse of them by stating that

. . . such restrictions as are adopted [in the overseas provinces] do not derive from any ideological position we may wish to impose; nor indeed from any conviction we may entertain to being the upholders of unique truth. We have considered that liberties exist [only] to the extent that they constitute the current practice of life, with the result that the essential is to see that they live.²²

The establishment of this historic power-concept also combines with the objective of colonial cohesion: "One of these [past] power-concepts was the unity of territory and of the Grail, as though there were no seas or races separating the constituent elements of the national whole."²³ The concept of the "Third Empire" is another recent addition to the Portuguese mystique. Intended to dispel the idea that Angola, Mozambique, and the other overseas colonies are more than just "live exhibits in a museum of memories,"²⁴ the creation of the empire idea results in a new imperial mentality:

. . . the notion of vast territories over which our flag flies. . . . It is the knowledge that our sovereignty as a small European state spreads prodigiously over three continents and is summed up in the magnificent certainty that we are the third colonial power.²⁵

Geographically, this claim is valid. The African possessions alone comprise some 780,000 square miles, roughly equal to the area of Western Europe. Although the dreams of a Portuguese colony in

²²Ibid., p. 173.

²³Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 152.

²⁴Ibid., p. 150.

²⁵Ibid.

Africa stretching in a bold swath across the southern end of the continent from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean ("the Rose-Colored Map" scheme)²⁶ died in 1890, this particular diplomatic boast compensates for former colonial inferiorities and inflates the historic prestige characteristic of metropolitan Portuguese. It is often heard in the homeland: "Africa is for us a moral justification and a raison d'etre as a power. Without it we would be a small nation; with it we are a great country."²⁷

A further attribute of the Portuguese character embodied in colonial myth is that of racial tolerance, which, on paper, seems

²⁶Prior to the delimitation of European territorial areas in Africa, the Portuguese claimed all the lands in southern Africa which today comprise Angola, Mozambique, the Rhodesias, Nyasaland; they also reluctantly sought South-West Africa. On Portuguese maps, these areas in Africa were rose colored to signify Portuguese claims, much as English territories have always been colored pink on a map. The completion of the Cape-to-Cairo Railway by the English, and the play of European power-politics at the Berlin Conference of 1885 dashed all Portuguese plans.

Dr. David Livingstone was in part responsible for the Portuguese loss of these areas. According to Roland Oliver and F.D. Fage in their book, A Short History of Africa (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1962), he succeeded in stirring Portugal to a recognition that attitudes to Africa were changing, and that in the nineteenth century pombeiro trading was an anachronism which would not justify Portugal's traditional claim to all the lands between the Angolan and Mozambique coasts. Livingstone's transcontinental journey of 1853-6 brought him into close touch with the Portuguese; he disclosed to the outside world a chain of forts leading inland from the Angolan coast from which half-caste pombeiros ranged in search of slaves and ivory, and a disastrous slaving system that fed plantations on the lower Zambezi valley and the coastlands of Mozambique. Pombeiro activity went right across the continent.

When the British Government in the 1880's and 1890's began to move in support of their missions in Nyasaland, and began the new railway lines which were spreading from the Cape to Matabeleland, they found Portuguese explorers, soldiers, and officials hard at work across their path.

²⁷Homer A. Jack, Angola: Repression and Revolt in Portuguese Africa (New York: American Committee on Africa, 1960), p. 4.

reasonable enough when compared to the native policies of other colonial powers over the years. For centuries, this racial tolerance catered to a belief that because of the character of Portuguese individuality, no racial prejudice was conceivable overseas. One of the distinctive aspects of the colonial mission was always that of a tranquil harmony between whites and non-whites; a basic presumption existed that the ideal goal was a mixed society lacking consciousness of color in which all would be equally assimilated to a common European model. It was the Portuguese belief that they had a unique contribution to make to the building of such societies. In their eyes, this belief not only justified, but demanded, Portugal's presence overseas. The English for years despised the lack of racial friction in Portuguese colonies by accusing them of having "gone native." Livingstone was later to write of the Portuguese that they practiced a racial policy which "did credit to their hearts."²⁸

The distinctive Portuguese outlook towards race relations derives in part from the realization that the Portuguese themselves are not a pure European race, and partly from the contact of centuries with people of different races throughout the empire. There is a considerable and important body of sociological thought which maintains that Portuguese traditions are rooted in the medieval coexistence of Portuguese with Moor in the Iberian Peninsula, out

²⁸Quoted in Patrick Balfour, Lands of the Equator: An African Journey (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 79.

of which came the easy acceptance of peoples of other colors and other cultures. The Brazilian socio-historian Gilberto Freyre was one who supported the idea of the superiority of Latin [i.e. Portuguese] colonizing abilities in tropical lands over those of the Nordic races. Racial discrimination was not a Portuguese trait in his analysis, and he took his cousins to task for even thinking the contrary:

A Portugal that is pretentious and imperially European, ethnocentric, 'Aryan,' is a Portugal which has as little future in Africa as Holland has in Asia. . . . The Portugal capable of eternalizing herself in Africa is the Portugal who remembers that she is Arabic or Moorish, and not only Nordic, in her origins and in her culture, character, and actions.²⁹

His view, criticized as fallacious by some,³⁰ was that the Portuguese acclimatized themselves without difficulty to the tropics and then displayed an inclination for miscibility which enabled them to create a society in the only way in which it could then have been homogeneously created. In this society, frequent wars, strange unconquered environments, slave labor, and the intermingling of races were social solvents. They provided a bond of union

²⁹ Gilberto Freyre, Aventura e Rotina (Rio de Janeiro, 1954), p. 483.

³⁰ James Duffy of Brandeis University is the sharpest critic of Freyre. In Aventura e Rotina, Freyre used the city of Huila, Angola, to support his Latin-versus-Nordic thesis. Duffy claims that this is the scene of the only Portuguese triumph of white colonization in Africa until the twentieth century, and that Freyre ignored three centuries of previous Portuguese failures to colonize Africa. Also, Duffy counters with the fact that Huila is not a tropical area and that it has more in common with sections of South Africa, colonized in part by Nordic races.

which prevented society's different parts from lapsing into complete alienation from one another. Also, parallel to the harsh economic relationship of slavery, they established the natural sense of mutual obligation.

This philosophy of "Lusotropicalism"-- as the Portuguese prefer to call their non-racism -- was exemplified in yet another of Freyre's works.³¹ Here the thesis was that the Portuguese, in dealing with indigenous peoples, adopted social and religious European values rather than ethnical ones. Typically, on their first contact with Africa in the fifteenth century, the Portuguese ambition was

. . . to spread Christianity, not to conquer territory, and they considered as their greatest victory the conversion of the Makongo [the native ruler of what is now the district of Sao Salvador in northern Angola]. The result [was] the establishment of an African Christian kingdom, adapted to local tradition. . . .³²

In custom, language, and dress, Freyre would argue, the Portuguese were always more adaptable than other colonizers, and through miscegenation there was complete racial and cultural fusion.

In this instance, the Portuguese again point with pride to Brazil. This South American nation apparently witnessed the accomplishment of the mission of racial- and cultural-blending. It was the fruition of a policy which the Portuguese claim to practice with a similar success in Africa. In Brazil, a superior civiliza-

³¹Gilberto Freyre, Portuguese Integration In the Tropics (Lisbon: SNI Books, 1961).

³²George Martelli, The Future in Angola (London: Central Press, 1962), p. 10.

tion was not imposed by extermination of the aborigines, but introduced by a method of assimilation. In other words, Portugal took something from what it found and gave what it brought. Thus, a nation and a culture were evolved with inseparable indigenous and extraneous elements -- both native and European gradually shed their original identity and adopted a new one which had in it something of both. Even when Brazil was lost to the empire in 1822,³³ all traditional ties with the motherland were preserved.

This sentiment of tolerance was also allegedly reinforced by Christian doctrines of brotherhood which made the Portuguese settler and explorer, as well as the priest, a missionary for the cause of racial tolerance and, perhaps, understanding. This is apparently what the Portuguese still have in mind when they say that only they understand the African, and that this is why they have survived in Africa for so long. Furthermore, religion enters in when it is recalled that the overwhelming majority -- ninety-five per cent -- of the Portuguese are at least nominally Roman Catholic ("profoundly Catholic when he is religious, the Portuguese is at the same time anti-clerical," claims Salazar),³⁴ and the universalist concepts of the Catholic Church, with its policy of expansion, do not in principle admit of racial discrimination.

Racial prejudice is also essentially an extension of social

³³The best histories on the colonial development of Brazil are probably: Robert Southey, History of Brazil, 3 vols. (London: 1817-22), and B.W. Diffie, Latin American Civilization: Colonial Period (Harrisburg, Pa.: 1945).

³⁴Salazar, op. cit., p. 173.

and economic prejudice. Duffy³⁵ maintains the idea that since the standards of living and education of the Portuguese lower classes are not much above those of urbanized Africans, the majority of Portuguese are exempt from prejudice. It was once the rule, he suggests, that

Portugal at its lowest standard of living is not far removed from Africa. The Portuguese peasant does not live so differently from the African peasant. The African makes an implicit caste distinction between the big white and the small white; he refers to the Portuguese as the black man of Europe and reacts to him as an equal.³⁶

In practice, however, race relations in the Portuguese African colonies are logically influenced by a number of local factors, such as climate, geography, land, and productivity. They can be said to have followed roughly the same pattern of empiricism as the former British or French territories with a similar geographical situation. Race relations in Angola, for example, have always differed from those of Mozambique as race relations in Kenya differed from those in Ghana. Until the 1890's the frontier between black and white was never sharply drawn in the Portuguese overseas colonies. Portuguese policy was generally one of acceptance, if not respect, of the African's autonomy. Out of a limited intercourse between indigenous population and the Portuguese, there emerged a sometimes

³⁵James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 373.

³⁶Ibid., p. 373. This opinion is likewise held by Balfour in Lands of the Equator.

tolerant racial situation which produced the accidental assimilation of a small indigenous number into the Portuguese world. They became priests, lesser administrative functionaries, and soldiers. Their numbers were never large, and in retrospect, Portuguese colonial statesmen have exaggerated this casual assimilation out of all proportion to its importance. In the last years of the nineteenth century, partly under the impact of example from the English and the Afrikaner, and partly out of an apparent necessity for Portugal to give the appearance of running the colonies along efficient European lines, strong elements of white racism began to influence Portuguese conduct. Even so, the expression of local influences in Portuguese Africa was, until recently, nowhere so intense as to invalidate the marked contrast between race relations in Portuguese colonies and those of neighboring British territories and South Africa.³⁷ Recent developments will, of course, be examined in turn.

The remaining doctrine of colonial philosophy which must be mentioned is that of "identity." This is the idea that the Portuguese colonies are merely overseas extensions of the motherland. "Identity" is largely a creation of New State dogma on colonialism, but it is perhaps the nearest approximation to any form of colonial policy which the Portuguese have as yet professed. In modern terms, the idea has been advanced as the one consistent historical objective of Portugal overseas, when in actuality it was born in the 1930's and modified to meet all contingencies. Theoretically, the idea

³⁷See either of Duffy's works, Portugal In Africa or Portuguese Africa for a detailed explanation of this process.

refers to people and to territory. When used in reference to the former, identity magnifies the equality of all men, and thus it is coaxial with theories of racial tolerance and Christian brotherhood advocated by the Portuguese. When applied territorially, identity is analagous to recent French attitudes on Algeria: that is, all provinces are an integral part of the motherland. Basically, the idea is compatible with a concept of the "whole" or, as the Portuguese refer to it, the "universalist kind of State."³⁸ There is, and can only be, a single status, under law, for all citizens, both in Portugal and overseas, and a single political unity for all areas under the Portuguese flag.

In its personal meanings, the idea of identity clarifies the superficial adherence to racial tolerance and purports to relegate the indigenous to a sanctified position within the national whole. It involves the process of assimilation, of the unity of race and culture, into a Greater Portugal. On paper, the idea contains probably the highest colonial ideal:

. . .we have always worked for and defended the development and consolidation of a multi-racial society, governed by law, with equal justice for all without distinction of race or creed, and equal opportunities for all according to their merits and qualifications.³⁹

Territorially, identity assumes the inclusion of all overseas areas

³⁸An attempted definition of this concept is contained in an article by Adriano Moreira, "Political Unity and the Status of Peoples," African Affairs, vol. 61, no. 245 (October, 1962), pp. 249-259.

³⁹Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese Problems in Africa (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional Da Informacao, 1962), p. 11.

into the metropolis. Such a political unity would mean equal rights for all the provinces, without priorities for metropolitan interests. To a Portuguese, Angola, or Mozambique, or Cape Verde, are as much a part of Iberian Portugal as are Algarve or Alentejo. It is inconceivable that any other relationship could exist. Critics claim that colonies, by whatever theoretical or administrative justification, are simply that -- colonies -- and that Portuguese beliefs and attitudes are merely a sham. Portugal insists that all overseas areas are provinces, not colonies. But when Portugal was a kingdom, the overseas areas were designated as "colonies"; when Portugal became a Republic, the overseas areas were "colonies"; when Portugal became a dictatorship, the overseas areas became "provinces." There has been a continual shift in the status of the overseas areas from colony to province to colony to province. This change and counter-change is indeed one of the vexing aspects of colonial history, for the transitions have implied little more than a change in terminology:

Before the nineteenth century one does not find the official designation 'provinces' used in referring to the territories we today call 'colonies.' Against the term 'colony' there exists an unjust prejudice, created especially after the advent of the republican regime by the political sectarianism of the enemies of the new government.

Looking through the documents of the period prior to the nineteenth century, we see that. . . territories were generally called 'overseas dominions' and at times 'conquistas.' The designation 'colony' is found in the seventeenth century and becomes current in the eighteenth. 'Overseas provinces' are only introduced into official language in the nineteenth century under the influence of ideas of political and administrative assimilation which denied to the colonial territories the need for a juridical administration different from that of Portugal -- which was patently absurd.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Marcelo Caetano, Do Conselho Ultramarino ao Conselho do Imperio (Lisbon: 1943), pp. 29-30.

To use some examples of this aspect of colonial terminology, in the 1930's, Salazar reverted to the use of the term "colonies" as a designation for the overseas areas in preference to the term "provinces." The term "provinces" was a manifestation of the second Liberal Government of the 1830's; Salazar claimed that the term had no practical significance and was nothing more than an ideological chimera. However, this reasoning was abandoned during the 1950's to anticipate a political expedient -- Portuguese membership in the United Nations. In keeping with contemporary ideology, the shift back to the use of "provinces" was historically necessary; the term was considered:

. . .to conform more with the centuries-old principle of unity and with the closer cooperation existent among all the peoples who constitute the Nation and the various parcels of the Portuguese territory.⁴¹

The dispute over the use of the terms "colonies" and "provinces" is yet another example of how Portuguese colonial policy is legislated as a short-run, not long-run, undertaking. Policy must always take account of political maneuvering. When Portugal entered the United Nations, the attempt was made to play down the idea of Portugal as a colonial power. Angola, Mozambique, Goa, Macao, and Timor were therefore labelled as "overseas provinces."

The identity idea is difficult to decipher in the Portuguese colonial mystique. The understanding on the Portuguese nation brings to mind a vision of the human body with Lisbon as the head,

⁴¹Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 200.

and the various Portuguese areas as component parts -- the arms, legs, etc. Even in these simplest terms the idea is ridiculous. But there is evidence which verifies such a conception. All due credit must be advanced to Portuguese propagandists who have convinced their nationals that every area under the red banner of Portugal is a living organism of the national body. Mere prestige in controlling so vast a colonial empire has been replaced with an unfathomable physical phenomenon in the hearts and minds of the Portuguese individual. This mass psychosis was exemplified when Goa fell. The event was geared to a display of emotionalism rarely witnessed in the modern nation state. The individual Portuguese was made to feel that he had surrendered a part of himself, as Masses were held (in one case, before the same portable altar that da Gama had carried to India), solemn music was broadcast throughout the empire, and the visions of the past were rehabilitated. In a true sense, "it sounded like, and it was, the funeral of an empire."⁴² The Portuguese were not only burying their glory, but also a part of themselves:

What the State of India [Goa] represented and still represents for the Portuguese Nation cannot be measured by the smallness of its territory but by the greatness of the history of which it forms part, and the nobility of the mission which took the Portuguese there in the first place.⁴³

⁴²The London Daily-Telegraph, December 20, 1961. The comment is quoted in Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 9, in the introduction by Ronald Segal.

⁴³Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, The Invasion and Occupation of Goa by the Indian Union (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional Da Informacao, 1962), p. 11.

"Identity," probably more than any of the other elements composing the Portuguese colonial myth, has been delineated on an all-encompassing base: it includes racial tolerance, heroism, neo-imperialism, and the various other aspects of colonial dogma. Identity is not one specific goal, but rather an objective resulting from the combination, overlapping, and summation of the other colonial tenets. Supposedly it is the successful secret of Brazil, and supposedly it is what the Portuguese are aiming at in Africa. Granted, it is an intangible; but so is most of Portugal's colonial ideology. Ideally, it envisions the highest and finest good latent in man; realistically, it provides a cover for rational political and economic motivations. It is the latter which is important in this study.

Part II: The Imperial Mission in Angola

The Portuguese speak of their historic presence in Angola as "continuity." Portuguese critics speak of the same presence as "atrophy." Each statement must be dealt with in turn, as both are valid.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to come in contact with what is now their West African province. In 1483, Diogo Cao sailed up the Congo River and sent ambassadors to the king of Congo in the name of John II of Portugal. The inscribed padrao planted in that year cites the evidence:

Year of the creation of the world six thousand 681, year of the birth of Our Lord Jesus Christ one thousand four hundred 83, the very high, very excellent, and powerful prince King

Joao second of Portugal sent to have this land discovered and this padrao placed by Diogo Cao, squire of his household.⁴⁴

Cao was to return in 1484 and 1485. From this record, the Portuguese give the impression that their settlers were living in Angola as early as 1483, and that they had arrived even before the Bantus had swept out of central Africa and driven the original Hottentot and Bushman inhabitants out. This continuity of almost five centuries also bolsters the Portuguese claims to the perpetuity of their dominion. But the claim is an over-simplification: in Angola, penetration and effective occupation of the entire territory are considerably less than a century old, and resistance to Portuguese occupation has never been thoroughly subdued. Even if Portugal's assertion of having had an attachment to Angola for nearly five hundred years was true, Portugal's constant reference to historic rights has, in fact, done it a disservice. The world judges the Portuguese in Africa not by any realities of their endeavor, but by their own insubstantial, but constantly reiterated claim, to have had 500 years of effective occupation.

Continuity fails to take cognizance of several factors. First, the early explorations in Angola were never more than a series of coastal repair depots for the imperial fleet; until the founding of Luanda in 1576, it held interest only in terms of coastal exploration and the projection of the Congo slave trade. It was only after the

⁴⁴Luciano Cordeiro, "Diogo Cao," Bulletin of the Geographic Society of Lisbon, vol. 11 (1892), p. 103.

appearance of Paulo Dias de Novais, the Portuguese African campaigner of the sixteenth century, that the lands to the south of the Congo River became a primary concern of the Lisbon Government. This concern also coincided with other geographical, religious, and economic motives.

Portugal had always been virtually impelled to the sea. The country is a narrow coastal strip lacking any substantial hinterland; its national boundaries had long since been rounded out, and powerful Castile to the east blocked any expansion by land. The small population had abundant energy to spare, and the most pressing home questions of national organization and security had been at least temporarily solved. All the larger European states had grave internal problems to fight through in the fifteenth century and Portugal alone was ready for the next step -- discovery and empire. The early explorations were also a part of a continued national momentum which began when the Portuguese had driven their Moorish conquerors from the peninsula. The Portuguese kept advancing and Africa lay in their path.

Prince Henry the Navigator had partially contributed to the religious motive,⁴⁵ but closely allied with his efforts was the Portuguese quest for Prester John. This mysterious eastern prince of Christian faith had been sought by Europeans for over two centuries as an ally against the Moslems.⁴⁶ The Prester was fairly well iden-

⁴⁵See Part I, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁶This belief is expressed by L. Denison Ross, "Prester John and the Empire of Ethiopia," Travel and Travellers of the Middle Ages, A.P. Newton (ed.) (London: 1930), pp. 174-194.

tified with Ethiopia, but the Portuguese, on hearing reports of the Meli Empire in the western Sahara, confused it with Prester John's kingdom. They therefore believed they could find him not far from the west coast of Africa.

On the economic side, there was every reason for action southward in Africa. Europe in general and Portugal in particular then suffered from a gold shortage that threatened to become a famine.⁴⁷ The shortage in Portugal, combined with a past government policy of debasing the coinage, had caused both a scarcity of good coins and a lack of confidence in the bad ones. Prices rose, and no law the government passed would keep them down to any arbitrary level. The Portuguese did not know the exact location of the African gold source, but they knew the general direction. A few maps showed a river based on vague reports of the Senegal in West Africa.⁴⁸

Secondly, Portugal in Angola was disposed from an early date to implant its authority over the Africans by force and to govern directly. Seldom did the indigenous peoples acquiesce in Portuguese culture. One Portuguese supporter has said:

⁴⁷The principal cause seemed to be a steady drain via the Isthmus of Suez eastward to India and beyond, where Europe paid heavily for the spices and luxuries it had imported from the Orient since the Crusades. Venice, allied with the Sultan of Egypt, had almost a monopoly of this trade and profiteered, although most of the gold found its way further east.

This is mentioned in Beazley, "Prince Henry of Portugal and the African Crusade of the Fifteenth Century," p. 19.

⁴⁸Some would claim that the history of Angola may be considered an extension of Portuguese activity in the Congo kingdom. The author feels that such an association was only marginal. The pursuance of a policy in Angola similar to that used in the Congo was abandoned as early as 1565.

The Portuguese [in Angola] were always outnumbered by the Africans in the ratio of thousands to one; frequently they had virtually no soldiers, and at any one time in the past they could have been annihilated by the Africans or driven into the sea. The fact that they were not, in the whole of that long history, is proof enough that their presence in Angola was welcomed by the majority of the Africans who appreciated the benefits to themselves of Portuguese settlement.⁴⁹

But the truth is that when the Portuguese did attempt to occupy the interior and spread these "benefits," their greatest obstacle was African tribal resistance. The entire territory was not fully occupied until 1912, following extensive military campaigns similar to the Bailundu campaign of 1902, the Cuanhama massacre, and the Dembos occupation of 1907.⁵⁰ By 1919, therefore, official historians declare, Portuguese domination of Angola was "completely secured and the whole province was pacified."⁵¹ Three years later, effective administrative occupation started. In other words, Portuguese control

⁴⁹Ronald Waring, "The Case For Portugal," Angola: A Symposium-- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 30-46.

⁵⁰In his book, Angola In Ferment, Thomas Okuma deals at some length with the military phase of Portuguese occupation. Briefly, in the case of the 1902 campaign, Portuguese force was used against the thirteen independent Ovimbundu kingdoms of the Umbundu-speaking groups in the Benguela highlands. These kingdoms had resisted Lisbon from 1773 on, and only in 1904 were they completely conquered. The 1904 massacre involved virtual genocide in southern Angola, resulting in the loss of nearly 20,000 lives. The Dembos people, described by the Portuguese as "naturally rebellious and of untamed disposition," resisted for three years. After initial defeats in 1907 and 1908, they waged a guerrilla war against Lisbon and Luanda; the region was only open for colonization after years of constant vigilance and policing.

⁵¹Antonio G. Matoso, A Compendium of the History of Portugal (Lisbon: 1944), p. 416.

over Angolan territory is only ten years older than the present Salazar Government.

The Portuguese conquered Angola by gun and sword in the characteristic manner of colonial imperialism. The African "acceptance" of their Iberian masters was only at gunpoint. But the military conquest adds a further glorious chapter to the greatness of the Portuguese nation:

A roll call of the dead was made, one by one. As each name was called, a marine guard answered 'Presente.' When the last name was read, the company presented arms and sounded clarions. No one talked. Soon after, among the great mass of Africans present, four elderly men advanced. They had taken part in the massacre of 1904. At the monument, they kneeled as a sign of respect and submission. No one had provoked them. This was the best way to erase the sad memory of those who had heroically died for the glory and splendor of Portugal.⁵²

This commentary on a 1932 commemorative service at the site of the Cuanhama massacre evokes conflicting sentiments. The Portuguese consider the heroic battles fought for the mother country, and the Africans remember their resistance against superior force.⁵³ The military and political value of the campaigns in Angola was

⁵²Ralph Delgado, To the South of Cuanza, vol. 1 (Lisbon: 1944), pp. 270-271.

⁵³Okuma has said:

"Conquest was not due to the superiority of the Portuguese, but to the deciding factor of modern arms. The memory of the 'fallen warriors' remains alive among the African peoples.

"They recalled the resistance of the Bimbe soldiers in the Bailundu campaign of 1902, when, in 1957, a rumor spread through Bailundu area that guns were found by the police in one of the Bimbe villages. Africans whispered to one another, 'The Bimbe people will rise again. They were the first ones to capitulate.'"

Okuma, op. cit., p. 18.

thoroughly exaggerated by popular sentiment of the day, which desperately needed a show of nationalistic heroics. But the psychological importance of Portuguese armed triumph over African forces cannot be minimized. At home and in Africa these victories stood for progress and positive policies; they meant that Portugal could now hold its head high with the other great colonial powers who were busily implanting civilization in the hinterland at the end of a rifle.

A third factor to bare in mind is the awkward inconsistency apparent in the administration of the colony. Granted that the Portuguese colonies in general were governed according to the flow and counterflow of Portuguese domestic politics; but Angola appears to have floundered in indecision. It would seem that perhaps the metropolis was never quite certain what to do with the area, or perhaps "never really believed that Angola could be kept indefinitely under Lisbon rule."⁵⁴ The colony became a proving ground for administrative experimentation.⁵⁵

Why did Portugal colonize and occupy Angola? The emphasis can not be placed on only an economic or a religious motivation. It is true that "the crusading zeal was never absent from Portuguese expansion,"⁵⁶ but scientific, religious, diplomatic, and commercial

⁵⁴Antonio de Figueriedo, Portugal and Its Empire: The Truth (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1961), p. 122.

⁵⁵It is apparent, as will be pointed out in Chapter II, that such indecision was responsible for many of the reform movements which were later to arise in Angola.

⁵⁶William C. Atkinson, Camoens, The Lusiads (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1952), p. 9. This statement appears in the introduction of the author's translation.

inducements all formed a part of the colonization of West Africa. The Portuguese sought communication, and, if possible, an alliance with Christian Ethiopia; they sought new channels of trade; they sought to discover, perhaps to annex and colonize, new lands; they sought to extend the Christian faith at the expense of Mohammedanism; and, ultimate objective of all, they sought a sea route to India and the East.

With the appearance of the Society of Jesus on the heels of the Portuguese conquistadores, however, the "civilizing mission" was advanced to the fore as the Portuguese reason for colonizing Angola:

What is pertinent is that, from the beginning, we took Christianity -- the main characteristic of Western civilization -- to the Africa that lay beyond Cape Bajador. The association of Christendom with the discovery permeated national life. Christian civilization is clearly identified with the Western civilization which we took to Africa. We went to preach the Gospel.⁵⁷

If there was an original colonial motivation in Angola, it was soon replaced by the desires and the determination of the Church. "Conversion" became a colonial goal.

It was in the union of the missionary cause with the political and military force of conquest which contributes to the second charge advanced against the Portuguese in Angola -- "atrophy." The Church became responsible not only for the spiritual welfare of the African, but also for his educational and physical welfare.

⁵⁷ Armando Cortesao, African Realities and Delusions (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1962), pp. 8-9.

It is a question of degree as to what extent it contributed to either. It is true that such orders as the Jesuits and the Dominicans maintained schools and hospitals and probably advanced to the African whatever cultural advantages he was to gain in the years between 1500 and 1900. But the social conscience of the Church generally reflected that of its age, and it often showed less concern for the material welfare of the African than perhaps should have been expected. The African clergy, too, was in part responsible for this. Educated in the colleges of Portugal and Africa, they were created in the image of the European priest -- their concern for African welfare was negligible. The Church also gained little profit in Angola in terms of lasting Christian influence. There were two reasons for this: the African's acceptance of Christianity was seldom rooted in sincere conviction, and, the example of white Christians manipulating their black brothers, often turning them against his own people, was not lost on the African.

Rather than contributing to a fulfillment or a development of a colonial program, the Church had nurtured a disharmony that hindered even the best efforts of the missionaries or the State administrators. This was particularly true during the liberal interludes of government in the homeland, when anticolonials or anticlericals seized power. Rarely was it denied that the Church had a fundamental mission to complete -- "the task of civilizing Angola"⁵⁸ -- but it insisted instead on criticism, on embroiling

⁵⁸Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 105.

itself in battles of words, which diverted it from a task which, had it been practiced in good faith and devotion, might have accomplished much. But the period from 1500 to 1900 was more a witness to charge and countercharge hurled between Lisbon and Luanda than to constructive accomplishment: the Church denounced colonial officials for corruption and brutality, and the State answered in kind with accusations of greed and mundaneness.

The Jesuits, in particular, undermined the objectives of the Church in Angola. They contributed to the annoyance of the white residents, who held them responsible for most of the colony's problems in the first place, by training both an African clergy and a half-caste administrative class which formed most of Luanda's lesser bureaucracy in the years prior to Salazar. The Jesuits fully participated in the slave trade; most of the order subscribed to the belief that the best way to convert the African was to sell him, so that he might be introduced to Christianity through the dignity of labor on American plantations. Ships belonging to the Society were engaged in the Anglo-Brazil trade. It appears that the Society was more interested in commerce than in catechizing Africans. Although they received a substantial royal subsidy, they were getting rich from real-estate transactions, from the lands under their protection, and from the slave trade. Both governors and local residents eventually were to consider the Jesuits as meddlers and hypocritical trouble-makers.

The Church seemed to continually decline following its initial zeal, partly because of climate and partly because it failed to sink

permanent roots in Angola (an outgrowth of slaving, failure at educating African women, and chronic lack of clergy). The record is spotty, as is supported by Church protagonists. Oliveira Martins was to say of evangelization: "The idea of introducing Negroes to civilization by means of Catholic metaphysics is an illusion."⁵⁹ The Bishop of Angola in 1773 was to complain of the missionary effort:

Some priests and missionaries come to seek their fortunes and pursue their own interests. . . others satisfy their passions. . . others flee from the discipline of their prelates. And from these greedy, lustful, expatriate, rebellious, and libertine men what else can be expected than the spread of vice and scandal in which this land [Angola] is already buried.⁶⁰

The work of the Church and of the State was at least in harmony on the following: "Years of inertia and expediency could not be called a colonial program."⁶¹ The comment applies equally well to both institutions. Contrary to the many pronouncements of both on the subject, the Portuguese Church and State never accomplished much in Angola because they never made any great efforts to understand the African or his cultures. What a Portuguese professed to understand was only his own image of the African and his culture, an image which summed up the African in paternalistic platitudes

⁵⁹J.P. Oliveira Martins, Portugal In Africa (Lisbon: 1953), p. xxiv.

⁶⁰Quoted in J. Alves Correia, Expansion of the Faith in the Portuguese Empire, vol. 2 (Lisbon: 1936), pp. 40-41.

⁶¹Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 63.

and made African problems less complex and burdensome. His culture was relegated to the limbo of curiosa and folklore. On the other hand, however, it was the preordained duty of the African to understand Portuguese culture and, in fact, to do more than understand it -- to adopt it.

The Portuguese found it simpler to accept the African than to understand him. The result was an obvious inaction, which reflected itself in the broad field of colonial policy. For example, the State responsibility for the almost three centuries of apathy in Angola can be adequately demonstrated in one instance. A report was submitted to Lisbon in 1590 by Domingos de Abreu e Brito outlining a proposal for the creation of a colonial government for the colony. The report was adopted and instituted. For the next 300 years, the creation was not modified in even a single detail! Despite changing circumstances -- the growth of the colony, the collapse of political and economic institutions, the sporadic appearance of revolt and aggression, the obvious need for change -- the document of 1590 stood. This might illustrate the Portuguese resolve to consider a situation as firmly and finally solved once it is law, but it also reiterates the Portuguese short-sightedness in colonial administration and hardly speaks well for their consideration of long-term goals.

Possibly it is a mistake to assume that Portugal's occupation of West Africa in the early years achieved nothing. Portugal's role as a colonizing and a civilizing force was scarcely visible in many parts of the colony, but it did render valuable service to

the African people it found there. But that service was rendered in a different way than the Portuguese expected:

In three centuries Portuguese administration had apparently done little to justify any rights based on effective occupation, and it has been usual to dismiss the Portuguese with contempt. But between them, the Arabs and the Portuguese introduced most of what are now the staple African crops -- maize, yams, manioc, sweet potatoes, sugar-cane, pepper, ginger, citrus, tomatoes, pineapples, and tobacco. Africa as the Portuguese found it was useless even as a port of call to supply the East Indian ships with fresh supplies in their long voyage to the more important East. There is much to be said, therefore, for the Portuguese who made this momentous contribution. . . .⁶²

This accomplishment can be added to the credit side of the ledger. But this small success is minute when compared with an obvious failure: the Portuguese who went to Africa to "save souls," to "civilize," to build a "multi-national state," to "educate and assimilate," went instead for trade or gold or administration. Those who stayed did so as masters of the land or of the African. The land they seldom worked, and the African they often sold. It is a curious commentary on the divergent patterns of Portuguese expansion that for a Brazil or an India with their agricultural and commercial development, there should have been an Angola, productive only in terms of human beings. To this reality it is hard to adjust the image of Portugal as a nation of colonizers.

⁶²William M. Macmillan, Africa Emergent (London: 1949), p. 94.

CHAPTER II

THE NEW STATE: BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT

Nobody would claim, of course, that the Portuguese have always lived up to their own ideal. Very few people, and fewer nations, do so. In the history of Portugal overseas there are chapters as black as any. At times, as at the height of the slave trade, it might have seemed that she had lost sight of her mission completely. Viewed over the centuries, however, these lapses are less important than that somewhere in the soul of her people there has been preserved intact the vision of her first missionaries: the vision of Christian civilization going forth, not to conquer but to rescue the heathen, and of being subtly changed itself in the process.¹

Part I: The New State In Angola

The Estado Novo of Antonio Salazar assumed the responsibility of colonial administration in 1932. It also assumed the duty of dispelling a major misconception about previous Portuguese efforts in Angola, and of creating a colonial mystique from the misshapen values of the past. Viewed simply as an exercise in European colonialism, the Portuguese achievement in West Africa from the end of the fifteenth century until the end of the nineteenth was not great or constructive. Some of their missionary work was heroic; but much more of it was mere time-serving by clergy unwanted at home. Some of its individual fruits were impressive, but nowhere were

¹George Martelli, The Future In Angola (London: Central Press, 1962), pp. 10-11.

adequate foundations laid to ensure the transmission of a faith very alien to earlier African beliefs and customs. Past Portuguese colonization was hardly more successful on the material plane; Angola was a shambles, in which the native peoples were employed by the Portuguese higher classes to make war on each other in the interests of slave labor for Brazil. The effect of penetration into Angola was almost wholly injurious to the African societies with which the Portuguese came into direct contact. One must view the Portuguese comment that the three centuries in which they were the dominant external influence in West Africa as being "significant in history" with some reluctance. An attempt was made in Chapter I to underline the Portuguese failure in Angola between 1500 and 1900; an attempt will be made here to show that not only did the New State fail to correct the mistakes of the past, but contributed to the growth of others. Dr. Salazar was to eventually become expert in building a colonial nationalism simply by his actions and his words. But these actions and these words were only another attempt to narrow the traditional gap between Portuguese colonial theory and Portuguese colonial practice.

The New State has worked diligently to plan and to explain Portugal's overseas conduct, much more so than any other government in the history of the empire. It is nevertheless true that Salazar has not changed or created a new Portuguese colonial policy; he has merely carefully refined the mystique of centuries-old Portuguese attitudes and distributed them more effectively and authoritatively. The various laws and programs devised in an earlier period still re-

main as an indispensable and integral part of Portuguese decisions. A strong continuity still underlies colonial policies. The only difference is, and it is uniquely contemporary, that the twentieth-century Portuguese oligarchy, organized into and behind the New State, has tried to revive the doctrines of Portuguese imperial literature, while ignoring the fact that present conditions and pace of life have outdated the doctrines of medieval imperialism.

The New State appeared in Angola at the crest of a reform wave which had been flooding the colony and the homeland since the early 17th century. Critics are all too familiar with the Salazar regime in today's Africa, but they fail to recognize that the rise of Salazar should have logically and chronologically initiated a change in fundamental colonial policy. For in some respects, there had been the beginnings of a new colonial outlook. Salazar was to block this trend, rather than continue it. During the long interval between discovery in the fifteenth century and "neo-imperialism" in the 20th, Angola was virtually forgotten by the homeland: there was an indecision and a confusion of objectives in the colony. It was in these 400 years that policy could have evolved differently. Of course, speculation about how present colonial policy might have changed if it had assumed the legacy of past liberal and reform movements appears to be irrelevant. But it is an obvious fact that the New State inherited the grievances of the past, and also inherited the solutions to these grievances, and ignored both.

The reform periods in Angola cannot be cast aside too easily. To a contemporary Portuguese, all the past efforts at change failed.

This should be sufficient to dismiss them as unimportant. The previous 400 years of "colonial experimentation" in Angola are considered by the critics of the 1960's to have directly created or fostered the evils, the neglects and frustrations, passed down to Salazar in the 20th century. Also, much of the legislation and formalization of policy under liberal governments and individuals does bare a striking resemblance to contemporary policy. There does not appear to be a history of change. But in several instances, the colony could have progressed along different lines.

Individual "reformers" such as Joao Correia de Sousa, Salvador Correia de Sa e Benavides, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, Barao de Mocamedes, the Marquis de Sa da Bandeira -- exceptional governors of the past -- were men removed from their centuries who nurtured the beginnings of a colonial orientation in Angola which at least must be given an equal consideration with the dismal realities which they meant to replace. In Portuguese history, reform waves had always tended to be led by personalities, all of whom continued to leave a mark down to the present century. Men and ideas created reforms which had validity well into the 1930's. "A systematic occupation of the country, the settling of colonists in the healthful plateau regions, a curb on the vast number of Africans exported annually, and a self-sufficiency of Angolan agriculture"² were prescribed for Angola in the 18th and 19th centuries, and were only being carried out by the 1920's.

²James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 72.

Critics such as these governors, all argued against the curious timelessness which seemed to envelop men and events in Portuguese Africa. They preached change. It was said of the past, and is just as relevant to the present, that the Portuguese "seem to have an almost mystical faith in the solution of problems by reports and complicated legislation."³ Critics placed their emphasis on a matter-of-fact reconciliation that Angola was a liability more often than not, but that with competent administrators, rather than legislation, perhaps there was a chance of working a miracle overseas:

What I am saying is that only with men, without one new law or the changing of a single existing law, will the province of Angola be regenerated, but there must be men to start and assist this regeneration.⁴

Later revolutionary movements in the 1950's and the 1960's would not be the first to oppose Portuguese policies in Angola. The temper for change, for a reorientation, of colonial policy existed from as early as 1616, when it was maintained that the colony would "never be inherently prosperous as long as the so-called campaign of conquest and pseudo-conversion of the indigenous peoples was pursued."⁵ Under Brazilian tutelage in the 1640's, Angola attempted the imitation of the plantation-economy system used successfully in that nation; it was over the objections of Lisbon which remained "unconvinced that southern Africa offered the same opportunities for success; [Lisbon]

³Ibid., p. 130.

⁴Eduardo d'Almeida Saldanha, Colonies, Missions, and the Colonial Act (Lisbon: Vila Nova de Familacao, 1930), p. 27.

⁵Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 63.

clung doggedly to its hopes of uncovering a hidden wealth of precious ore."⁶

Reform movements reappeared in the 1760's, when a colonial program stressing nothing but "one hundred years of expediency" was attacked by the same people in Portugal and abroad who criticized the slaving practices of the pombeiro traders. The nebulous native policy was labelled "abusive exploitation"; proposals were submitted for the regeneration of the colony: the need to strengthen the economy and give direction to administration. In the 1830's reform elements succeeded in promulgating the abolition of slavery. While the move was designed to sever the major link with a discredited colonial past, it was also the case that slavery had run its course: its final suppression was a recognition of its failure to do more than enrich a privileged class and keep the colony in a state of chronic backwardness.

The Liberal and Septembrist⁷ governments of the 19th century, the regal period (1885-1910) and the Republican period (1910-26) symbolized the effort at colonial reform. They all tried to give colonial policy a new liberal orientation. Efforts in these three periods were directed at the formalization of the three compelling necessities so evident in Angola: occupation of the interior, a re-

⁶Ibid., p. 57.

⁷In September, 1836, Sa de Bandeira, former governor of Angola, led an uprising in support of the 1822 Constitution against the Chartists, a group favoring the 1812 Constitution and led by Pedro, former emperor of Brazil. The event is only important in this study because it continued the resurgent reform movements in the colonial empire. The government fell in 1842.

organization of the provincial administration, and a colonial policy consistent with realities. A new colonial policy finally became a necessity. This was the time of the great transition period which was to last until 1926 -- a change from a traditional to a modern colonial age, from the romantic to the practical:

The outspoken policies [at this time], which sometimes do not seem to be Portuguese because of their very bluntness, were unquestionably influenced by the apparent vigorous success of Anglo-Saxon tactics. . . . This generation realized that the problems were not brought on by the events of any previous decade. They were also aware that the habits of neglect and inertia . . . could, if not corrected, lead to losses of prestige and territory.⁸

This modern colonial mentality pushed the metropolis to a realization that the African provinces "were no longer untidy step-children who could be forgotten until they attracted the neighbors' attention."⁹ The colonial criticisms again found spokesmen in two governors: de Moura and de Albuquerque. These theoreticians emphasized the thinking of many Portuguese prior to the advent of Salazar:

Portuguese colonial administration has been erratic and empirical. Governors follow a pattern of colonial occupation characterized by violence, heroics, and great expense. Modern colonial powers try to develop their territories for the benefit of Africans and white colonists, while we Portuguese draw up laws and regulations.¹⁰

⁸Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 225-226.

⁹Ibid., p. 246.

¹⁰Joao Lopes Carneiro de Moura, A Administracao Colonial Portuguesa (Lisbon: 1910), pp. 259-260.

Mousinho de Albuquerque laments:

The administrative processes by which our colonies have been governed, or rather, disgraced, may be summed up as conventions and fictions. Vast territories conventionally ours where we exerted absolutely no influence; powerful chiefs tied to the crown by fictitious vassalage; a system of government conventionally liberal in which improvised citizens elected in sham voting a fictitious deputy already designated by the minister, as unknown as he was uninstructed in the country he represented; conventional municipalities where there were no decently eligible town councilors. . . . And on top of all this, majors, and colonels, and commanders, endless officers, bulky reports, countless laws, many decrees, a hundred unworkable regulations. Words, words, words.¹¹

This indictment was directed at what was, and still is, the major fault of the Portuguese administration in the colony. Instead of initiating and supporting direct forceful action and a colonial policy designed specifically for Angola, the Portuguese bound the colony to an extension of the past -- a bastardization of a metropolitan administrative system. Such criticisms were passed on to Salazar. Unfortunately, he refused to heed his critics. The prophets of the "Third Empire" sought their own answers.

An aspect of the Angolan mentality which the New State failed to recognize when it assumed power was a growing desire for colonial independence. A thought that perhaps autonomy or independence might be for the best in the colony coincided with the movements for a change in colonial policy; it also coincided with the periods

¹¹Mousinho de Albuquerque, Mozambique, II (2 vols.) (Lisbon: 1934), pp. 17-18. Although the first volume of this edition is entitled Livio das Campanhas, both volumes are usually referred to by the title Mozambique.

of administrative indecision overseas.

The Brazilian overlordship was one such interim. Although the South American nation attempted to strengthen its hold on its major economic partner, and programmed a vision of Angola as an appendage of its own dominion,¹² Brazil initiated a vague conception of a colonial philosophy that called for an autonomous federation of Angola and Mozambique within the empire. The same idea was proposed a second time during the Napoleonic invasion of the homeland in 1807, when the royal court governed from Rio de Janeiro. As far as the Portuguese in Angola were concerned, the court in Rio was as far from Angola as it was in Lisbon. The movement for separation became widespread; provisional juntas emerged in the colony as autonomous governing units opposed to the crown.

By the time of the regal period (1885-1910), separation was being debated in a realistic light: whether Angola should be prepared for independence or should be drawn closer under Lisbon's control. Practical colonial questions were finally considered: should white colonization be promoted directly or indirectly, should the African be systematically introduced to European civilization, or should he be allowed to follow his own cultural patterns? The

¹²This move was only logical as far as Brazil was concerned. Brazil's position within the empire presupposed its determined interest in the security of Angola. When the Dutch attacked the West African coast in 1641, the Brazilians, of necessity, became the protectors of Angola. The wealth of Brazil was one of the foundations of Portugal's national policy and Brazil's security depended on Angolan slave labor. In addition, Angola's orientation toward the West and the Angolan settlers' admiration for the so-called "experiment" taking place in Brazil, encouraged Brazilian efforts to promote its policies in the colony.

debate on separation resulted in some tangible results. There was the beginning of a transition from military to civilian government, and greater freedom was granted to the colonial government itself. Financial autonomy and decentralization were granted -- a likely abdication of colonial responsibility by the home government. Practically unlimited powers were given to the newly-created office of colonial high commissioner -- a title commensurate with increased local authority. The colony was also encouraged to rule itself, formulating legislation in accordance with specific local needs, with Portugal exercising a loose form of general supervision. The thought among Portuguese statesmen was that "with the work of pacification completed, Angola should be permitted to develop its resources more or less in its own way."¹³

These independence movements had early been joined by separatist elements in the colony. In the 1820's the influence of those Portuguese who supported the demands for Angolan autonomy was not as great as it was later to become under the New State, but, at the time, separatism met with the approval of the governing liberals. It was this element which came to the fore under the Republic in 1910: they were responsible for expanded economic development in Angola and they took a firm stand against the social exploitation of the African. By the time of Salazar's appearance, separatism had gained its greatest support and reached its greatest influence preaching against the "prevalent morality of Angola" and for a

¹³Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 250.

"colonial realism" which had not been evidenced in nearly four hundred years.

All of these factors signaled a reaction in favor of change. The periods when colonial policy might have taken a different course were many, the opportunities were there; the main failure lay in the indifferent implementation of reform actions. Salazar took over the empire in 1932 at a time when Portuguese colonial aspirations now "sprang from an enlightenment too frequently absent in European colonization in Africa."¹⁴ It was assumed that the New State would begin another major reform era.

The former economics professor from the University of Coimbra appeared to have the same aspirations in 1932:

In its relations with the Government it is the nation's duty to give expression to the truth. . . . It is the duty of governments to institute a national policy. Similarly, it is the duty of its subjects to develop a national attitude and sentiment, to work for the nation's prosperity, and to hold in respect everything that appertains to their nation.

We have now arrived at a proposition -- the only one which to my way of seeing is the true one: it is that a dictatorship must solve the Portuguese problem. With what object in view should the dictatorship solve this problem? In order that the program of reform may continue and not be rendered useless; that the spirit of labor and discipline may unite and be productive; that a new mentality may be created indispensable for the regeneration of our political and administrative habits, for the establishment of social and judicial order, for promoting public peace and prosperity.¹⁵

¹⁴Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁵Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Doctrine and Action: Internal and Foreign Policy of the New Portugal: 1928-1939, trans. R.E. Broughton (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1939), pp. 59-60, 83-84.

The fundamentals of present colonial policy were also laid down at this time. Legally, the New State was to govern by the principles of "unity of Empire" and the "assimilation of indigenous populations." These two were further expanded into "political unity, spiritual assimilation, administrative differentiation, and economic solidarity."¹⁶ The first of the four supposedly stresses the unitary state with one territory, one population, and one government; the second respects the modus vivendi of the African while at the same time imparting to him Catholicism, nationalism, and the Portuguese way of life; "differentiation" recognizes that peculiar circumstances of territory, society, and economics necessitates diverse administrative units dissimilar from those operating in the metropolis. Economic solidarity necessitates a longer discussion, and will be covered shortly.

These principles have not changed since 1932, but they have always been open to broad administrative interpretation; any weak points in them are bolstered with nationalistic half-truths. The statesmen of "neo-imperialism" stressed that

. . . the first requirement of national policy, as well as the first duty of the Government, is to promote the recognition of the objective reality of the Portuguese nation, and of the unity of its people throughout its dominions -- at home, in the islands, and in the colonies. It is an historical and a social reality, embracing individuals, families, private and public bodies. And in the unity resulting from this integration, it will be the Government's duty to harmo-

¹⁶Marcelo Caetano, "Principles and Methods of Portuguese Colonial Administration," The Colston Papers: Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration (London: Butterworth's Scientific Publications, 1950), p. 86.

nize those differences and to subordinate them to the collective interests of the nation. Our motto shall be, 'All for the nation -- nothing against the nation.'¹⁷

Thus, all the words and phrases combine into the time-worn concept of the "national whole," which apparently has always remained pronounced in Portuguese colonial histrionics. Salazarists maintain that this "Portuguese universal idea is still faithful to what it was in the 15th century, although, naturally, methods have changed."¹⁸ The First Minister can say:

I once got a telegram from Angola which was worded thus: 'We do not want the Portuguese colonial empire. We do not want to have a metropolis at the head of mere colonies. We want Portugal, and we want Lisbon as the capital of the Portuguese Empire.' This was no unpleasant surprise. I didn't feel that I was faced with an irreverent or rebellious state. No. What I saw in this message was the ancestral loyalty of the Portuguese from Angola for their mother country.¹⁹

Words such as these reinforce the Portuguese belief in what they consider to be a unique historical tradition overseas. But they ignore another underlying sentiment, expressed by an Angolan nationalist in the 1960's: "All we care for is to have our own land; we do not wish the country of Portugal joined to ours any longer."²⁰

New State colonialism professes a belief that all the words and phrases provide "answers" for every fundamental aspect of colonial doctrine. All that they really accomplish is deliberate win-

¹⁷Salazar, Doctrine and Action, p. 59.

¹⁸Luis C. Lupi, Portugal In Africa (Lisbon: SNI Books, 1952), pp. 8-9.

¹⁹Christine Garnier, Salazar: An Intimate Portrait, trans. from the French (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Young, 1954), p. 134.

²⁰Quoted in Thomas Okuma, Angola In Ferment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 97.

dow-dressing for practical motivations. The Minister for Overseas has said that "politics of today are the politics of yesterday"²¹ in the African colonies, yet the New State refuses to admit this publicly. Salazar's apologists continue to declaim that the objective in Angola is to "repeat the miracle which was realized in Brazil."²² The opposite is true. The New State realizes, as did many of the previous governments of Portugal, that Angola must remain within the embrace of the metropolis because of economics. Angola, too, under Salazar occupies a position within the Portuguese empire much as do the other overseas areas: merely one part of a composition of a number of separate and distant territories bound together, not by sentiment or theory, but (as in all other empires), in proportion to their economic development and wealth. In former years, Angola provided slaves to build up the economic base of the empire; today the colony enriches the motherland with vast wealth in diamonds, gold, copper, iron ore, oil, and coffee, and serves as a ready import market for empire goods. It is estimated²³ that Angola imports nearly 45% of all its goods from the motherland, and exports approximately 20% of its goods to Portugal. The colony has become more than an historical appendage of Portugal -- it has become profitable.

The economic aspect brings us back again to one of the 1932

²¹Dr. Adriano Moreira, quoted in Ibid., p. 39.

²²Ibid., p. 38.

²³These estimates are based on figures in James Duffy, Portugal In Africa (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962), pp. 202-203. The exact figures for 1959 were 18.1% of exports, 44.6% of imports. The percentages are probably higher at present.

colonial principles: "economic solidarity." This ideally encompasses

. . . instead of the broken-down 'colonial pact' which made the Metropolis [in the past] the exclusive beneficiary of colonial utilities, a policy of inter-territorial coordination with division of labor and internal protectionism.²⁴

In practice, however, this idea, like all the others, has been changed. Instead of "inter-territorial coordination" one finds "metropolitanism," that is, an economic subjection in which Lisbon has seen to it that all colonial development should in some way or another be subordinate to metropolitan interests. The extension of the economic framework of the New State to Angola has resulted in the control of the colony's import and export trade in the interests of the homeland. This is in keeping with the concept of the "national whole" and has resulted in some material benefits for Angola, but all too often Portugal's economic relationships imply that the province obtains little that is of use to it, and, in turn, must contend with a number of problems arising from Portugal's own social and economic underdevelopment. "Economic solidarity" is only one example of how Portuguese colonial idealism is applied in practice. It is also an example of how theory has been modified for expediency. Angola is of economic interest to the homeland; the New State is there because of this interest, and also plans to remain there because of it.

Neither the words nor the deeds of the New State in Angola

²⁴Caetano, op. cit., p. 88.

have created a new colonial doctrine, but rather contributed to a rehearsing of the old. Salazar continues forced labor. His ideas on assimilation have reverted back to the assimilacao uniformizadora concept put forth by Liberal Governments in the 19th century, although originally

by assimilation, the New State did not mean, as government spokesmen have pointed out repeatedly, assimilacao uniformizadora -- the ideal of granting to the African populations legal status and protection as Portuguese citizens. Such a policy was regarded as hare-brained philanthropy.²⁵

The material level presents the greatest source of pride for the administration, and oft-quoted figures attempt to portray a benevolent government whose ceaseless efforts revolved around the welfare of the African. Statistics abound: 35,000 houses built for Africans in five years; 93 new hospitals, 80 health centers, 32 maternity centers, 2550 schools, three colleges all dedicated to the African.²⁶ It is ironic that these Portuguese efforts are reminiscent of another colonial power in Africa -- Belgium. It was the latter which also stressed the humanitarian side of their "civilizing mission" in the Congo: no colonizer gets far, they found, unless he believes that he is bringing some good to the colonized as well as to himself. Prince Albert said in 1908:

²⁵Duffy, Portugal in Africa, p. 163.

²⁶Ronald Waring, "The Case for Portugal," Angola: A Symposium -- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 44.

"It is in raising the moral level of the natives; in the continuous amelioration of their national lot; in fighting diseases from which they suffer that we shall assure the future."²⁷ These words are apropos to the Portuguese, who speak as if they were like the Belgians: "Our enlightening action in Africa has been characteristically 'paternal'."²⁸

Halfheartedly, Salazar has tried to correct the wrongs in Angola. On August 28, 1961, the Overseas Minister proclaimed a new department of colonization which would seek to facilitate the integration of Angola into the mystique of the Portuguese multi-racial society. In the Minister's words, all barriers of "race, color, and creed" would disappear, and it would be

. . . within this spirit of fraternity that the government will abolish the status of indigena and extend citizenship to all Africans. Furthermore, new agrarian reforms will guarantee private property and the individual's right to farm his land.²⁹

A minimum wage law has been recently introduced, penal sanctions for breach of labor contracts have been abolished, and sentences of forced labor for political crimes is now forbidden. Political representation was long denied the African, but recent changes have included elections based on adult suffrage for rural and mu-

²⁷George Martelli, Leopold to Lumumba (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1962), p. 183.

²⁸A.J. Alfaro Cardoso, Angola, Your Neighbor (Johannesburg: 1950), pp. 71-72.

²⁹Okuma, op. cit., p. 38.

municipal councils (which might be regarded as a step towards a more consultative system of government), and the elevation of some Africans to the Legislative Council which advises the Governor-General. It remains to be seen, however, whether these changes are implemented -- for it is usually the case in Portuguese Africa that only repressive legislation is carried out. The changes are viewed as a beginning, but there is a justifiable skepticism concerning this "new Look." It is remembered that the forced labor system was also formally abolished -- by government decree in 1926. But it still exists; the only abolition has been the name. The practice of "volunteer labor" inherited the worst features of the old system.

In United Nations debate in 1962, the Soviet delegate voiced the doubts of many concerning reform in Angola. He said:

There had been some talk of reform in the Portuguese territories, but the situation had not really changed. The statements made by the petitioners from Angola in the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration showed that the people of Angola had no rights; they had to work fourteen hours a day and endure insults in silence, and they could not participate in elections or in the government. The Special Committee's conclusions that the reforms did not meet the basic aspirations of the people or significantly change their political, economic, social, and educational conditions showed that they provided no real solution.³⁰

The New State must accept a large part of the responsibility for the riots and disorders which erupted in Angola in 1961. It was Salazar who contributed, inadvertently or deliberately, to a further

³⁰United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 17th Session, A/5238 (October 8, 1962), p. 494.

undermining of Angolan traditional society when he brought "neo-imperialism" to West Africa. It was the disruptive forces of centuries -- forced labor, the impact of western education, and the missionary movement -- which Salazar failed to correct; these forces combined with the growth of urban areas as a result of increased white immigration, a new racial prejudice, and an economic dislocation under Salazar's colonial policy. All contributed to the growth of revolution and change. Indirectly as a result of the effect of these forces on the African Angolan, his "belief in the superiority of the white Portuguese crumbled,"³¹ and he began to seize an initiative which he previously did not possess. It is denied that the events of 1961 had any relevance to contemporary Portuguese colonialism:

Examining that policy against a background of terrorism and counter-terrorism gives the impression that the latter is the result of the former, which is not the case. The attack on Angola, although it naturally exploits the grievances of the Angolans, has little bearing on what the Portuguese have or have not done.³²

However, the events of 1961 and the continued growth of revolutionary efforts are a direct reflection of changes brought about by disruptive forces which came to a head under the New State. Until ten years ago, Salazar still might have accomplished something in the colony:

³¹Okuma, op. cit., p. 36.

³²Martelli, op. cit., p. 11.

In 1951 there was still a chance for Portugal to show the way to a non-racial integrated society in Africa. But the tragedy of present-day Angola is the tragedy of the last ten wasted years, years during which the accumulated non-racialism of centuries was squandered like the wealth of Brazil and the Indies three hundred years earlier. Wherein lay [sic] the future?³³

We must examine the disruptive forces before approaching the revolutionary movements themselves.

Part II: The Disruptive Forces

In its mystique and reverie in Angola, the New State contributed to its own disunity and weakness by subverting its own high ideals of 1932. While it can be granted that such results were likely to occur (the adage about history repeating itself is particularly relevant to Portuguese colonialism), one could not have foreseen in 1932 the possibilities of Salazar discrediting his own ideals by the very use of them. The seeds for revolt were planted the day that "neo-imperialism" came to Africa.

Four traits of Salazarist colonial intent gradually gained prominence in colonial dogma -- betraying the objectives of the regime, weakening its position, and eventually destroying its aims. The first was in the quenching of altruism, assuming that this existed in New State philosophy. At the time of the 1926 coup d'etat which was eventually to bring Salazar to power, there appears to be no doubt that the military leaders had a serious concern for the state of Portugal. A constructive effort was made

³³Clifford J. Parsons, "Background to the Angolan Crisis," The World Today, vol. 17, no. 7 (July, 1961), p. 283.

to bolster the economy, to increase capital development, and to expand industry. Even though Salazar was criticized for the repression of the opposition in the early 1930's, he was respected for his administrative skill and his shrewdness. Legislation was enacted for the improvement of social services at home, and increased investment benefitted the overseas areas. Unfortunately, a gap began to widen as the colonies were more frequently treated less as an end in themselves than as a means to an end -- the glorification of the motherland. Some good work was done in Angola during these years (the campaign against sleeping sickness being a notable example), but the approach to colonial problems was doctrinaire and unimaginative. A legacy of corruption and maladministration stultified much that was good in inception. World War II also had its effect. All the other colonial powers (Spain excepted) had been in the war against the Axis: the ideals of freedom and democracy had been implanted among the colonial peoples. But Angola remained outside this trend and the post-war period witnessed an inflexible determination by the Portuguese to retain hegemony, come what may. "Isto e nosso" ("This is ours") was the constant refrain. The opposition at home continued to be stifled, and criticism within the party was ended in 1947 with the suppression of Henrique Galvao's report.³⁴ This suppression was

³⁴The "party" in this sense refers to the National Union, the only recognized legal political party in the Portuguese Republic. Portugal has been a one-party State since 1932. Galvao's report on the forced labor system in Angola will be looked at more closely later. Excerpts from it are quoted in Appendix B on page 269.

the death-knell of altruism, which now had been submerged by a higher good -- the maintenance of the regime and the status quo.

Secondly, the New State's obsession with nationalism had led to three sorry evils: a false assessment of the national achievement, a nostalgic romanticism concerning the past, and a deep suspicion of foreign influences in the present. In the resurgence of the Portuguese nation great emphasis was placed on the glories of the past. National history was invoked to inspire the new generation to an emulation of its ancestors: the exploits of the founders of the nation, the freedom-fighters, the explorers, the navigators, were constantly depicted on postage stamps and monumental plinth. The cult became an obsession which neglected modern history and the exploits of other nations and peoples, which discouraged travel abroad and insulated the territories from the outside world.

The fear of economic imperialism in the form of foreign investment and loans contributed to the underdevelopment of the territories. The Portuguese are self-conscious concerning their own poverty, and thus, very sensitive about the wealth of others. Also, Salazar was determined not to incur any more foreign debts; he refused to borrow abroad and placed limitations on foreign investment. Foreign capital was viewed as a Pandora's box that might release a variety of ideological demons whose presence inside the body politic would be detrimental to its condition.

The theory of gradualism, finally, built a false security against African nationalism. The official line was that development of Angola and its people must be gradual because progress was

a slow business. The Africans would first have to become acclimatized at a pace which was consonant with Portuguese resources and African capacity. This attitude was understandable when it was realized that Portugal itself had so much leeway to make up in literacy, social progress, and industrial development. But the retarding of advance in Angola was undoubtedly a source of friction with the Africans, particularly with those living in the frontier areas who saw better systems operating in the Congo or the Rhodesias.

These were the doctrinal failures of the New State. But there were also practical failures in the economic, social, and political realms which exacerbated relationships between the European and the African communities in Angola. Chief among these have been the practice of "contract labor" and disputes about land. The former was an inherent evil of New State colonialism from the outset, while the land dispute has merged into a larger problem that defies any practical solution -- that of the "white settler."

The contract labor system was the first disruptive force. A study of it could well occupy an entire work. Truly this is beyond the limits of the present paper. The system has a long history, and its ramifications have effected the Portuguese colonial program to its very foundations. It is complicated, but interesting, and there is a school which adheres to the notion that it is contract labor, more so than any other aspect of colonial policy, which will ultimately destroy Portugal in Africa. Others are of the opinion that the system itself is not bad but that Portugal is held accountable for the methods used in its practice. (These are the same

scholars who profess that all colonial systems in Africa employed some form of forced labor against the native.) There is positive agreement that such a system does exist in Portuguese Africa. In fact, the Portuguese themselves admit to the "native's obligation to work," and they take legislative pains to provide a raison d'etre for the existence of the system. The Colonial Act of 1930, **still the basic piece of colonial legislation, states:**

. . . the system of native contract labor rests on individual liberty and on the natives' right to a just wage and assistance, public authority intervening only for purposes of inspection.³⁵

Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the 1954 Statute for the Natives of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique declares:

The State will try to make the native recognize that work constitutes an indispensable element for progress, but the authorities can only impose work upon him in the cases specifically covered by the law. The natives may freely choose the work they want to carry out. . . . The use of native labor by nao-indigenas [non-inhabitants of the colony] rests on the African's freedom of contract.³⁶

Until recent years, the labor system of the Portuguese native policy was only incidental to the administration and exploitation of Angola. This is not to say, however, that the practice was virtually ignored and sheltered from controversy. Individuals

³⁵Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 319.

³⁶Ibid., p. 320.

such as Nevinson, Ross, and Cadbury³⁷ were early instrumental in bringing the institution to public attention, and while their efforts possessed a certain degree of sameness, the average Portuguese was at least made aware of what was going on and he became determined to do something about it. This he eventually succeeded in doing under the 1910 Republic.³⁸

³⁷ Henry W. Nevinson, A Modern Slavery (New York: 1906); Edward Alsworth Ross, Report on Employment of Native Labor in Portuguese Africa (New York: 1925); and William Cadbury, Labour in Portuguese West Africa (London: 1910). These are dated studies dealing with the forced labor system before the Salazar regime. However, they provide an excellent understanding of the subject in the years up to 1926. Ross' report, in fact, was submitted to the Temporary Slaving Commission of the League of Nations. It was unfortunate that with his 1925 report the matter of forced labor in the Portuguese territories came to an official dead-end and nothing was done again for almost thirty years.

Other useful sources are: Thomas F. Buxton, The African Slave Trade (London: 1839); John N. Harris, Portuguese Slavery: Britain's Dilemma (London: 1913); Lord Cromer, "Portuguese Contract Labour," The Spectator (September 18, 1915), pp. 359-360, and the same article in the Journal of the African Society, vol. XVI (1917), p. 343; and Charles Swan, The Slavery of Today (London: 1909).

As an aside to this question, William Cadbury in 1910 was a partner in Cadbury Brothers, the English chocolate company. Using the information he obtained in Sao Tome and Angola, his firm, two other English companies, and a German firm, boycotted Sao Tome cocoa. This decision brought to the attention of the English public what was later to be popularly labelled the "Sao Tome Scandal", perhaps the most scalding condemnation of the Portuguese contract labor system. Cadbury Brothers also instituted a legal suit against Portuguese cocoa interests on Sao Tome, Cadbury v. Standard, which was decided in favor of Cadbury's, and resulted in minor changes in the system of contract labor on the island.

³⁸ Efforts crystallized under the colonial governorship of Norton de Matos, who refused to heed the complaints about the shortage of labor and the necessity to force the African to work. He overrode the resistance of local residents in a series of decrees designed to get the African to work for himself, enforced the parts of the labor code guaranteeing the contract worker minimum benefits, abolished corporal punishment, suspended the licenses of certain recruiting agents, and held that the African had to be free, a property owner, and master of his skills.

From 1930 to 1945, years in which humanitarian attention was drawn to other parts of the world, the labor system in Angola was virtually forgotten except for passing criticism. There was the impression that new legislation and pronouncements outlined by Salazar were serious efforts to correct past abuses. Portugal also signed the Slaving Convention in 1926 and the critics were temporarily belied. What was overlooked, however, was the fact that labor is necessarily the cornerstone of the assimilation process created by Salazar -- labor is the means to a distant end. The goal of achieving assimilation lies in the necessity for the African to work -- either for the state, private employer, or himself. The practice cannot be substantially altered, despite Portugal's maneuverings, because all other attempts to raise the African's cultural and economic level, to assimilate him into a single community -- by education, administrative tutelage, missionary work, health programs, colonization schemes -- are peripheral to the overriding obligation to work.

The institution is also an absolute necessity at present because of the economic drive for the development of Angola. Labor is the basis of the economy:

We need the labor of the natives. We need it in order to improve the conditions of the laborers themselves; we need it for the economy of Europe and for the progress of Africa. Capital . . . needs workers in abundance who are sturdy and cheap.³⁹

³⁹ Antonio Enes, Mozambique (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral das Colonias, 1946), p. 98.

Substantial funds are also coming into the metropolitan treasury from the labor system. The Republic of South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia, under agreement with Portugal, have annually contracted for 400,000 native laborers to work in the Rand diamond mines and in the Roan Antelope copper mines. The Portuguese receive payment in turn -- approximately £10 a head. Basil Davidson could write in 1955, without fear of contradiction: "Forced labor is the economic flywheel in Angola."⁴⁰

The Portuguese deny the existence of forced labor. To them, the labor is obligatory, but either contracted or voluntary.⁴¹ They cite a 1926 decree, still apparently law, which declared that forced labor could only be used in the public interest, and that all other positions for native labor permit the African a choice. For those unable to obtain contract work, the "voluntario" category was created. But this latter term is an euphemism, since in reality it is no different than contract labor. Under the contract system, all available "idle" men between the ages of fourteen and sixty are liable to be engaged. The definition of "idle" is applied to those who are not working, i.e., those who are not already under contract. Also, legal phraseology assures those Africans who are "gainfully" employed that they will not be subjected

⁴⁰Basil Davidson, The African Awakening (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), p. 197.

⁴¹In 1955, on Portugal's entry into the United Nations, there was a temporary abandonment of the obligatory principle. But as so often happens in Angola, administrative integrity has not infrequently failed to match high principles set down in black and white. The "obligation" to work remains a fundamental practice.

to contract labor. The practice, however, is to define "gainfully" so as not to include subsistence farming -- the universal practice of all African villagers.

The excesses of the labor system are an intrinsic part of the development of the system itself. The abuses have been common Portuguese practice in Angola for centuries. But, under the New State the methods of forced labor have been compounded by two developments: the New State brought a police-state efficiency to an informal apparatus of terror, and Salazar cannot avoid labor practice abuses when he must achieve the combined goals of the economic development of Angola, on the one hand, and the assimilation of the African, on the other. In the case of the latter, the issue is academic -- "the very existence of native labor codes implies a restriction of the African's freedom, and as long as colonial legislation contains provisions that the African must engage in productive work, repressive exploitation of him will ensue."⁴² Beatings, arrest without reason or evidence, deportation to the slave camps of Sao Tome, correctional labor and corporal punishment are frequently employed against recalcitrant or dissident Africans: "we Portuguese regard the native as a child and like good parents we have to spank him from time to time."⁴³ The chicote, a hide whip, and the palmatoria, a wooden paddle with holes in the striking surface which cause large welts on palms or legs, are symbols of

⁴²Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 318.

⁴³Ibid., p. 304.

the Portuguese determination that the native has the right to a "just wage and assistance." One instance will serve to disprove what is also generally termed the traditional "liberality" of the practice:

'If my wife,' said a decent European resident for many years' standing, 'likes to accuse one of our servants of being rude to her, and I take him up to the police station, they'll slash him mercilessly -- hands, arms, face, everywhere.' Flogging is generally admitted. 'If any native gets political ideas,' the same European observed, 'they'll beat them out of him right away.' And they will send him to Sao Tome or the Bay of Tigers [both slave camps]. So that he may contemplate the Portuguese soul, no doubt, and properly admire it.⁴⁴

The labor system was characterized in 1948 thus:

When an Angola plantation owner requires labor, he notifies the government of his needs. The demand is passed down to the village chiefs, who are ordered to supply fixed quotas of laborers from their communities. If the required number is not forthcoming, police are sent to round up. They are paid a wage sufficient for their sustenance, but no more.⁴⁵

By 1955, nothing had changed:

Only the twisting of language can make the system differ from slavery. There is much less cruelty than in Nevinson's day. Otherwise the system is unchanged; and it is probable, on the evidence I collected, that there are now many more slaves in Angola than there were fifty years ago. In those old-fashioned days, they brought down the contradados by foot, marching them crazily across the Hungry Country beyond Silva Porto and down through the mountains along the still older trails of the pirate days before full-blown slavery was abolished. . . . The British holders of Benguela Railway stock in 1954 will be relieved to hear that nowadays

⁴⁴Davidson, op. cit., pp. 231-232.

⁴⁵A.T. Steele, "Forced Labor is Common for Angola's Natives," New York Herald-Tribune (February 15, 1948), p. 13.

their slaves are brought down in trucks and railway wagons, and almost always survive the experience. Furthermore, they are even paid a small wage, because it is in fashion nowadays to cosset Africans. . . .⁴⁶

Many people still remember the famous Galvao Report of 1947. As High Commissioner in Angola, Henrique de Malta Galvao, at the government's request, submitted a confidential report on forced labor in the colonies which Salazar refused to publish. After describing how Portuguese policy had forced in ten years alone -- 1937 to 1946 -- over one million Africans to flee the colonies to neighboring African areas, he concluded that their situation was worse than "pure slavery."

In some respects, the situation is more grave than that created by pure slavery. Under slavery the bought man, acquired as a head of cattle, was regarded as an asset by his master. He was interested in keeping him healthy and strong and agile in the same way as he would look after his horse or his bull.

Today the native is not bought -- he is simply rented from the Government, though he may have the status of a free man. His master could hardly care less if he falls ill or dies as long as he goes on working while he lives. . . . When he becomes unable to work or when he dies, the master can always ask to be supplied with other laborers.⁴⁷

The hatred of the forced labor system was one of the causes of the 1961 revolt. In September of that year, Robert Young reported from the Congo:

The people spoke of suffering, not only from the war, but also in their daily lives before the war, of cruelty, of sick-

⁴⁶Davidson, op. cit., pp. 195-196.

⁴⁷"Galvao's Suppressed Report," Africa Today, vol. 8, no. 2 (February, 1961), pp. 6-7.

ness, of early death. They told of being taken to far-away places to serve as contract laborers for a year at a time. Mothers spoke of working in labor gangs, even as they carried their young. They spoke of the passbook that each male must carry at all times to record his labor and of a separate code of laws made to keep the black man a laborer with the hoe and the machete. In village after village they told us of beatings at the hands of the local police and of the Portuguese administrator, the chefe do posto.⁴⁸

In this way, the system had contributed to the rise of the regime's one enemy and only fear -- nationalism. Forced labor provided a common hatred of the practice among all who had lived under it and at least united them in this respect against Portuguese colonialism. But, in addition, the very movement of workers under forced labor contributed to the growth of nationalism. For example, the transportation of workers from the south to the coffee plantations in the north and to the docks in the two coastal cities of Luanda and Lobito enabled workers to make contacts beyond their own tribal groupings. Their realization of their common grievance over inadequate pay and bad working conditions had brought them the beginning of a feeling of solidarity against their European employers. These laborers were village people and could be found involved in any form of mass demonstration, and the African party and trade union leaders built upon the common feelings of antagonism of the contrados towards their patroes, or employers.

This cursory examination of the forced labor system leaves many questions unanswered. Its only intent was to show that such

⁴⁸Robert Young, "Values In Revolt," Africa Today, vol. 8, no. 9 (November, 1961), p. 5. This article was condensed from "Angola, Journey to a War," NBC White Paper No. 7, which was televised on September 19, 1961.

a system exists, has existed in the colony for a good part of its history, and, the Portuguese being Portuguese, probably will exist for sometime to come. Also, the Portuguese see nothing strange or wrong in the mass employment of forced workers: far from concealing the system, they talk freely of it and think it a splendid thing. Forced labor is a natural step in the African's progress to "civilization"; it continues also to unwittingly undermine the New State's colonial legacy in Angola. The contract labor system is part of the totality of Portugal's colonial policy in Africa, and as such, it will fail to serve the legitimate interests of some ten million Africans as certainly as will the colonial policy in general. For both are founded on the assumption that Angola is to be a white man's colony.

Large-scale white immigration was not the intent of Salazarist colonialism in the early years in Angola. The policy in the 1930's could be considered "wavering" -- many felt that transferring a large number of citizens to the colony would not solve the unemployment and poverty questions existing at home. In addition, "after the expenditure of fabulous sums, it [Portugal] would merely have created a vast white proletariat in regions where it would be difficult to succour them."⁴⁹ The government was not prepared and not able to sponsor white settlement. Efforts were made, however, to create a colonial mentality which could be exploited at a later date -- the Colonial Ministry attempted to convince a

⁴⁹Armando Monteiro, The Colonial Problem (Lisbon: 1944), p. 345.

youthful elite to dedicate their lives to service in Africa and appeals were made to Portuguese women to accompany their husbands. But poverty at home and exaggerated stories of prosperity in Africa increased the white population eleven per cent between 1940 and 1950. Of the total increase in that ten-year period, six per cent -- more than half -- took place in the cities; fifty-seven per cent of the total European population live in the cities, while only six per cent of the total African population do so. The increase in city population is due, of course, to increase in economic activity. The trend of the economy has made the cities commercial, shipping, and transport centers, and the shift from rural to urban areas was therefore understandable. This growth is another important factor in the changing complexion of Angola: in these towns and cities one may see at least one success of the New State's policy of forging a single identity between the provinces and Portugal, but in the process it has contributed to the formation of two distinct societies in the colony, one African and the other European.

For the Portuguese, there are economic and social reasons for migrating to such centers as Luanda. The struggle of the Portuguese to make a living in the bush has become increasingly difficult. Increased pressure for manpower under the contract labor system has reduced agricultural activities in the villages. The falling production of cash crops has reduced the purchasing power of Africans and low market values have reduced trade volume in village stores. The European trader's business stagnates. One of two recourses is open to him -- to extend precarious credit or move to

the cities. Also, children of European farmers are not disposed to continue in their father's footsteps: they feel that the meager income wrested from the land does not compensate for the amount of time and energy expended. An artisan in the city, for example, receives a minimum wage of sixty escudos for a nine-hour day, a farmer earns half as much working a twelve-hour day. This is the economic motivation.

The social factor bringing the Portuguese into the cities is based on the nature of the Portuguese themselves. They are a gregarious people, and isolation in the small towns increase the feeling of sandades ("homesickness") among them. The homeland can be recreated far easier in Luanda, Lobito, or Nova Lisboa. These towns all bare the "uncompromising stamp of continental Portugal. Here the Portuguese cultural image has been re-created -- in the architecture, in the cafes, in the formal little parks."⁵⁰ The Africans, however, are also moving into the cities and it is on this point that the New State's professed ideal of non-racism is being laid to rest.

The African settles in the cities for several reasons: the unproductive soil in the hinterland, the desire for money, and the rumors of numerous job opportunities in town. Another reason is schooling, especially at the high school level. Many who fail the third or fourth years in the program go to the cities to take special annual exams. Students failing have to wait until the next

⁵⁰Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 204.

year, and meanwhile, they remain in the cities. Cities also offer the African an opportunity to escape the tribal authority in the villages. Many flee after being nominated to do contract labor, or after contracting unpaid debts. Whatever their motives in moving, Africans have been influenced by the change from a rural to an urban society. They have also discovered what they have always inwardly felt -- Portuguese humanism extended to the African is merely para os Ingleses ver (for the English to see).⁵¹

From 1955 to 1960, the population of Angola rose by 90,000, to 200,000 Europeans, and new social problems were created. A sharpened color-consciousness became evident. Not only were Africans denied the few opportunities that inadequate economic expansion offered, but in some cases they were replaced by the poor whites. The Portuguese immigrant, himself a laborer from an economically depressed country, came to Angola with his own insecurities which led him to justify his privilege on the basis of his color. As more Africans entered the cities, a color line was drawn. At one time it could be said that the Salazarists took their mission of assimilation seriously, but white colonialism has now forced the former African "brothers" to adjust to the pattern of segregated life. Discrimination, although all-prevailing, is dis-

⁵¹This phrase, quite common among the Africans, refers to Portugal's habit of presenting an outward guise of humanitarianism in the governance of the colony when facing an outside pressure. England, of course, is Portugal's oldest ally and for years Whitehall maintained a watchful eye on Portuguese colonial policy. Whenever Portugal was criticized, Lisbon merely invented another legalistic facade intended to convince outsiders, especially the English, that everything was not really as bad as it appeared.

guised under subtle subterfuges. At a post office, for instance, "telegrams handed by the bearer" and "telegrams handed by the sender" notices are the Portuguese equivalents of "whites only" and "blacks only." Curfews have been imposed on Africans, and more theaters, restaurants, and hotels display the now-prominent "Right of Admittance Reserved" sign. The statement of Caetano appears to have at last taken on added significance: "Portugal does not in absolute terms accept the primacy of native interests."⁵² The concentration of the Portuguese in the cities has created "white pockets in a black world"⁵³ in which the African lives a ghetto existence in the sanzala, isolated and insulated from the Portuguese. He must also face other adjustments:

. . . the city or large town, by its complexity and because it makes no provision for the extended family to maintain its physical integrity, forces the African to adopt an individually oriented way of life. Thus he depends less upon the family and is not as strongly controlled either by the family or by the tribe. Added to this is the entirely new set of values based on working for a wage or salary and in activities that cannot clearly be seen to have any direct relationship to one's own life. Old religious ties are broken and in many instances, no new ones fill the gap.⁵⁴

But beyond the alienation of the African from the white, the weakening of family ties and traditional authority, the urban society has given the African educated elite the opportunity to communicate

⁵²Marcelo Caetano, Methods, Traditions, and Principles of Portuguese Colonialism (Lisbon: Ministry of Overseas Affairs, 1957), p. 41.

⁵³Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 204.

⁵⁴John and Rena Karefa-Smart, The Halting Kingdom (London: Friendship Press, 1959), p. 26.

with each other. This has advanced the nationalist cause: members of the Kikongo-, the Kimbundu-, and the Umbundu-speaking peoples, existing within their tribal association groups in the large cities, deal with each other in the colonial language -- Portuguese. Whereas before, the unity of the tribal movements was hindered by various tongues or dialects, the use of the lingua franca now at least makes it possible for a Bakongo to talk with an Umbundu about common grievances, about African politics, about the Portuguese. The location of some cities, especially coastal ports like Luanda and Lobito, has also opened contacts between Angolans and educated Africans from other countries. One instance of this was a workers' study conference at Luanda in 1957, attended by a delegation from Ghana. A group from the Angolan elite met with the delegates, and were immediately apprehended by the state security police (PIDE).⁵⁵ The news of the arrests spread throughout the country, and leaders of the nationalist organizations cited the arrested men as the "vanguard" for an independent Angola.

The concentration of educated Africans in urban localities also intensifies their personal, social, and economic grievances. Assimilados resent the paternal attitude of the Portuguese, their own "voluntary" segregation into "native" sections, and the limitations on their schooling in the Portuguese educational system.

⁵⁵The Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (the International and State Defense Police -- PIDE) is the secret police organization established by Salazar in 1932. With headquarters in Lisbon, the PIDE extends its influence throughout the empire by a network of branches in the main cities. It has its own police force (Polícia Judiciária and Polícia de Segurança Pública), a special military body (the Guarda Nacional Republicana), and its own armed customs officers (the Guarda Fiscal).

The result has been a closing of ranks among the Africans -- tribal and personal differences become insignificant and the Africans become anti-colonial and anti-European.

White colonialism has intensified the land problem, a perpetual bone-of-contention in colonial Africa. The New State's land policies seem to be equitable. A series of decrees from 1900 have provided that large sections of Angola will remain available to the African population. In 1901 all land not privately owned was declared to be state property. Large areas were reserved for the exclusive use of the African, and could not be taken away. The Salazar Government has adhered to these earlier pledges, but added two of its own: outside of reserve lands, the African may occupy vacant land, from which he may be removed only if he is compensated and granted an equal tract of land elsewhere; and, if the African is governed by Portuguese common law, he may acquire real rights in terms of inheritance and sale over the land he has occupied.

Land policy is confirmed in Article 38 of the 1955 Native Statute for Angola;⁵⁶ but a legislative vagueness as to the actual rights of the African villagers and the location and extent of native reserves provided another opportunity to drive a wedge of misunderstanding into African-European relationships. Until the 1950's, points of dispute between Portuguese colonizers and Africans were comparatively few: some traditionally African land had

⁵⁶The article formally states: "Natives who live in tribal organizations are guaranteed, in conjunction, for use and development, in the traditional manner, of lands necessary for their villages, their crops, and for the pasture of their cattle." Quoted from The 1955 Native Statute for Angola (Lisbon: SNI Books, 1956), p. 9.

been absorbed by European coffee fazendas in the northeast, and some Africans had been resettled to make room for sugar plantations. The government's program seemed flexible -- until the increase in the white population. Portuguese colonists started a ground-swell of criticism:

One can neither understand nor justify the principle by which the best and even the largest areas of land . . . have been reserved for the natives and closed to occupation and exploitation by European capital. The native does not have the slightest interest in the soil, this sacred soil which prodigally offers him everything he needs in order to live He exploits it as long as it produces, and when it doesn't produce . . . he moves off with his family to another area.⁵⁷

The colonization schemes of the New State -- "Land Development Schemes"⁵⁸ -- brought further repercussions. "The hoe to each man"

⁵⁷ Simoes Vaz, Problems of Mozambique (Lisbon: 1956), p. 53.

⁵⁸ The explanation of this new settlement scheme belongs to James Duffy:

"The long view of the New State ideology sees the ultimate creation of a modern peasant society An agrarian society is to be achieved through the settlement of Portuguese peasants in colonization projects, in some of which the African is to participate, and through the establishment of African agricultural colonies, under the direction of Portuguese administrative and technical authorities, which will create the conditions favorable for the economic and spiritual assimilation of the African.

"What this policy . . . really envisions is the creation of a semi-literate population of Africans and Portuguese holding rural Portuguese values, hard working, dedicated to the land, and politically conservative."

Quoted from Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 308.

In addition, Figueredo mentions: "Furthermore, they [the white settlements] would form an occupation force in the event of a threat from African nationalism."

Quoted from Antonio de Figueredo, Portugal and Its Empire: The Truth (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1961), p. 126.

programs paid traveling expenses of every Portuguese migrant to Angola, and gave them land and tools. Large areas were set aside as colonatos and entire agricultural villages were built. In many cases, settlements such as Cella displaced the Africans from much of their land. But also the fact was not lost on the African that these settler interests had become the first concern of the government and large sums of money were spent on them while the African was shuttled about and virtually ignored. Many Africans were also compelled to give compulsory service on their own ancestral holdings to these new Portuguese owners. Many of the settler element did not assimilate themselves to the African situation and they failed to reveal the easy tolerance and understanding of earlier settlers. Thus, the resentment of the whole system smouldered steadily beneath the surface both in the European and the African communities.

The second major disruptive force in Angola, and probably the strongest, is a desire for Western education by the African. Under the New State this historic desire reached a crucial stage. The desire for education is understandable, for education is the quickest route by which the Africans can raise their status in Portuguese society. Education is the key to job opportunities (government positions in the health, postal, and administrative services require the minimum of a fourth class diploma), dignity, and economic wealth. Also, because they need clerks and officers for the administration of the colony, the Portuguese are interested in giving the Africans an education. Government authorities depend upon African interpreters who must be able to write and speak the

Portuguese language. Again, to "Europeanize," to "Christianize," or to "assimilate" the natives, the Portuguese must seek to impart to them at least a rudimentary knowledge of reading, speaking, and writing. To achieve these two objectives -- creating an administrative cadre and assimilation -- the government has two distinct educational systems -- one for the Africans (ensino de adaptacao) and another for whites and assimilated Africans (ensino oficial). The distinction, the Portuguese claim, is due solely to the "natural consequence of the degrees of social and mental development."⁵⁹ But this "progressively restrictive" idea reveals two realities: that the Portuguese perhaps possess an unconscious sentiment that education for the mass of the African population represents an implicit threat to national interests, and that both the Church and the State are incapable of creating an educational system to serve more than a small percentage of the inhabitants. Granted that Portugal has a heavy educational burden in the homeland (where the rate of illiteracy is 40%), and that because of this the education of all Africans cannot be accomplished quickly. But the fact remains that under Salazar there is a deliberate attempt made to prevent African advancement: entrance exams are longer and more detailed, Africans must board at the school, no legal provision exists for the African to go on to elementary school, and worst fate of all, African boys in their teens are subject to the labor draft. It is ironical that

⁵⁹ Angola, Portuguese Province in Africa (Luanda: Angola Institute, 1953), p. 63.

a system which forms an inherent part of colonial "assimilation" educates 18,000 Portuguese out of a total population of perhaps 200,000, but only 12,000 Africans out of a population of perhaps 4.5 million.

The educational set-up not only hinders the attainment of Portuguese goals in Angola, but it contributes to the formation of united African elements opposed to the regime. The Portuguese short-sightedness is revealed by one fact: the emergence of even a barely literate African elite is painfully slow. Yet it is these same Africans who must, if Portugal prevails in Angola, undertake the real task of assimilation, or who must, if Portugal does not prevail, shoulder the responsibilities for governing and administering an independent nation. To the Africans' credit, however, even this small elite is important: they usually have sympathies and interests that go beyond the traditional tribal groups, and they are interested in building non-tribal organizations, such as political parties and cultural societies. They also help to create a consciousness among the African mass of the inequalities of the system -- "native" and "European" education, and the deliberate attempt by the government to keep African literacy low by prohibiting them from attending state schools. The scepticism and doubt is perhaps well-founded when it is noted that Portugal spends only one-tenth of one cent per head per year on African education as compared to \$4.02 per head per year in Rhodesia, and that 11% of the total African population attends school in Rhodesia as compared

to one per cent in Angola.⁶⁰ It would appear that Portugal is again at odds with another of its colonial tenets: "[Education of the African] is intended to inculcate in the population working habits and aptitudes for driving them away from laziness, as well as preparing the rural workers and artisans of the future."⁶¹

Lastly, the missionary movement has always been a growing disruptive force. Both the Protestant and Catholic missionaries have been successful in converting a large number of Africans to the cause (approximately 50% indicated in the 1950 census that they were Christians), but many observers have questioned whether African life has actually been penetrated by a Christian spirit in matters of faith and morals.⁶² There is no doubt that in many regions of Angola missionary activities have led to the modification of the Angolan African traditional society, through education, through the weakening of traditional authorities, through the introduction of the ideal of equality, and through the creation of an African clergy. The church has come to supplant the traditional kings and elders as the highest authority as loyalty to the church comes to transcend kinship and tribal ties. Christian ideals, such as the worth of each individual in the sight of God and the love of one brother for another regardless of race or color,

⁶⁰Figures are based on the 1959 school year in Rhodesia and on the 1956 school year in Angola. Quoted from Okuma, op. cit., p. 45.

⁶¹Angola, Portuguese Province in Africa, p. 64.

⁶²Gladwyn Childs, Umbundu Kinship and Character (London: 1949), p. 223.

have appealed to the Africans' longing for freedom and have constituted revolutionary influences in African life. Difficulties which have arisen centered around the Africans' equation of Christianity with European power; also, the contradiction between equality before God and discrimination among men, a contradiction inherent in the colonial situation, still troubles both Catholic and Protestant mission societies.

The rise of an educated clergy has had the most considerable impact upon the traditional society. African priests and ministers are not considered bound to the traditional authority of the kings and chiefs; indeed they often have become leaders of opposition. African clergy also have status as black men in a white society, and African Catholic priests have sometimes possessed sufficient status to oppose the local administration, especially in cases involving members of their parishes.

On the issue of nationalism, neither the Catholic nor the Protestant churches in Angola has as yet taken a definite stand. Officials of the Catholic Church, by virtue of its ties with the State, tend to support the government. Unquestionably this stand prejudices its future. As the revolutionary movement within the colony intensifies, Africans will look upon this association as Catholic sanction of colonial policy. The disassociation of the church would be significant: it would remove the moral sanction of continued Portuguese rule in Africa and would give moral support to those African Catholics working for independence. This vision, however, is definitely in the future. Indications are that the

church has infrequently criticized the regime, and, intermittently in the past, was in the forefront of colonial reform. But an open break is highly unlikely. The Church and the State are too intrinsically intertwined in Africa for the former to assert its rights. While the Protestants have no such official ties, they are under tight surveillance by the State. They have been accused of "denationalizing the natives"⁶³ -- introducing their own national cultures and weaning the African away from Portuguese national standards -- and of conspiring with communists to ferment the 1961 revolt. Any effective opposition voice the Protestants might have possessed has been stilled for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the government appears to be aware of a potential threat to colonial rule from both churches -- particularly in the existence of Protestant and Catholic organizations.⁶⁴

These then are the historic forces in Angola which have come between the African and the Portuguese. They became magnified and grew under the New State. They laid the foundations for beatings, punishments, hostages, economic and social indignities, and the alienation of the African from his land and his opportunities. What can be termed "the look in the eye" finally brought an end to

⁶³ John T. Tucker, Angola, The Land of the Blacksmith Prince (London: World Dominion Press, 1933), p. 49.

⁶⁴ "In a recent directive," says Thomas Okuma, "the governor-general ordered local administrative officials to attend all church meetings held in their juridical areas. The order was carried out at the last church council meeting of central Angola (Protestant), held in Dondi, Bela Vista, in January of 1961. The Administrator and the Inspector of Service of National Instruction, Dr. Rosa, sat in on all the sessions." Quoted in Okuma, op. cit., p. 57.

African patience under the New State. Angola, under Salazar, began to take on the appearance of a European colony in which the African was at best approaching the status of a second-class citizen.

CHAPTER III

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Peasants, Unemployed, Forced Laborers, your duty is clear. You are the most downtrodden. It is you who suffer most from colonial oppression. That is why you have the greatest interest in the re-establishment of the Angolan nation. For the past five centuries your ancestors, your parents, and you, yourselves, have been condemned to exert all your efforts for the enrichment of only the Portuguese colonialists. You create the riches but you have not the right to profit from them. Your sweat is the grease of the colonist, your blood is sucked by the colonial vampire,¹ and you are left to languish in misery and humiliation.

In Chapter II we have seen how the ten years between 1950 and 1960 were decisive in the making of an Angolan revolt. Prior to these years the resentment of centuries had not yet crystallized into what might be called a movement for emancipation, chiefly because the African failed to use the opportunities for revolt that had been created for him by the Portuguese. Despite the bitterness created by a contract labor system, and the physical and social sanctions that were its concomitant, Africans had not yet glimpsed the possibility of ever being delivered from their near-slavery. It was claimed that the African in Angola was content and happy under Portuguese colonialism. Such a happiness was not in praise of the minatory system which ruled him, but in praise of the spirit of a people

¹Declaration of the Steering Committee of Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA) (London: Union of Democratic Publication, 1961), p. 20.

who long since learned the technique of living with their overlords. "You cannot stay sad for four hundred years," echoes an African.

Part I: Nationalism in Angola

One is immediately struck by the fact that the appearance of nationalism arose in Angola later than it did in other areas of the African continent. It was almost as if the Portuguese Government based its policy on a belief that African nationalism would stop at the borders of Angola, or be stopped. The repressive administrative system, the deliberately selective and restrictive educational system, and widespread censorship combined to thwart any African political movement. The justification was that opportunities and knowledge nurtured dissatisfaction and revolt. But at the same time it was admitted that the African needed an outlet for his excessive energies and intellect, which, if not properly controlled, could easily become channeled into revolutionary activities. Two revolts early in the present century -- in 1914 when General Buta and his associates tried to stop deportations of Angolans to Sao Tome and Cape Verde, and in 1928 under the governorship of Norton de Matos -- convinced the Portuguese of the need for the creation of some organization especially for the betterment of African social and intellectual conditions. The result was the appearance in 1929 of the state-subsidized, white-controlled, ineffectual, African National League (Liga Nacional Africana). The LNA can be considered as the beginning of an Angolan nationalism. Here at least was an organization primarily for the African.

Modeled on similar leagues existing in Portugal, the LNA was recognized by the Government as representative of the millions of Africans overseas. It admitted whites, mulattos, and Africans, but betrayed its true orientation by limiting membership on its steering committee to only whites and mulattos. The League never advocated independence for Angola and never effectively counted for much in influencing colonial policy, but it was given verbal encouragement by Lisbon: the LNA being

an actual federation of all the indigenous associations scattered throughout the five provinces of Portuguese Africa and representing several million individuals. . . . This Liga . . . has a commission from all other native organizations and knows how to express to the Government in no ambiguous terms, but in a highly dignified manner, all that should be said to avoid injustice or bring about the repeal of harsh laws. That is why the Liga is the director of the Portuguese African movement, but only in the good sense of the word, without making any appeal to violence and without leaving constitutional limits.²

For all practical purposes, the LNA was merely a "social" club, concentrating its activities in cultural and welfare spheres. The organization was largely unknown to the Africans in the hinterland of the provinces. Some of its members were dedicated individuals, but they spoke with a very soft voice and were well aware that any influence they might have would have been quickly lost if they had raised it. For example, recently (1960) the LNA "made representations to the United Nations; its relations with the Government immediately deteriorated."³ A similar instance had occurred in the past:

²Quoted in George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? (New York: Roy Publishers, 1956), p. 141.

³Homer A Jack, Angola: Repression and Revolt in Portuguese Africa (New York: American Committee on Africa, Inc., 1960), p. 19.

in the 1940's, the LNA assumed the initiative for prescribing new methods of righting grievances which required the direct participation of the urban masses. There were demands inside the LNA for its transformation into a mass organization. The authorities responded to these signs of unrest according to the usual pattern: threats, pressures, and the introduction of police agents. Finally the elected leaders were replaced by administrative committees nominated by the Governor-General. Similar troubles had also reappeared in 1957. In that year, the directors were requested by the Governor-General to send a delegation to the United Nations to corroborate Portugal's claim that Angola was an integral province of the mother country. The directors declined, and the organizational structure of the LNA was again overhauled.

Also in 1929, the Gremio Africano was founded. Later renamed the more popular Associacao Regional dos Naturais de Angola (ANANGOLA), the organization included both Portuguese and mulattos among its members. ANANGOLA still is a more tractable group than LNA, and has, as a result, received more government support and guidance. Yet it too is primarily a social club of limited membership. One other attempt at legal organization by Angolans at this time (1929) was the Associacao Africana do Sul de Angola (AASA), founded by railway workers in Nova Lisboa. Its militant program was soon interfered with by the authorities; the ineffective organization now enjoys a Government subsidy.

These then were the outlets for the African. They were the only legal secular organizations, appealing to the African educated elite. They followed a cautious pattern of governmental orientation

and control, and created the impression of the perpetually satisfied native. Political organizations other than the government party, Uniao Nacional, were illegal. Movements were hindered because no voluntary group could be formed without the approval of the Governor-General. He certified it, approved its constitution, the names of its directors, and its locality.

There has never been an active African press in Portuguese Africa. Any dissident journals that did appear were soon closed down. The one editorial spokesman for the African cause in the years from 1930 to 1942 was O brado africano ("The African Cry") which was published in Lourenco Marques, Mozambique. But it was softened to a respectable whisper in 1932 after publishing a ringing editorial, "Enough", which ran contrary to all the traditional colonial proclamations of the Portuguese. If nothing else, this editorial merely substantiated the smoldering revolutionary fervor among the Africans.⁴

⁴In part, the editorial proclaimed:

"We are fed to the teeth.

"Fed up with supporting you, with suffering the terrible consequences of your follies, your demands, with the squandering misuse of your authority.

"We can no longer stand the pernicious effects of your political and administrative decisions.

"We are no longer willing to make greater and greater useless sacrifices. Enough.

"We want to be treated as you treat yourselves.

"We do not want the comforts with which you have surrounded yourselves at the cost of our sweat. We do not want your refined education. We prefer our savage state, which fills your mouths and your pockets. But we do want something.

"We want bread, we want light.

"We don't want to pay, but to receive.

"We want of you a more humane policy. We have the scalpel ready. We shall dissect your work. Enough, gentlemen, change your ways. There still is time."

Quoted from O brado africano, February 27, 1932, p. 1, in James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 305-306.

Voluntary African interest groups in the field of sports and in religion also existed. Luanda, Benguela, Nova Lisboa, and other cities, sponsored all-African soccer leagues; Catholic and Protestant bodies encouraged regional youth meetings; the Angola Christian Youth Congresses of 1955 and 1957 were examples of their efforts.

The absence of political activity was not limited to the African, however. The Portuguese from Europe were hardly in a better position. Under the regime there is no voting that has any significance, and no chance for opposition. Together with government-sanctioned cultural and social clubs for the Angolan Portuguese, there has existed the "Portuguese Youth" (Mocidade Portuguesa), an organization formed in 1936 in which school children are forcibly enrolled. The Legion and the "clubs" provide a hard core of supporters who conform in doctrine and action to the principles of the New State. In Dr. Salazar's opinion, the State has the right

to promote, to harmonize, and to control all national activities; the [Portuguese Youth] teaches the younger generation to be devoted to their country, to instill discipline in them, to encourage them to practice sports and physical exercises, so that they may be trained for greater activity and be ready to do anything that might be demanded in the national interest and by the national honor.⁵

The only active European nationalist movement of any importance prior to the end of World War II was pre-Salazar. The Pro-Angola Party was formed in the colony in 1920. It was for the establishment of administrative and financial autonomy based upon the British

⁵Dr. Agostinho Campos in a colonial address. Quoted by F. Eger-ton in Salazar, Rebuilder of Portugal (London: Holden & Stoughton, Ltd., 1943), p. 275.

system of self-government, and proclaimed that the Portuguese colonial administration had not satisfied the aspirations of Angolans.⁶ It will be recalled that the movement for colonial autonomy was particularly prevalent during the 1920's, and the Pro-Angola Party was therefore created more as an opposition to administrative policy rather than an active opposition movement against Portugal itself. For example, the party leaders conceded that Portugal would continue to have sovereignty over Angola, but they wanted the colony to have the right to choose its own governor. Unfortunately, the party died out in 1928 and remnants of it joined Salazar's National Union.

This was the situation until after the Second World War. Beginning in the late 1940's a political awareness among Angolan Africans and Angolan Portuguese began to spread. The general defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe did have some repercussions in the colony. Foreign books dealing with the origins of Fascism and the fight for national liberation began to come into the country, especially from Brazil. There was a renewed freedom of thought and discussion due to Salazar's laxity in failing to re-implement the tight war-time censorship and secret police activity. News began to trickle into Angola of the growing independence movements in the African colonies of other European powers.

The younger generation of Angolans became impatient with the reformist ideas of their elders and began to talk about the need for ending the barrier between "native" and "assimilado." They urged

⁶See Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 58-60.

the need to form African mass organizations to work for Angolan independence. In Chapter II it was pointed out how a minority educated elite was beginning to form a vanguard of an independence movement and how an accumulation of grievances and opportunities began to favor the African. The white Portuguese also began to have second-thoughts about continued Portuguese rule from Lisbon.

At the outset, one must be specific about Angolan nationalism. There is not one mass revolutionary movement, but two -- the African and the European. Both groups have in common their desire to be free of the Salazar regime in Portugal. But both are distinct in character and organization, and each must be examined separately.

Part II: European Nationalism

There are a number of obvious economic and political reasons why Angolan settlers should prefer to go their own way. The factors conducive to separation from the mother country are three: the geographical distance, the economic development, and the creation of a "indigenous" European society. Angola is 4,000 miles from Portugal and although communications link the two, the distance separating them impedes the development of a homogeneous community. No matter how much the Portuguese insist to the contrary, the overseas province of Angola is not in the same category as the domestic provinces of Minho or Algarve. The distance contributes to a feeling of separateness, and also results in a number of political discontents. Even within the framework of existing institutions, the province of Angola is relegated to a status somewhat less than that of the other

provinces: it is deprived of any effective representation of its interests in Portugal. At the National Assembly, for instance, "representation in these crucial years of political change has been limited to three deputies, whose election is not free, and who do not even have to be permanent residents in the territory."⁷ The Assembly comprises 120 deputies: Angola is evidently underrepresented. Furthermore, unlike Republican and Monarchist Governments of the past which appointed as High Commissioners and Governors-General of Angola some of the notable Portuguese politicians of their time, Salazar has deliberately nominated a number of navy and army captains of lesser importance in the Portuguese political scene. The Angolan settlers have thus felt that Angola was a province in name only.

Economically, facts and figures would indicate that Angola is not dependent upon Portugal. Portugal, instead, needs Angola: the colony is an important outlet for Portuguese goods. The mother country has been less important to the economy of Angola, as exports from the province to Portugal have continued to decline. Angolan commercial interests also prefer trade with foreign countries other than Portugal -- the initial investment is usually larger, and the returns are greater. The home country market in Portugal is likewise limited. Europeans in Angola can see no advantage in being tied to the economy of the homeland. Angola, like the other Portuguese

⁷ Antonio de Figueiredo, Portugal and Its Empire: The Truth (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1961), p. 124. The number of deputies from Angola has since been increased to seven. This 1962 decision might be a possible indication of Salazar's concern with the opposition argument that the province is underrepresented as to its importance within the Portuguese "nation."

colonies, is subject to a central policy whereby its economic development has been greatly hampered by the interests of Portugal itself. Instead of being allowed to industrialize its own resources, Angola must confine its economic activity to the export of a variety of agricultural, tropical, and sub-tropical products which are dependent on weather conditions and vulnerable to fluctuations in demand and quotations in the world market. The plantation interests resent what they feel to be the government's rigid and doctrinaire controls over the local economy. They argue that metropolitan import firms are given privileged positions in major development schemes, to the detriment of local interests. They are not happy that

while prices for raw materials and foodstuffs are officially kept below world levels, and some commodities, such as cotton and sugar, are sold exclusively to Portugal, imports are subject to protective policies, aimed at maintaining the market for Metropolitan Portuguese manufacturers where these would otherwise meet with foreign competition.⁸

They have questioned the New State's claim of economic integration when they are still obliged to pay duty on Portuguese goods entering the colony. Other grievances are directed at the establishment of industries to meet local requirements being conditioned to non-competition with metropolitan industry, and the absorption of Angola's balance of trade surplus by its financial commitments to Portugal. The latter results in a lack of available currency to pay for an increasing rate of imports and a virtual devaluation of the Angolan escudo, officially at a par with that of the metropolis. This grow-

⁸James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962), p. 197. He is quoting Antonio de Figueiredo.

ing anger against Portugal's mercantile policies in Angola is unquestionably one of the significant elements in the formation of a conservative, yet active, white nationalist element within the business community.

An "indigenous" European society of second- and third-generation Angolans has now arisen overseas. These Europeans belong more to Angola than to Portugal. They regard Angola exactly as a European regards his own country, and for them Angola is the "nation." Many of them resent the fact that metropolitans consider them second-class Portuguese, and their doubts were confirmed when the white colonization schemes were inaugurated, bringing in selective Portuguese more loyal and dogmatic to Lisbon's policies. There were other discriminations practiced by Portuguese Europeans against Angolan Europeans -- there is the fact that prior to 1950 the bilhete de indentidade (the pass-book) of an Angolan Portuguese was not valid in the homeland; also, restrictions on travel to Portugal applied to the Europeans in Angola as it did to the non-Portuguese residents in the colony. Over a period of years these discriminations have weakened ties to the mother country. New immigrants into the colony also play a part in the development of a European nationalism -- for migration produces new loyalties and new traditions:

New communities have come into existence, and it is possible to see cases of 'proto-nationalities' -- groups of people slowly moving towards nationhood. The most obvious factor in the making of a proto-nationality is length of residence. Labor migrants, white or black, regard themselves as bound to the land of their origin until they become definitely settled in the new country. Portuguese peasants brought in to settle the

Huila region [one of the areas of the white colonization projects] regard themselves as Angolans; emotional ties as well as those of self-interest now permanently link them to their new homes.⁹

This "proto-nationality" has reached fruition in the Rhodesias, the Republic of South Africa. Perhaps it will eventually manifest itself in Angola. Europeans several generations removed from the original settlers of the African nation tend to look upon themselves also as "Africans." Their present country is their home too, and they would not consider leaving it. Very often the overseas European becomes more egalitarian than his former fellow countrymen and looks upon the colonial country as a "meddler" in his own affairs.

"Proto-nationality" of an entrenched white settler element has been the cause of colonial reckoning in other areas of Africa. In Angola, the entrenched Europeans are beginning to question the dictates of Portugal. A typical example was the long-continuing debate on modification of the Colonial Act of 1930. The aim of the Act was to reverse the trend of the 1920's toward financial and political autonomy overseas and to present a picture of a united imperial front. It was incorporated, with some change, into the 1951 Portuguese Constitution. The defenders of the New State consider the Act to be an "inspiring affirmation of Portugal's destiny, the emergence of a new Rome,"¹⁰ while the colonial reaction is more

⁹Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan, White Settlers in Tropical Africa (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962), pp. 68-69.

¹⁰Duffy, Portugal in Africa, p. 156.

reserved and realistic. Angolans, in particular, take a more limited view of the Act, arguing that through it an subsequent legislation, their development has been curtailed and the metropolis has merely returned to the traditional policy of milking the colony for the profit of Portugal. The metropolis has answered the complaints by instituting a certain amount of administrative latitude,¹¹ but Angolans continue to exert pressures. This controversy was one of the factors instrumental in consolidating Angolan European support behind the presidential opposition candidate in the 1958 election.

There is an unrest on the part of the whites in Angola, a boredom with remote, paternalistic control from Lisbon. They cherish their origins, but they also want to feel a separate, if interwoven, Angolan indentity. They want freedom, for instance, to run their own finances without having to refer back 5,000 miles for leave to spend an escudo. The sort of thing that riles the Angolan community was the recent "dismissal" of Governor-General Deslandes and Overseas Minister Moreira. These two were credited with creating the university system now arising in the province, and they fostered the crash program of economic development. They personified the efforts of the overseas element in the building of Angola, and when Salazar placed both in "cold storage" the Angolan community felt they had again been deserted by the metropolis. They pointed out, somewhat wryly, that Salazar has never been to Africa, and is not in a position to know what is best for Angola.

¹¹See ibid., pp. 156-160; also Figueiredo.

Apart also from these purely domestic considerations, Angolan settlers have long realized that the colonial rule of Portugal leaves the political future of Angola open to uncertainty. Many Europeans generally think of independence as the route to becoming another Brazil. The relatively large half-caste element (some 750,000) and a number of culturally assimilated Africans have backed the idea. The argument is that once independence is achieved it would be possible to accommodate a greater number of Portuguese immigrants -- the density of population, 1.8 per square mile, being one of the lowest in Africa -- while at the same time raising the social standards of Africans. As in the case of Brazil, the immigrants would be fitted into a non-racial plan. Still other Europeans visualize Angola as the third party in the Luso-Brazilian community.

One must be careful in dealing with European nationalism to avoid labelling it as simply another movement for colonial autonomy. There is perhaps a fine line of distinction between the autonomy movements of the 1920's and the independence movements of the 1950's and 1960's. Many of the points of dispute between Angolan Portuguese and their kin of the metropolis appear reminiscent of the reforms advocated by Governors-General of the Republican period. The one factor which differentiates between the two is that the Angolan Portuguese of today possess a leadership which was denied to their parents of thirty years ago. The factor of time has also had something to do with the change in feeling and temperament.

It was the Portuguese democrats fleeing into exile with the coming to power of Salazar who provided the needed leadership. The

European nationalist movements soon were dominated by such personalities as Generals Humberto Delgado and Norton de Matos, Captain Henrique de Malta Galvao, Antonio de Figueiredo, Joaquim de Andrade, and A. de Oliveira. Conducting their campaigns from Brazil, these men were instrumental in bringing out into the open the latent settler opposition. In 1949, and again in 1958, these democrats ran candidates for the presidency of the Republic against the choice of the National Union party. Both attempts ended in failure but the opposition gained support both inside and outside of Portugal by focusing attention upon the New State's colonial policy.

General Norton de Matos was the candidate in 1949. He had previously been in the forefront of the movement for colonial autonomy, and the Angolan Portuguese felt that the issue was still of such importance that perhaps he could reopen the whole question.¹² The second legal attempt to oust Salazar occurred in 1958. The opposition had by now crystallized behind Henrique Galvao's "Portuguese Civic Organization."¹³ Campaigning under the slogans, "We

¹²De Matos had been dismissed by Salazar in 1933 for supporting this cause, and his defeat was a foregone conclusion. This 1949 effort was the last stand of the Angolan settlers on the issue of autonomy. After de Matos' defeat, efforts were redirected to a program of full independence. Some of the factors already discussed were instrumental in this decision.

¹³Galvao had created the Portuguese Civic Organization in 1951 after the banishment of the Democratic and Independent presidential candidates in the elections of that year, Professor Rui Luiz Gomes and Admiral Quintao Meireles respectively. It is widely held that Galvao and the Organization were involved in the 1952 attempted coup d'etat. Also, Humberto Delgado, nominated as the 1958 presidential candidate by the Democratic Party was sympathetic to the PCO and was an intimate friend of Galvao's. The ramifications of this association have not been analyzed.

The PCO apparently had no program -- at least one has not been acknowledged. The main goal was to oust Salazar, nothing more.

are tired of being treated as a flock of sheep," and "Fear is ended," General Humberto Delgado was nominated as the Independent candidate for president. Confusion, bad political maneuvering, and personal betrayal combined to defeat him. Official results were not published, but reports gave Delgado approximately 23 per cent of the total vote (236,528 against 758,998 for Admiral Tomas of the National Union), "the majority of them cast in Angola."¹⁴ Delgado, after a period of asylum in the Brazilian Embassy in Lisbon, fled to Latin America and joined with Galvao in the reorganization of the PCO. These two continue to maintain an opposition through the newly-created Movimento Nacional Independente,¹⁵ with centers in Rio de Janeiro and London.

In dealing with personalities among the European nationalists, all others revolve around Henrique Galvao. For almost fifteen years he has singlehandedly been The Opposition, and deservedly, he merits

¹⁴Okuma, op. cit., p. 61. A note of explanation is in order here. The object of this paper purposely must ignore much of the detail involved in these two opposition attempts to unseat Salazar. They fall more within the realm of Portuguese domestic politics; where this overlaps into Angola it must be noted. Both presidential campaigns assumed more the character of a monarchial "palace revolt" than an election campaign, and both were doomed from the beginning. The only importance they had to Angola was that much of the support for de Matos and Delgado was centered in this province.

Political fractionalism and opposition infighting on the metropolitan scene continues down to the present. Most of it is beyond the area of Angolan nationalism, and only indirectly does it affect the province. A good source for the specific developments in this respect is de Figueiredo's book, Portugal and Its Empire: The Truth, especially the chapter entitled, "The Opposition and the New Opposition."

¹⁵Figueiredo, op. cit., p. 87. The organization and program of the National Independence Movement are unknown. Presumably, it advocates the singular goal of the old Portuguese Civic Organization -- the removal of Salazar.

more consideration than any of the others. The activities of this former Angolan deputy in the National Assembly are well-known because of his colonial report of 1947, when he was High Commissioner overseas. His career since then has included imprisonment, and a sentence of death in absentia. He has lived in Venezuela, England, and Brazil, is credited with initiating four major coups against the New State, and has, of late, formulated a colonial doctrine which has won approval from such diverse elements in Portuguese society as liberals, monarchists, Catholics, and left-wing parties. He has said of Angola:

Once the fundamental problems created by the dictatorship have been solved, once the country is liberated and the free exercise of democratic institutions restored . . . the ground lost by the overseas provinces in their scientific development, in the growth of their economies, and, in the moral, political, and social elevation of their native peoples and permanent residents will be regained. The democracy must concern itself with the problem which will be the raison d'etre or the finality of the Portuguese presence in Africa -- the redirection of these territories along the road of their human destiny, that is, their elevation to the dignity of self-government; the surest solution [to the overseas problem], the one which will offer the greatest human guarantees, is decidedly the one which consists in not placing difficulties in the path that a free Portugal will want to follow in carrying out its work of emancipating its provinces¹⁶

These words echo throughout the underground "Joint Committee for Patriotic Action" in Portugal, and are carried overseas in the pages of the revolutionary Tribuna Livre (Free Press), the mouthpiece of the Opposition. Galvao's words appear to be those of a true revolutionary, and while one does not wish to become involved

¹⁶Henrique Galvao, "Portuguese Africa Today and Tomorrow," Africa Speaks, edited by James Duffy and Robert A. Manners (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand and Company, Inc., 1961), p. 176.

in a semantical digression, there is one clarification needed. It has been a common assumption that Portuguese protagonists abroad have been primarily concerned with the disposition of Salazar, and only secondarily with the future of the overseas province. That is, they wanted to oust the First Minister purely for political motives -- to place themselves in power -- without changing the status of areas under the Portuguese flag; the overseas province would remain an overseas province regardless of who sat in the Ministry at Lisbon. Galvao appears to follow this pattern when he amplifies his earlier ideas:

A Portuguese program of action will automatically impose itself on Africa. The territories [will be] elevated to the authority of a community, federation, or confederation of Portuguese-speaking states which will be, insofar as circumstances in the present-day world permit, the most natural and the most human form their destiny would seek.¹⁷

In addition, he conceives of "the work of emancipating its provinces" being followed by Portugal's "making a community which will be the natural result of four centuries of living together."¹⁸ Is the spokesman for the Opposition merely using the words customary to all revolutionaries, or is he saying what he means? Duffy has claimed:

General Humberto Delgado's quarrel is with Dr. Salazar's metropolitan policies, and if African affairs sometimes enter the discussion it is only because the General will use any club to beat the regime with. Not even Henrique Galvao, an old-time colonial officer, seeks to overthrow Dr. Salazar for the sake of the colonies.¹⁹

¹⁷Ibid., p. 176.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 178. (Italics mine.)

¹⁹James Duffy, Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962).

It would thus seem that the National Liberation Movement is really only interested in the Portuguese political scene; in fact this is perhaps what almost all dissident Portuguese really care about. They are not blind to African problems, but they are Portuguese and not African; they want to solve their own problems before they start to solve other people's. The opposition's ambiguous approach towards Angolan liberation is also influenced by the fact that many of them have remunerative interests both in Angola and Mozambique. One suspects that their answer to the problem would be a Portuguese Africa in general run rather on Southern Rhodesian lines. Galvao is a case in point here. He tried to state his case for Portuguese Africa before the United Nations Trusteeship Committee last autumn,²⁰ and even though he is Salazar's stormiest critic, he was branded by the African members as a colonialist.

Like the regime, the bulk of the opposition knows that a history of industrial and agricultural neglect in Portugal makes the retention of the African treasure-chests of paramount importance if the country is to be kept economically afloat.²¹

But, if he has done nothing else, Galvao has consolidated the opposition movement and has brought Portugal before the world.²² Un-

²⁰See "Liner's Captor UN Topic," The Edmonton Journal (November 12, 1963), p. 14.

²¹Elizabeth Morris, "Gun-point Peace in Angola," The New Statesman, vol. 67, no. 1725 (April 3, 1964), p. 514.

²²Useful sources in this respect include: Henrique Galvao, Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal (New York: 1961); selective issues of the Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin published in London by the Union of Democratic Publications; issues of the United Nations Review; and a book by Abel Djassi, The Facts About Portugal's African Colonies (London: Union of Democratic Publications, 1962).

knowingly, he has also confirmed a previously over-looked characteristic of the Opposition -- that it is dominated by the military. Galvao is an army captain, Delgado a general; Norton de Matos is likewise a general, and Quintao Meireles -- presidential candidate in 1951 -- is an admiral. The four attempted coups engineered by the Opposition had significantly broken out at military installations with the knowledge and support of a majority of the career officers. There are rumors now that the army is becoming increasingly restless fighting in Angola and that many of the younger officers are under secret police surveillance. It is remembered that Salazar came to power following an army revolt, and present efforts center on preventing a repetition.

How well Galvao and the members of his opposition have managed to rally anti-Salazar forces against the regime is hard to measure. Continuing arrests by the International and State Defense Police (the PIDE) of such personages as Galvao in 1949, Figueiredo in 1959, and Pinto de Andrade, the Chancellor of the Diocese of Luanda, in 1960; an increasing number of convictions for crimes against religion and the State (the figure for 1961 in Angola was 3800²³); and growing harassment against Angolan Portuguese, would indicate a continuing rift within the Portuguese community. The previously strong and visible sentimental association with the one-time Portuguese colony of Brazil has also been ruptured. In the second half of the decade of the 1950's, Portugal could usually count on the enthusiastic sup-

²³Duffy, Portugal in Africa, p. 13.

port of Brazil and a fair number of other Latin American countries.

Freyre once said of Angola:

Happily I find here people who have respect for the past as something to be defended, not with the exaggerations of an antiquarian, but with a pleasure for those eternal Portuguese values which cut through conventional notions of time to form a kind of 'alwaysism.'²⁴

This was the period of all the talk on the creation of a Portuguese community, a sort of cultural commonwealth of Portuguese-speaking lands. Brazil's support of the idea was a diplomatic advantage for Portugal, for the creation of such a commonwealth would have been a resounding demonstration of its claims for the spiritual unity of the Portuguese world; Brazil's formal association with Portugal in this amorphous union would also have offered a convincing argument against anti-colonial attacks. As late as 1960, this commonwealth, probably intended to be Portugal's last trump in Africa, could have provided a framework in which Angola could be granted limited independence.²⁵ But the change in the Brazilian administration with the elections of Janio Quadros and his successor, Joao Goulart, destroyed this contingency.

²⁴Gilberto Freyre, Aventura e rotina (Rio de Janeiro: 1954), pp. 475-476.

²⁵The commonwealth idea has since been resurrected. See Chapter V of this work. Some Portuguese see the commonwealth in 1963 as the only way to move the province of Angola to independence, while at the same time keeping it within the Portuguese cultural, spiritual, and economic, orbit. The idea has gained new support because of the fear of a recurrence of the 1961 revolt in which Portugal might have to fight both Europeans and Africans. Hugh Kay is an ardent advocate of the idea. See primarily his two articles, "The Portuguese Way in Africa," Fortune, vol. 49, no. 1 (January, 1964), pp. 112-115, 139-142; and "A Catholic View," Angola: A Symposium -- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 80-103.

The predecessor of both of these men, President Kubitschek, was known to be pro-Salazar, in spite of the fact that Brazilians had been increasingly concerned with Portuguese policies. The latter was a result of the scandal of General Delgado's asylum in Lisbon and the Brazilian growing interest in African affairs. Kubitschek, for instance, was known to have accepted Salazar's delays over Brazilian consular representation in Angola and Mozambique, where Brazil would be likely to inherit the cloak of Portuguese cultural influence. Quadros, on the other hand, had had an interview with Galvao in Venezuela and was known to entertain little of his predecessor's sympathy for the Lisbon Government. His granting of diplomatic asylum to the hijackers of the liner Santa Maria in 1961 was taken as a personal affront by Salazar. It is apparent that Portuguese diplomacy still needs to redouble its efforts in again winning the favor of Brazil.

Part III: African Nationalism

The Africans comprise 96 per cent of the population of Angola. It is probable that independence for the colony will rest with them.

A study of African nationalism in general entails certain difficulties: one is usually obliged to rely primarily upon the somewhat contradictory accounts of colonial governments seeking to explain imperial connections, or one must rely upon the accounts of African nationalists determined to achieve self-government and the "good life" of which national self-determination has become the symbol. One is placed in the uncomfortable position of having to formulate opinions and policy and to render judgments without sufficient

knowledge, or, what could be worse, on the basis of evaluation provided by participants in the nationalist struggle. Another problem is in defining African nationalism. The problem is "correlating or distinguishing between the generally accepted political concepts elaborated with specific relevance to developments in the Western world and the conceptual tools developed by the Africans."²⁶ For, despite the fact that African nationalists are endeavouring to mould new nations in Africa in direct imitation of Western form and content, these Western creations are as exotic to Africa itself as they are to the rest of the non-European world.²⁷ One tends to view the whole process through Western eyes.

African nationalism, briefly, is the terminal form of colonial protest -- the end product of the complex transformation which has occurred in Africa since the European intrusion. It is this definition which applies to Angola. The growth of such a nationalism requires considerable gestation, and European elements have contributed to this. There has been the change from a subsistence to a money economy, the growth of a wage-labor force, the rise of a middle class, urbanization, social mobility, Western education, Christian evangelization, the neglect or frustration of Western-educated elements, the eclipse of traditional authorities, and the forging of new "national" symbols.²⁸

²⁶This opinion is held by James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, vol. 48, no. 2 (June, 1954), p. 410.

²⁷See Arnold Toynbee, The World and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 71 ff.

²⁸These are covered in some detail by Coleman, loc. cit., pp. 411-412. They are the most important, but not all, the factors.

Also, nationalism in Africa has been sparked and led by the so-called detribalized, Western-educated, middle-class intellectuals and professional Africans; by those who in terms of improved status and material standards of living have benefitted most from colonialism, in short, by those who have come closest to the Western world but have been denied entry on full terms of equality. From this group have come the organizers of the tribal associations, the cooperative groups, the farmers organizations, and -- more recently -- the national movements. In the province, these elements would be the Angolan Africans whom Portuguese colonial policy has done the most to create and the least to satiate.

Normally, a colonial nationalist movement directs its efforts towards the attainment of two main objectives: the achievement of self-government, and the creation of a cultural or political sense of nationality and unity within the boundaries of the area of the nation to be. Angolan nationalists, in particular, have adopted the second objective because the Portuguese either did not or could not establish political boundaries which embraced only one self-conscious cultural unit; and certainly they made no conscious effort to build a distinctly African nation. Of course, there is a dilemma resulting from these two goals. In most cases, pursuit of the primary goal (self-government) lessens the likelihood of achieving the secondary goal (cultural and political unity). Put another way, the drive behind African nationalism in many instances is not the consciousness of belonging to a distinct politico-cultural unit which is seeking to protect or assert itself, but rather it is the movement of racially-conscious

modernists seeking to create new political and cultural nationalities out of the heterogeneous peoples living within the artificial boundaries imposed by a European master. Their task is not only to conduct a successful political revolution and capture power, but also the painful job of national political integration; and, as Crane Brinton²⁹ has shown, the lessons of history are that nation-building is the product of both consent and coercion, and usually the latter. In Angola's case, it is the Portuguese, of course, who have had a monopoly over the means of coercion.

The major factor conditioning the development of a particular nationalist movement is the degree of internal politico-cultural unity, tolerance, or compatibility amongst the peoples of the area moving into its national era. However, disunities can exist in a given territory for a variety of reasons: traditional pre-colonial hostilities and cultural incompatibilities; tensions between groups resulting from unevenness in development, acculturation, and the acquisition of modernity; tensions between the Westernized-elite -- the nationalists -- and the traditionalists and the masses; and differences within the ranks of the Westernized elite. These historical disabilities are the product of a complex mixture of hard historical and cultural facts, of changes introduced and differentials created by a Western intrusion, as well as of the provocations of the nationalist drive itself. The success of the Angolan movement, or any movement for that matter, will in a large measure depend upon the extent to

²⁹Crane Brinton, From Many One (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948).

which these internal tensions are softened or dissipated. The latter will depend, in turn, upon the degree of repressive opposition, or unwitting or intentional cooperation, of the Portuguese or any other European power; upon the development of pan-territorial political associations, the membership of which is rooted in all ethnic groups, and in which there is free vertical mobility into the "upper crust" which that membership constitutes; upon the emergence of pan-territorial economic-interest groups; and upon many other sociological processes which K.W. Deutsch³⁰ has suggested are essential building blocks of any new national community.

It would be naive to argue that a large measure of politico-cultural integration is required -- as distinguished from being desirable -- in order for the Angolan movement to succeed in wresting self-government from the Portuguese. Most successful colonial nationalist movements have been organized and led by small minorities which have been able either to gain the support of the masses or to capitalize upon their inertia and apathy. It would be unrealistic, however, to contemplate the success of a movement which did not have at least a minimum of unity or tolerance within the "upper crust."

Thus far it has been assumed that the leaders of the African nationalist movements will seek to build new national communities out of the diverse human materials located within the artificial boundaries of the existing colonial territory. This was precisely what happened in Latin America (Spanish imperial provinces), in the

³⁰Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations," World Politics, vol. 5, no. 2 (January, 1953), pp. 168-196.

Middle East (European and Turkish regions), and in Southeast Asia (Dutch Indonesia, Burma, and, in a qualified way, British India).

In general, it would also seem that where nationalism manifests itself in considerable strength it is evidence that disintegration of the old around the symbols of the new order have occurred on a scale sufficient to weaken or destroy attachments and loyalties of the nationalists to pre-colonial political units, either because they have been crushed and are beyond memory or because they are unattractive or manifestly unsuitable as "nations" in a modern world of nation states. For example, the Portuguese presence in Angola has done much towards the creation of a new nation, the "national" sentiment of the nationalists being a reflection of this.

One can conclude by stressing the fact that there is perhaps no other phenomenon capable of evoking stronger feeling than colonial nationalism. The word "nationalism" in a colonial milieu has tended to be treated as the equivalent of sedition, or even treason. There is good reason for this. By definition colonial nationalists are seeking to bring about a radical alteration in the power structure; namely, to evict the imperial power and to enthrone themselves. From the moment it makes its presence known, therefore, a nationalist movement is, in effect, engaging in a civil war with the colonial administration, the constitutionality of its methods varying according to the liberality of the colonial regime and the moderation of the nationalist leaders.

Ignorance and isolation are the factors which have until now helped to insulate Angola from the mainstream of African change. The Portuguese probably recognized this, and were rather proud of it.

But in spite of it, in spite of the pressure of demoralization which was evident throughout the overseas province, ideas of hope and change began to appear in Angola early in the 1950's, stimulated by rumors of what was happening in the British and French colonies and by a belief that the United Nations could expose Portuguese misrule. Late in 1953 a small group of assimilados in Luanda and other coastal towns sketched the shape of things to come by sending a signed letter to the United Nations pleading for intervention:

Justice is completely unknown Punishments are inhuman and prisoners are neither fed nor clothed. Deportation and exile are frequent The whole country lives in terror. Men hide night and day . . . to escape military expeditions and forced labor battalions to distant places.³¹

Nothing came of this. But the fact of having done it was important. Working partly through legal "cultural societies" and partly through clandestine groups in Luanda ("an extensive underground nationalist movement has existed for many years in Portuguese territories"³²), a few Africans began to draw attention to the contrast between Portugal's attitude to Africans and the treatment that other Africans were receiving from other European powers. They wrote makeshift tracts, circulated leaflets, reproduced facts about Angola that foreign visitors had gathered and published abroad, and worked for an improvement in social conditions. This was the moment when the Portuguese could have built a bridge for African advancement. Instead of that,

³¹George W. Shepherd, Jr., The Politics of African Nationalism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 114.

³²Ibid.

they continued with their familiar repression.

At some point in 1959 and 1960 the ideas of nationalism made their crucial leap from the "poets and dreamers" to the mass of the people. Exactly when this was is uncertain. But one example to illustrate this stage would be the political developments in northern Angola. There is no doubt that in this region the leap came when the Bakongo peoples of the Western (Belgian) Congo passed on their hopes of independence along ethnic lines -- to their brothers living in Angola. The Bakongo have a long history of statehood; they look back in their traditions to the memorable kings who made alliance with Portugal in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. It was not coincidental that one of the Bakongo plans in 1959 was to re-create the old Congo kingdom as a separate state, knowing full well that its capital had lain at Sao Salvador in Portuguese Angola.

The Portuguese realized this too. They stiffened their authoritarian attitude, reinforced their garrisons, and strengthened their repression:

In 1956, I spoke to an African leader of Methodist mission work about the extent of nationalist sentiment among his people. He told me: 'Portuguese prisons are not hotels where a budding nationalist can go for a time to rest and await the inevitable surge of nationalism that will set him free. Gandhi and Nkrumah in British colonies faced a more humane opponent. Life-long hard labor and torture are the more likely fate of the African who opposes Portuguese rule.'³³

The years 1955-1959 were also witnessing the formation of half

³³Shepherd, op. cit., p. 113.

a dozen small political groupings.³⁴ Under the tightening pressure of the PIDE, these groupings began to coagulate into the larger mass revolutionary parties that were to emerge as the open African opposition to the New State in Angola.

What type of movements arose from this coagulation? Coleman³⁵ has categorized them as "modernist" in that the nationalist movement, organized and led by a Westernized elite "which is activated by the Western ideas of democracy, progress, the welfare state, and national self-determination, aspires to achieve absolute social and political equality and local autonomy within a broader Eur-African grouping or within what is manifestly a plural society." Involved in the whole process as the workers, referred to by Woddis³⁶ as the "pace setters," the bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia.

The working class³⁷ in Angola is still a relatively small minority of the African population. Moreover, it is a young class, most workers being of the first generation. But it is growing. It has been the case in other areas of Africa that it was these very workers who organized and joined trade unions, became members of political

³⁴See "Proxies for Communism," The Reporter (June 8, 1961), p. 22.

³⁵Coleman, loc. cit., p. 407.

³⁶Jack Woddis, Africa -- The Roots of Revolt (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960).

³⁷The term here used does not include the numerous "contratado" or "voluntario" workers, but rather those Africans either self-employed or working for an employer outside the normal forced labor apparatus. This class numbers approximately 12,500. See "Social Classes and Change in Portuguese Africa," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 3 (February, 1962), pp. 11-15; "Social Composition of African States -- Peoples and Cultures," International Journal (Johannesburg: The Africa Institute) vol 4, no. 4 (April 1963), pp. 19-23.

parties, and took part in demonstrations and movements against the colonial power. In the busy market-of-ideas of the urban centers they became new men, with enlarged horizons and an awareness of class interests and class solidarity, and a new national consciousness. It is against this group that the regime imposes anti-strike legislation, restrictions on the normal functioning of trade unions, and the pass laws. It is this group which becomes rapidly educated in the realities of imperialism; they notice them every day -- in the absence of any African companies, in the collusion of government and management against workers and unions, in the fact that European-run newspapers distort their case and European-led police arrest their leaders, European wardens control the prisons, and European judges mete out their sentences. They cannot avoid having the politics of national independence driven into their heads by these experiences. Out of a growing anger and discontent arises a class solidarity intertwined with a strong feeling of common national bonds. The experience of the working class has been the forerunner of the present nationalist movement.³⁸ But the movement itself is not purely a struggle of any proletariat, important as may be the participation of the workers in it. The Angolan movement, is, after all, a national movement, a movement in which whole peoples are involved and in which the aim is not the particular interests of one class or section, but a common goal.

An important role is thus also being played by the African bour-

³⁸ See Leslie M. Roberts, "Workers -- Backbone of Revolt," The Reporter (August 4, 1961), p. 24.

geoisie. It is, of course, true that such an element is still numerically weak in Angola and that economically it is still not a powerful force.³⁹ Its main sphere is agriculture, and as an industrial and manufacturing bourgeoisie it is naturally in an embryonic stage. Generally, it is also a weak force vis-a-vis the Portuguese. Yet it too is constantly at loggerheads with them. To make any profits in Angola, the African bourgeoisie needs control of its own domestic market, an expansion of that market, and an industrial home base to make the goods to supply that market. It is on this economic aspect that the Portuguese and the bourgeoisie clash. It has resulted in the fullest support for the nationalist movement from this African sector of the population.

The leadership for the Angolan movement lies with the African intelligentsia. In this respect it is not unique. There has thus far not been a single national political movement or party of the African people, in any of the former colonies, in which intellectuals have not played a significant and often leading role. One has only to enumerate some of Africa's most prominent national figures -- Nkrumah, Banda, Chirwa, Kiano, Moumie, Nyerere, Kenyatta, Kuanda, Senghor, d'Arboussier, and so on -- to see how important is this participation. One factor contributing to this leadership is that most politics in Africa have been urban-based, and the intelligentsia naturally come largely from the urban areas.

³⁹The African bourgeoisie in Angola numbers about 7500, and, in many cases, the group overlaps into the working class. See "Social Composition of African States -- Peoples and Cultures", or "Background to a War," The New York Times (April 6, 1961), p. 24.

Portuguese colonialism presses just as heavily on the African intellectual as it does on the workers, the peasants, or the farmers. As Mphahlele has said:

the white settler fears and resists the educated African and goes out of his way to humiliate him, to deny him the things education gives him the aspirations for, to reduce him economically below the level of the illiterate, and politically to the same level. Thus in a community the black man cannot be apprenticed as an artisan or dentist or pharmacist, because neither the law nor the whites will let him The doctor would not be allowed to examine white patients. The clerk who holds a matriculation or some commercial certificate becomes an ordinary messenger. At best, he is given a pencil and notebook to keep an account of the stock in a wholesale warehouse.⁴⁰

The African intellectual, under such conditions, is reduced to the position of a "puppet" and forbidden even to protest against his professional limitations. The daily humiliation cannot but play its part in impelling them towards involvement in the nationalist movement. The intellectual is subject to two opposing influences. On the one hand, the Portuguese try to suborn and seduce him by offering small privileges through a subtle and deliberate process of de-Africanization and of Westernization. On the other hand, because the Portuguese are anxious to retain all the key strings in their own hands, and because white settlers want all the plums of office and profession, the intellectual finds his ambitions constantly thwarted. He comes to realize that neither his own personal or sectional interests can be advanced while colonialist rule continues. It is this two-fold nature of the pressures on African intellectuals -- to have

⁴⁰Ezekiel Mphahlele, "The Dilemma of the African Elite," Twentieth Century (April, 1959), pp. 320-321.

privileges over the rest of his people, yet be subordinated to the Portuguese -- which accounts for the hesitations, indecisions, or sudden shifts of position from one extreme to another which so often characterize their role in the nationalist movement. Another difficulty arising from these same pressures is the revolutionary conflict between the elite and the mass. This conflict was to play a decisive role in the early nationalist efforts in Angola, as we shall see shortly.⁴¹

African nationalism in Angola seeks, as an ultimate objective, independence for the province. The nationalists reject the arguments that Angola belongs to Portugal for a number of reasons. For one thing, the concept of Portugal's historic rights has never been accepted by the Africans; they regard the Portuguese as conquerors, not as a people belonging to Africa. Furthermore, African nationalists question the ability of the Portuguese to develop the overseas territory, the consideration being that the metropolis is itself an underdeveloped country.⁴² The policy of assimilation is also unacceptable -- both in theory and in practice. It is based on the racist

⁴¹An adequate discussion of the Westernized African elite is contained in George H.T. Kimble, Tropical Africa: Society and Polity, vol. II (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1962), beginning on page 398.

⁴²Facts and figures quoted by Karl M. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Products," American Political Science Review, vol. 54, no. 1 (March, 1960), p. 56; by the Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 1 (February, 1961); and by the Portuguese themselves, confirm this. Further, the average weekly earnings of industrial workers in 1958 were \$5.24; Portugal's per capita gross national product is only slightly higher than that of Ghana; and Dr. K.K. Rao of the Food and Agricultural Organization's Nutrition Division reported that in 1955-56, the intake of calories by the Portuguese people was the lowest in Europe, and was equal to the intake in Tunisia and the then-Belgian Congo.

idea of the incompetence of African people, and implies that African cultures have no value. The Africans point out the Portuguese violation of the fundamental rights of man as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948. Finally, the claim of national unity is revealed as a subterfuge which contradicts all geographic, historical, ethnic, social, and cultural factors.

The Africans stated their grievances briefly to the United Nations:

1. The policy of assimilation, proclaimed by the Administration, was not accompanied by an energetic effort to prepare the indigenous inhabitants for the status of citizens.
2. The vast majority of the indigenous population has had no opportunity to participate in the management of the affairs of the territory.
3. Many complaints concerned the denial of human rights, abuse of authority and high-handedness, especially by local administrative officials.
4. The indigenous inhabitants have come to feel that they were victims of exploitation.⁴³

Part IV: The African Revolutionary Movement

Rupert Emerson claims that in the evolution of African nationalist movements, all such organizations at first "combine some of the characteristics of a study club, a debating society, and a genteel political party or pressure group."⁴⁴ Thomas Hodgkin⁴⁵ and Ruth Sch-

⁴³United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola, 16th Session, Agenda Item 27 (November 22, 1961), p. 45.

⁴⁴Emerson, op. cit., p. 243.

⁴⁵Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Tropical Africa (London: Frederick Muller. Ltd., 1956).

achter⁴⁶ also claim that the most prevalent primary organizations for the rise of such groups are the social and cultural clubs created by religious institutions. One can take the standards of these three and apply them to the rise of nationalist activity in Angola. As far back as 1929, the "Society of the Arts" was created from the African National League as a monthly gathering of intellectuals within the larger group for the purpose of "formulating a social and cultural program for League members."⁴⁷ This program was to include an attempt at "nurturing and cultivating the implicit African contributions to art, language, and culture." It focused on dancing, African painting before European conquest, and early tribal history. Many of the discussions of the group centered on such topics as: the Kimbundu contribution to tribal government, the fall of the Bakongo kingdom in the 15th century, and the tribal religion of the Ovimbundu.⁴⁸

The "Society" was selective. Meeting within the building that served as the headquarters for the African League in Luanda, it catered to the members of the Kimbundu and Ovimbundu tribes, conferred membership upon those who had received at least three years of schooling under the Portuguese, and only to those who were bilingual in the native tongue and in Portuguese. At no time was its membership greater than 130, and until 1931, when it was dissolved, only

⁴⁶Ruth Schachter, A Note on the Classification of Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959).

⁴⁷E.G.R. Taylor, "The Beginnings of Angolan Nationalism," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 1 (December, 1963), pp. 15-21.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 17.

fifteen members were from outside the city of Luanda. The "Society" was composed of an intellectual urban elite, schooled by the Portuguese to become eventual assimilados within the Portuguese colonial system. They were given the duty of providing a strictly African social orientation for a strictly African organization. In 1931, the police intervened at a gathering of the members during a discussion on "Manicongo and the Portuguese," arrested all the members present (18), and dissolved the "Society." Records of the security police of February of that year stated that "malcontents within [the group] had ventured to incite by discussing subjects not open for discussion," had used "abusive language against the chairman of the discussion," and "were conspiring."⁴⁹ The "Society" vanished without another mention. One fact which later emerged was that one member charged with "conspiracy" was Angelino Kusengo, an uncle of Dr. Agostinho Neto, now president of the Angolan Democratic Front in Rabat.⁵⁰

The African National League continued to form other branches in the ensuing years to plan social and cultural programs, but such meetings after 1931 were witnessed by Portuguese officials, and were held only every three months. The discussions on tribal history, or any similar subject that might arouse passions were curtailed. The

⁴⁹Michael Derrick, "The Society of the Arts: A Vanguard," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 2 (January, 1964), p. 6.

⁵⁰The Angolan Democratic Front is one of the two major African revolutionary groups fighting for an independent Angola. It was formed in 1963 from a coalition of several smaller parties that had been based in Leopoldville, Congo. A fuller discussion of the party will follow in this study. Dr. Agostinho Neto is one of the first Angolan nationalists to fight the Portuguese. He is a poet and a physician, has been in and out of prison three times, and has a substantial following among the mulatto element in the colony. His background will be discussed in full later.

sessions, according to one Portuguese official who sat through them, were "mediocre and boring:"

For three hours, the members haggled over how many weekly dances should be held in Catete [a Luanda suburb] and what bazaar should have the most conspicuous booth on La Avenida Marginal [the main street of Luanda]. On one occasion, a Kimbundu, who had missed several previous meetings, questioned the use of red tablecloths at a picnic.⁵¹

In 1936, at an open forum sponsored by the African National Congress, several Kimbundu in the audience were flogged in the back of the hall for distributing what were termed "political" leaflets.⁵² The flogging was carried out by police agents canvassing the meeting, several of whom were spat upon by other Africans present. The incident was repeated at another forum three weeks later, when two secret police agents were knocked unconscious. Again, pamphlets were being distributed to the crowd.⁵³

In 1938, the American Methodist mission at Muxima was closed. Pastor John Trevor, the mission head, was questioned on the creation of a Bible-study club which apparently "corrupted official Church doctrine."⁵⁴ Trevor explained on his return to the United States that during one meeting of the club, an African had questioned him

⁵¹Jayme Batalha-Reis, The African National League (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1944), p. 31.

⁵²Richard H. Major, Early Methodist Missions in Africa (Nashville, Tennessee: The Methodist Publishing House-Cokesbury Press, 1940), p. 51.

⁵³These events are recorded in Batalha-Reis, op. cit., pp. 38-42, but this author is doubtful of his interpretation. For a more practical approach, see Francis Gribble, "The Deceptive Calm," The Saturday Evening Post, vol. 175, no. 6 (June, 1951), pp. 31, 71-76.

⁵⁴Major, op. cit., p. 53.

on the meaning of "brotherhood," and Trevor had replied that "all men were created equal in the eyes of God."⁵⁵ The Methodist Church, as but one example, was particularly hindered by the Portuguese. The church recorded six mission closures in the period 1936-1942, five in 1945, and ten since that time.⁵⁶ Charges against them usually centered around the creation of "Bible Clubs" or "Fellowship Meetings." At one point in 1945, the Portuguese Colonial Office labelled these Methodist groups as "political." However there is no evidence to suggest that any church missions in Angola deliberately sheltered or encouraged political activists. Some political Africans did however use church meetings for political rallies. Miguel Necaca, the grandfather of Holden Roberto,⁵⁷ was arrested in 1928 by the Portuguese at a Baptist rally for speaking out against forced labor. The mission staff reported that "he had not been invited."⁵⁸

During the years of World War II, political activity in Angola was well underground. Portugal's sympathies for the Nazi cause on the continent of Europe had repercussions in the colony. The secret police became more vigilant at searching out antagonists of Portugal's war-time policy. There were records of sabotage and harassment in

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

⁵⁶ Henry H. Hart, Contemporary Missionary Work Overseas (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1960), p. 44.

⁵⁷ Holden Roberto is leader of the second major political group fighting for Angolan independence, the Union of Angolan Peoples. He is also president of the Angolan Government-in-Exile in Leopoldville, and commander-in-chief of the National Liberation Army. A discussion of his background and his party will come later.

⁵⁸ Hart, op. cit., p. 49.

some of the coastal cities, but these were more the work of nationalist fanatics than of any organized political grouping. There is almost no information on political organization in the war years. Only after 1953 was there again an indication of African political consciousness.

Among the Africans, 1953 would appear to be the first time that a clandestine meeting took on the overtones of a nationalist movement. While details are sketchy, it is known that approximately forty men met weekly at the home of a "Mr. Patranheiro" (which in Portuguese means "the storyteller") in Luanda to discuss "politics in general."⁵⁹ Several important personages in attendance at one meeting were Luis Santos, the head of the Angolan Communist Party; Pedro Lulendo, now Secretary of the General League of Angolan Workers in the shadow Government-in-Exile; Pierto Kosundo, a former student at Lausanne and member of AASA; and Henrique Azevedo, secretary to Dr. Agostinho Neto.⁶⁰ It was on the initiative of the men at this meeting that the 1953 letter was sent to the United Nations.⁶¹ Another political group was La Soldadesca ("The Soldiery") which had grown out of a former student group at the University of Lisbon. At Lisbon, the leader was not revealed. But when several followers of the group appeared in Luanda in 1953, Jorge Reinel emerged as spokesman.⁶² Reinel remains an enig-

⁵⁹"The Psychology of a War," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 5 (April, 1962), p. 10.

⁶⁰Dr. Agostinho Neto, "Political Memoirs," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 2 (January, 1964), p. 11.

⁶¹See above, page 113.

⁶²Teofilo Braga, "Jorge Reinel," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 4 (March, 1964), pp. 11-12.

ma among the nationalists of Angola. He was a white Portuguese, descended from the famous Portuguese cartographers of the sixteenth century, Pedro and Jorge Reinel. He was a lecturer at Lisbon University from 1946-1951, and came to Luanda in the latter year to research a book for the Lisbon Geographical Society. In 1952, he resigned from his work and was mentioned again in 1956, when he was arrested for "treason."⁶³ Apparently, Reinel first met with members of the transplanted "Soldiery" at a railroad union meeting in Lobito in 1951.⁶⁴ When he returned to Luanda, he spoke at some of their private meetings, and became a fanatic disciple of their cause -- separatism. As treasurer of the group, he secured support for Soldadesca activities from the Portuguese Civic Organization and later from the Movimento Nacional Independente. Reinel then vanished until the announcement of his arrest as he entered the Angola Museum in Luanda. Reinel professed a great belief in the principles of the French Revolution, and was even nicknamed "Robespierre" by one member of the group.⁶⁵ He was convinced that only an uprising against the motherland would free Angola. This uprising was to be a mass rebellion of white and black Portuguese under a combined "directorship" of African and Portuguese intellectuals. The strength of "Soldiery" however would have made this goal difficult to accomplish -- at no time did the group comprise more than 600 paying members.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵See A. P. Newton, "Personalities of Angolan Nationalism," Presence Africaine, vol. 7, no. 2 (October, 1963), p. 17.

One other group of which there is a record grew out of a personal devotion to Dr. Agostinho Neto. The "friends" of the famous nationalist were composed of some forty mulatto families in Luanda who had campaigned for his release from prison the three times that he was confined by the Portuguese (1952, 1958, and 1960), and in 1958 they had set up a fund intended for his "personal use and discretion."⁶⁶ The fund grew to only \$1200 by 1959, and the "friends" decided to campaign for additional support in the outskirts of the city. It was by this move that members of the Kimbundu tribe were first drawn into the circle. Dr. Neto is a mulatto of the Kimbundu tribe, and many of his tribal "brothers" pledged their support.⁶⁷ With the active sympathy of the paramount chief of the tribe and perhaps 3,000 members in the hinterland, Neto's "friends" distributed pamphlets and held meetings among groups of Africans and Portuguese. They staged demonstrations and attacked Portuguese police and military installations in the northern part of the province. When Neto became a member of the MPLA party,⁶⁸ the group of "friends" at first hesitated in joining this larger party organization. But with Neto's elevation to the presidency of MPLA in 1962, the members of the group soon merged into the party.

The years between 1955 and 1959 saw various small clandestine

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 18.

⁶⁷Newton, loc. cit., p. 18.

⁶⁸The MPLA, or Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, was created in 1956 and based at Conakry, Guinea. It moved to Leopoldville in 1961, and was the forerunner of the Angolan Democratic Front. The MPLA was the major rival of Holden Roberto's party until 1963 when it collapsed amidst bickering and recriminations. A detailed study of the party will follow shortly.

groupings professing no particular political ideology, but all pledged to the goal of independence. "Reading groups" appeared in at least three instances: the Hotel Cardeal in Benguela was the meeting place for union leaders and African civil servants; the Polana Cooperative Development in Catete was the meeting place for African laborers; and the Mossamedes Technical School witnessed student gatherings.⁶⁹ "The de Matos Club", named after the former governor of the colony, was created by a group of mulattos who met infrequently during the summer months of 1958. Much of their discussion centered around the former liberal governor. One major project was a compilation of articles on de Matos, some of which were published in local newspapers; the club received commendations from the colonial government for its "exceptional" work. In 1959, three researchers for the club journeyed to Leopoldville where they encountered several members of the Union of Angolan Peoples. They returned to Angola professing an allegiance to the party. The particulars of this meeting in the Congo have not been researched adequately.⁷⁰ What is known is that the club shortly afterwards (July, 1959) tabled a motion at one of its discussions that all members "from this day, who profess a devotion to the person of Norton de Matos and to the ideals in which he believed attempt to implement those ideals in practice."⁷¹ The club members who supported this defeated motion -- ten in number -- arrived in Leopoldville the following month to join

⁶⁹"The Psychology of a War," p. 11.

⁷⁰Perhaps the best is Newton, loc. cit.

⁷¹Gaspar Correa, Social Upheaval in Angola Province (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1963), p. 8.

Holden Roberto.

Police reports also shed some additional light on political activities. One source mentions 36 known groupings which met regularly for "political discussions" in the city of Luanda alone.⁷² No doubt there were many more in the other coastal cities and in the interior. Of these 36 groups, only five were still meeting regularly by 1961.⁷³ Arrests and executions immediately following the February prison riots in Catete in 1961 reveal examples of a cross-section of a revolution:⁷⁴ three Kimbundu arrested at the Lobito Mining Company headquarters for distributing pamphlets which contained excerpts from the "Declaration of the Steering Committee of the UPA" (two of the Africans were later deported to Sao Tome); two employees of the Angola Diamond Company, one white Portuguese and one black, both in the city for "business," shot and killed when fleeing an apartment which contained a small printing press and materials from the MPLA; sixteen members of the Cassinga Tennis Club arrested and subsequently imprisoned for "professing an interest in the aggressive policies of Nkrumah"; four African school teachers and a white priest sentenced to twelve and six years imprisonment respectively for "speaking against the First Minister [Salazar]"; three African students at Cuima Technical School "reprimanded" for attempting to nail a picture of Holden Roberto to a fence; 22 African women beaten and imprisoned for attempting to solicit financial support for the UPA

⁷²Amadeu Cunha, "The Nationalist Underground," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 1 (December, 1963), p. 7.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 8-9.

in a presumably "loyal" African neighborhood; and six white Portuguese imprisoned for trying to organize a "political rally." Police sources also reveal the capture and arrest of 435 Africans attempting to cross the northern border into the Congo during February 1961, many of whom "carried revolutionary propaganda" on their person.⁷⁵ All of these incidents occurred before the March rebellion, and they appear to confirm the belief that revolutionary underground activities were functioning continuously until the open outbreak of war. Of course, these illustrations are only scattered examples of what had been going on for some time.

Tribal associations such as Assomizo also gave rise to the later political movements; cooperative groups such as the Catete Agricultural Center, which pledged allegiance to the UPA in a 1960 letter to Roberto in Leopoldville,⁷⁶ and the Casamodes Union, which contributed 38 men to the National Liberation Army in 1961,⁷⁷ have also been a contributory factor to the rise of the national movement. It is interesting to note that of the six cooperatives in Congo District of northern Angola with a total male population of approximately 4300, only 150 men remained on them in 1961, all under 14 years of age or over 50, and all Portuguese.⁷⁸ According to an Overseas Ministry report, the African males in the 15-50 age bracket "had fled to

⁷⁵Taylor, loc. cit., p. 19.

⁷⁶"The Psychology of a War," p. 12.

⁷⁷Newton, loc. cit., p. 18.

⁷⁸Adriano Moreira, The Effects of the Angolan Revolt (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1963), p. 10.

the Congo or were imprisoned."⁷⁹ This region has always been politically active. Demonstrations by UPA supporters in 1959 and 1960 were put down with force by the state police. As early as 1956, Roberto's followers were organizing strikes in this area, and in 1959, when the Belgian Government extradited many UPA followers back to Angola, it was in this region that they organized party cells among discontented contract laborers.⁸⁰ The Kimbundu and the Ovimbundu are the major tribal groupings in the north and both possessed a political awareness as far back as 1914, when they precipitated the revolt against General Buta. The Kimbundu, especailly, have sheltered political activists. They are the most Europeanized of the tribes, and they appear to be the most readily influenced by political opinion. The Portuguese, on their part, have catered to the Kimbundu, probably because this was the first tribe they encountered when they came to Angola almost four centuries ago and the relationship has remained just as strong down to the present. Also, the major white centers in the north -- Luanda, Carmona, Malange -- are surrounded by branches of the Kimbundu tribe. This proximity of Kimbundu and Portuguese has made the two almost brothers: until the declaration of equal citizenship in 1961, three-fourths of the African assimilado element came from the Kimbundu tribe.⁸¹ The Kimbundu consider themselves as an elite with-

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 11.

⁸⁰John Marcum, "The Angola Rebellion: Status Report," Africa Report, vol. 9, no. 2 (February, 1964), p. 3.

⁸¹Adriano Moreira, The Civilizing Mission in Overseas Portugal (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1962), p. 15

in the tribal complex in the province. They are the second largest in number (1.1 million) and have furnished revolutionary leaders for the Government-in-Exile, the UPA, and its predecessors. The two Kimbundu tribal associations -- Kimosso (a mutual-help association) and Kimdura -- supported the MPLA when it first emerged as a political party. The two associations were also a major source of financial support for the MPLA, and they continue to aid the Angolan Democratic Front. Where they secure the funds is uncertain; nevertheless, from June to December, 1963, the two donated the equivalent of \$12,000 to Dr. Neto and his party.⁸²

The closest ethnic group to the Kimbundu is the largest tribal grouping in Angola, the Ovimbundu, who number 1.5 million. They long remained voiceless in political affairs, and even now they remain aloof from supporting either of the two rival Angolan nationalist parties. For some unexplained reason, most of the African refugees who fled Angola following the 1961 revolt were Ovimbundu. Almost 100,000 of their number went to the Congo, and once there, they set about helping the more than 150,000 other refugees who also had fled. Members of the Ovimbundu are active in Servico de Assistencia aos Refugiados de Angola (SARA), the non-political organization providing material relief to refugees in the Congo.⁸³ The tribe itself has given the revolution only one important leader -- Jose Kalandungo, field commander of the National Liberation Army.⁸⁴

⁸²Taylor, loc. cit., p. 19.

⁸³Marcum, loc. cit., p. 4.

⁸⁴Ibid.

The Bakongo tribe, although numbering only about 500,000, has provided the preponderant core of the revolutionary movement. This is the wealthiest tribal grouping; it is also the most violently opposed to continued Portuguese rule. The Bakongo have a long history of warfare against Portugal. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was they and the Cuanhama tribe from the south who were united against the imposition of Portuguese colonialism; the Cuanhama fought in order to survive and the Bakongo fought to resurrect the ancient kingdom of the Congo. The Cuanhamas are now semi-nomadic and politically isolated from the rest of Angola; but the Bakongo have witnessed the rise of five political parties from their own ranks, and have seen one of them, the UPA, become a government-in-exile and the only major opposition force against Lisbon in Angola. From the Bakongo have come Holden Roberto, the majority of the guerilla soldiers with the National Liberation Army, and the initiative for the 1961 revolt. After 1960, the tribe possessed the advantage of bordering on an independent Congo. Their lands then became the training and staging area for the war of independence. Their lands also became the field of battle.

As far back as 1942, a Bakongo farmers' organization -- the Bassango -- was staging protest demonstrations against land reallocation.⁸⁵ In 1944, the organization branched out into politics, organized a strike at the Damba Agricultural Cooperative (which was

⁸⁵Taylor, loc. cit., p. 15.

put down with a loss of 300 lives) and then faded into oblivion.⁸⁶ In 1952, thirty members of the Bakongo created Bassango Zidwe, a "social and cultural organization" under Portuguese sponsorship.⁸⁷ The group existed for one year until a secret police agent overheard one African tell another that members were "taught to reason in the style of Hume and Descartes."⁸⁸ Unrevealed foreigners "circulating among the Bakongo tribe in the Belgian Congo"⁸⁹ were mentioned by the agent as perpetrators of the "crime."

The bases of the political parties now existent -- the Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA) and its shadow Angolan Government-in-Exile in Leopoldville, and the Angolan Democratic Front in Rabat -- were largely recruited from these tribal groupings. But there was also the combination of an urban educated elite and the African workers, of the students and the members of the middle class. The early beginnings were small -- five, ten, or thirty individuals out of almost four million Africans. Gradually support was to come from the hinterland as well as the cities. The process may have been created with the first meeting of the "Society of the Arts" in 1929.

Until July of 1963, the Angolan revolutionary movement was shared by thirteen parties and groupings -- eleven African groups, and two European opposition groups. The latter still exist and are out-

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 16.

⁸⁸Kimble, op. cit., p. 398.

⁸⁹Newton, loc. cit., p. 18. Also see Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Foreign Influences on the Revolt in Angola Province (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional da Informacao, 1963), pp. 13-15. The title of the latter explains the subject covered.

side of our frame of reference for the present. The former African parties have now merged into two large groups, thus overcoming their greatest weakness -- fragmentation. A discussion of the major African groups is necessary for an understanding of the present situation.

The first appearance of a revolutionary party occurred in 1954 with the formation of the Uniao das Populacoes Norte de Angola by Holden Roberto and six other Angolans resident in Leopoldville⁹⁰ -- this city being chosen "thanks to Holden's close friendship with Patrice Lumumba."⁹¹ The party had replaced earlier nationalist activities among the half million or so Angolan migrant workers or expatriates who had been resident in the Congo. Until 1958, when the party was renamed its present Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (Union of the Angolan Peoples), the organization was tribally-oriented. Roberto and many of its early members were Bakongo, confined to the northern areas of Angola enclosed by the Portuguese Congo, from whence the UPA drew most of its early support. For the next six years this tribal orientation was to stay with the party. It was one of the liabilities possessed by the UPA in its efforts to form a united front of all political parties in the Congo. The Union has always insisted with considerable emphasis that it was a national, not a

⁹⁰These six were presumably Jonas Savimbi, Alexandre Tati, Emmanuel Ziki, Alberto Pires, Pierre Simba, and Paul Touba -- all now members of the Angolan Government-in-Exile. See "Psychology of a Revolution," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 3 (February, 1963), pp. 5-10. Savimbi, Tati, and Ziki are now respectively the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Finance in the Government-in-Exile; Pires is political commissioner of the army; Simba is president of the executive committee of the Youth of the National Liberation Front; and Touba is the representative of the exile government in New York.

⁹¹Antoine Matumona, "Angolan Disunity," Angola: A Symposium -- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 121.

regional or tribal, party. But it was not this in 1954; the emphasis on national representation and the omission of the word "Northern" date from 1956. Also, the Angolan community in Leopoldville, headquarters of the UPA, was composed largely of members from both the Bakongo and the Kimbundu. Critics associated this fact with the support that the party received from these two tribal groupings. Roberto has always denied this; the accusation was only another in a continuing series of disagreements which had followed the UPA since its founding.

The UPA was created amidst disagreement -- both religious and tribal. The Bakongo around Sao Salvador are both Catholic and Protestant. In 1954, on the question of choosing a king (ntotela) for the region, Catholic members insisted on a Catholic in accordance with tradition, while the Protestant majority demanded a member of their faith. The unresolved conflict resulted in the election of Roberto. The Catholics promptly left the tribal structure, refused to join with Roberto, and formed their own small party -- the Ngwizako-Ngwizani a kongo. At the same time, the Bazombo branch of the tribe organized Assomizo a kongo to counter the grouping around Roberto. Within a day of its birth, the UPA had two rivals.

The man who was chosen by the Bakongo tribe is one of those Western-oriented intellectuals which appear often at the head of African political movements. He was born in 1925 in Sao Salvador, but moved with his parents to the Congo when he was two years old. He received all of his schooling under the Belgians, and after 1943 worked in the Finance Department of the Belgian Administration in Leopoldville, Stanleyville, and Bukavu. He has traveled widely --

attending the first and second All-African Peoples' Conferences in Accra in 1958 and in Tunis in 1960, lobbying at the fourteenth United Nations General Assembly, and attending the second Conference of Independent African States at Addis Ababa in 1961 -- but he has only been in Angola four times since infancy. On one of those visits in 1951 he first discovered his political vocation. He saw a chefe do posto (a Portuguese administrative official similar to a policeman) beat and kick an old man, and then force him to run until he fell. On his return to the Congo, he attended twice weekly classes in political party organization secretly conducted by a Belgian for a small group of Africans, and he joined the Union of the Populations of Northern Angola. His political thinking was influenced by his grandfather, Miguel Necaca; Franz Fanon, the philosopher of the Algerian Revolution, who counselled him when he was in Ghana; and by his Christian training. It was in Ghana that he also formed a close relationship with Kwame Nkrumah and Patrice Lumumba, and it was there that "his contacts with Pan-Africanism rapidly changed his whole outlook; he devolved rapidly to liberal and republican ideas."⁹²

Within the UPA, Roberto was chairman of the Central Committee of the party, and he appointed members to the Political Bureau. He was, and still is, Commander-in-Chief of the National Liberation Army, and wields absolute control over a movement which claimed to

⁹²Ibid., p. 121. Roberto's name is also another area of disagreement. Portuguese authorities persist in calling him "Roberto Holden"; the leader himself claims that he possesses three names, two obviously being pseudonyms used often. His family name is Roberto, and the "Holden" is in honor of an American Protestant missionary.

never have had more than 40,000 active members and half a million sympathizers in Angola. The UPA sponsors a youth organization, Youth of the National Liberation Front (FNLA), a womens' organization, Associacao das Mulheres de Angola, a students' organization, Uniao Nacional das Estudantes Angolanos, and publishes a fortnightly newspaper, La Voix de la Nation Angolaise in four languages -- French, Portuguese, Kimbundu, and Kikongo. From headquarters at 78 Rue du Dodoma in Leopoldville, the UPA presently fields an army estimated at 5,000 in five subcommands in Angola. It is this group which has done the fighting since 1961.

The Union of Angolan Peoples was always the largest, the most moderate, and the most effective African opposition group. Its political and military aim has remained independence, even though violence must be used to achieve it. Roberto had frequently said that the goal should be achieved peacefully, but he is now convinced that only violence can create a change in Portuguese policies. He expects his military campaign to spread from the northern region, where it has been concentrated for three years, to the rest of the country.⁹³

It is not clear just how far the political plans of the UPA extend beyond the immediate goal of independence. The 1960 Declaration of the Steering Committee, "The Struggle for the Independence of

⁹³ Although the Portuguese announced on October 10, 1961, that the war in Angola was ended, a form of guerrilla warfare is still being waged. See Anthony Verrier, "Portugal on the Brink," The New Statesman (October 19, 1962), p. 518, and Robert Young, "Values in Revolt," Africa Today, vol. 3, no. 9 (November, 1961), p. 7. Portugal has of yet not lost the initiative in Angola, despite a steady buildup of nationalist arms and material in the Congo.

Angola," is predominantly a recital of Portuguese abuse and an exhortation to the African peoples to overthrow an ancient tyranny. It calls upon both Portuguese and African to join the cause and promises equal participation in national affairs to Portuguese residents of Angola. Its proposals are general:

. . . Angola would form an autonomous state, establish its own democratic, responsible government, conforming to the traditions and needs of the land, a government fully competent to direct public affairs, organize public services, national economy, education, public health, in the best interests of all its citizens and excluding all foreign interference; Angola would appear on the international scene to participate in world government and in the building up of the United States of Africa in support of the resolutions of the Conference of African Peoples held at Accra and Tunis.⁹⁴

Roberto speaks of a strong central government within the present frontiers of Angola. He rejects any possibility of union between the Portuguese Congo and the Congo Republic, but he still fears that President Kasavubu, a member of the same Bakongo tribe as Roberto, may have notions about absorbing the northern part of Angola into the Republic of the Congo. It is known that a small part of the membership of the UPA had worked with the left-wing Congolese African Solidarity Party, once headed by Antoine Gizenga. It is also known that the Adoula Government in the Congo is friendly to the UPA and Roberto, although for a time the differences among the Angolan nationalist groups had put the Congolese in a difficult position.

In late March, 1962, the UPA merged with the African Democratic

⁹⁴Declaration of the Steering Committee of the Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA) (London: Union of Democratic Publications, 1961), p. 22.

Party (ALIAZO). ALIAZO had grown out of a mutual-help association that had been organized against Roberto, and it only became a political party, the Zombo Peoples' Alliance,⁹⁵ when the Congo became independent. The merger created the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, with Roberto as president. The Front immediately announced the formation of an Angolan Government-in-Exile (GRAE) with Roberto as premier and Emmanuel Kounzika of ALIAZO as first vice-premier. This merger and proclamation of a provisional government were political decisions necessary to establish the UPA as a viable political entity in order to deal more satisfactorily with countries in Africa and abroad, and an attempt to outflank the other minor political parties that were then headquartered in the Congo. Beginning in 1958 there was the constant effort of other groups to undermine the mass support of the UPA. There was also the added frustration of the tribal accusation and of Protestantism.

The UPA has always been dominated by Protestants, and this label has special significance in a country where the official Catholic religion of Portugal is dominant. Roberto himself is associated with Baptist missionaries, and he often describes his motivation to Western audiences in Christian terms, as for example: "I am a revolutionary because I esteem that a Christian who remains silent before a crime becomes a participant in that crime."⁹⁶ Protestantism

⁹⁵ In Portuguese, the name is Alianca Angolana des Originarios do Zombo. The party also used the name Democratic Party of Angola (PDA).

⁹⁶ Andrew Westwood, "The Politics of Revolt in Angola," Africa Report, vol. 7, no. 10 (November, 1962), p. 8.

was a propaganda label used by the Portuguese against the UPA. Lisbon emphasized that Protestant connections demonstrated the minority status of the party in a predominantly Catholic country. Tribalism and Protestantism were the two adjectives used by the Portuguese and the opposition parties to denigrate the position of the UPA.

Also, outsiders remained suspicious of the UPA even up until the time it remained as the only mass Angolan political party. The ferocity of the 1961 revolt was interpreted by some as evidence that Angolan nationalism, and particularly UPA, was bitterly anti-white. But it seemed clear that Roberto and his followers made a distinction between Portuguese whites and American or British whites. An American journalist who spent some time with the UPA guerrillas and went into Union-occupied territory reported:

I, as a white, was warmly welcomed. This was true in the villages as well as later among the rebel troops. Holden Roberto and his colleagues had told me in numerous interviews that they were not leading an anti-European movement. The revolution is not anti-white; it is simply -- and brutally -- anti-Portuguese.⁹⁷

Because of these factors and these accusations, the Government-in-Exile had to be formed. The UPA was faced with a growing challenge. It was known that Roberto had long considered establishing a government, but it was to be one on Angolan soil, and in undisputed control of some segment of Angolan territory, not a government whose claim to be the government of Angola might easily be disputed. The formation of it seemed to have been primarily an effort to establish a

⁹⁷Richard Mathews, "A Visit to the Rebels of Angola," The Reporter, vol. 27, no. 11 (September 28, 1961), p. 21.

single proper focus for Angolan loyalty. To extend its appeal beyond the northern regions of Angola, the government had even named Msgr. Mendes Das Neves, the former Vicar-General of Luanda imprisoned in Lisbon, as honorary vice-premier.

Rightly or wrongly, Roberto's party was also the subject of ridicule by the other revolutionary groups; his followers were called "extreme Pan-African supporters" and he was reminded that:

Holden's statements show that he wants to stand out amidst all the Angolan leaders, to give the impression that it is his party alone that is fighting at the front and that he alone is leader of the rebellion. But he must analyze the facts.⁹⁸

The UPA was responsible for the direction of the military campaign in northwest Angola. The party's leadership was established early, and so far, it has been an effective force in directing and consolidating the activities of the Angolan nationalist offensive. But UPA was challenged for long by its immediate rival, the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), or the MPLA. The MPLA as such is no longer in existence, and in 1964 the UPA and the Government-in-Exile have no effective opposition. As late as a year ago, however, the MPLA appeared to be successful in its campaign to submerge, and possibly seize the initiative from, the UPA.

The Movement was numerically inferior to the UPA, but it was a more cosmopolitan and a seemingly-better organized group. Its actual beginnings were unknown; evidence suggested that it grew out of a

⁹⁸Matumona, loc. cit., p. 125.

merger of several clandestine opposition factions within Angola. One of these factions, and the apparent spearhead for the creation of MPLA, was PLUA (the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola), probably the first revolutionary party which planned to operate as an illegal, mass organization in the province. In December, 1956, leaders of PLUA met in Luanda with other organizations to form the new party -- a movement intended to be a mass organization working inside Angola. Perhaps for this reason, and because of others, the MPLA was always the better known revolutionary party to the Portuguese. It was also easier to identify. Some of its leaders, such as Ilido Machado, Dr. Agostinho Neto, and Mario de Andrade, were distinguished African intellectuals, graduates of Portuguese, German, and French universities. Andrade was a poet and one-time student at the Sorbonne; Viriato de Cruz, the Secretary-General of the party, was for long associated with the prestigious journal Presence Africaine and was a poet and writer; Neto, one of the earliest and most widely-known Angolan nationalists, was a physician and poet. Most of the leaders had at one time been imprisoned by the Portuguese, and the party leadership in Angola was all behind bars:

On 29 March, 1959, the Portuguese authorities struck and several hundred people, including the leaders of the MPLA, were arrested. It was at this time that to avoid arrest and the complete decapitation of their organization that many of the MPLA leaders were compelled to leave the country, and carry on their work from places of exile. Three trials followed in which a total of 57 persons were accused of 'attempts against the external security of the State, and the unity of the nation.'⁹⁹

⁹⁹Patricia McGowan Pinheiro, "Politics of a Revolt," Angola: A Symposium -- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 109.

The case of Agostinho Neto is relevant to the development of MPLA. Although not an original member of either of the two major parties, he was named an honorary vice-president by MPLA not only to enhance its position, but also to act as a mediator in policy disputes with other parties. He was appointed nominal president of the party in 1962. The prestige of Dr. Neto is great in Angola. In 1947 he graduated from the University of Coimbra, in 1952 he was arrested in Lisbon for disseminating "dangerous thoughts" (largely to members of the Portuguese Youth), in 1958 he was imprisoned again for "subversive activities," and in 1960 was arrested a third time, transferred to Lisbon, and deported to the Cape Verdes. His second arrest initiated a world-wide writers' protest which eventually resulted in his release, and his 1960 arrest led to African demonstrations in Luanda and other cities. An active revolutionary since 1959, Neto's presence is an asset to the Angolan nationalist cause.

Viriato Francisco Clemente Cruz is also important in a study of Angolan nationalism, and is not to be overlooked. Not as well-known in England and the United States, Cruz was interesting because he learned his politics entirely inside Angola, which he did not leave for any length of time until he was forced to flee from arrest in 1959. He was the founder of the journal A Mensagem (The Message) which was banned in Angola after its second issue; he was the spokesman for the MPLA. At the 1958 Rome Congress of Negro Writers he outlined not only his own political ideals, but also those which were later to be found in the MPLA's long-term program for Angola. He said then:

The unity of the Africans is the most powerful arm on our continent, of the struggle against colonialism. Their unity with each other will be an indispensable condition for material and spiritual progress as well as for securing freedom and the peaceful work of our people. This is a statement, which because it is simple and often repeated, always seems a platitude, but from which only we, the Africans, know how to deduce immense practical value, because we have present in our memory all our experience and the bitterness which is an instinct with us.¹⁰⁰

These words were spoken by Cruz shortly after returning from a visit to China and the Soviet Union, and the speech was interpreted by some as proof of Cruz' political affiliation -- communist. He had a high position within MPLA, and this, coupled with his remarks generally, labelled the Movement as "communist" from the outset. The Portuguese repeatedly accused the MPLA of receiving financial assistance from the communist bloc. Of course, this sort of allegation is used indiscriminately by the Salazar Government against all opponents: it becomes ineffectual through repetition. What is important in this instance is the fact that this allegation was taken up and circulated by some foreign observers. It is ironic that this factor created more interest in the MPLA than the fact that it was a revolutionary party with an organization, a policy, and a goal.

There is still talk that the remnants of the MPLA which went with Dr. Neto in 1963 are "communist." But the degree of communist influence, if any, on the MPLA was never certain. There was no doubt that Mario Andrade traveled in Eastern Europe and to Moscow. He also was apparently once a member of the Portuguese and the French

¹⁰⁰Viriato Cruz, "The Responsibilities of the Black Intellectual," Presence Africaine, vol. 2, nos. 27-28 (June, 1958), p. 330.

communist parties and had published several articles in Pravda.¹⁰¹ His speeches received favorable attention in the Chinese press, and during the Angolan debates at the United Nations, Soviet Ambassador Zorin mentioned that the nationalist leader had written to Khrushchev for support in the anti-colonialist struggle. Khrushchev reportedly replied:

The Soviet Government and the Soviet People . . . are ready to render utmost aid and support in this just struggle for the people of Angola. . . . The patriots of Angola can rest assured that . . . the Soviet Union is promoting an extensive drive to expose the criminal actions of the Portuguese colonialists in Angola and to increase support for the struggling people of Angola.¹⁰²

Cruz attended the Afro-Asian Conference of Writers at Tashkent in 1958; also, his statements on the revolt in Angola were favored for re-broadcast to Africa by the Chinese, probably because they placed much stress on an "international capitalist conspiracy" led by the United States as the factor behind Portuguese repression. Soviet sources readily admitted that the Communist Party of Angola, established in October, 1955, and having a membership of about 4000, was among the parties which came together in 1956 to form the MPLA: "In December, 1956, the Communist Party, the Party of Joint Struggle of the Africans in Angola, and other patriotic forces joined together in the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola."¹⁰³ Both the

¹⁰¹The most recent appeared on February 6, 1961, entitled: "Down with Colonialism: Freedom Will Come to Angola as Well."

¹⁰²Pieter Lessing, Africa's Red Harvest (London: Michael Joseph, 1962), p. 21.

¹⁰³"Portugal's Colonial Possessions," International Affairs, vol. 7, no. 3 (March, 1961), p. 117.

Soviet Union and China consistently treat the revolt in Angola as an affair directed and led by the MPLA's replacement, the Angolan Democratic Front, with the UPA in a vague or subordinate position, if mentioned at all.

When questioned in January, 1962, on the charge that the MPLA was pro-communist, Andrade said:

That was first said when we had a bureau at Conakry and found ourselves being lumped with Guinea as a target for propaganda attacks. Now that our headquarters is at Leopoldville, we are no longer called communists. And to reply directly -- no, we are not pro-communist.¹⁰⁴

The Conakry connection was inflated by the antagonists of the MPLA. For whatever such identification is worth, the MPLA was generally associated with the African nations of the Casablanca bloc (of which Guinea was a member). There would appear to be inadequate evidence to substantiate the accusations that MPLA was communist. There may have been communists within the movement, but it is not probably accurate to pin so easy a label on the group. Extensive research on this aspect of the MPLA is conspicuous by its absence; the supporters of the communist-affiliation theory were either Portuguese or South Africans. Both sources were apt to point out that not only was MPLA directed from Moscow, but also UPA. Such "facts" as the following were exhibited to world opinion: the story of the uprising in Angola started in 1960 with the arrival of Daniel Semenovitch Solod in Conakry as Soviet Ambassador, and shortly afterwards he took control of Soviet operations along Africa's Atlantic coast; that even

¹⁰⁴Westwood, loc. cit., p. 31.

though Roberto is projected in the West as anti-communist, it can be disproved by an Order-of-the-Day which he issued on the eve of March 14, 1961.

The evidence also credited Solod with the creation of FRAIN,¹⁰⁵ credited Roberto with buying Czech arms shipped in Soviet and Polish vessels to Ghana, credited the Belgian and French communist parties with providing the majority of revolutionary funds through the Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund, an organization directly under the Soviet Commission for Cultural Cooperation.¹⁰⁶ The communist charges still remain unverified. Recently, Roberto purchased arms from China,¹⁰⁷ but this doesn't make the UPA or the GRAE a communist party. "Indeed, one of the most striking things about the Angolans is how little they seem concerned with the cold war."¹⁰⁸

The Movimento sent delegations to the various All-African Peoples' Conferences, and it was instrumental in plugging for the formation of

¹⁰⁵The Front Revolutionnaire Africaine Pour l'Independance Nationale des Colonies Portugaises will be discussed shortly.

¹⁰⁶This particular approach to the revolutionary movements is presented in the Introduction to Lessing, op. cit., pp. 11-24. As far as is known to the author of this study, Lessing is the only individual who has undertaken such an investigation. However his thesis is open to innumerable questions, primarily because he is a South African writing as a South African would on the question of Portuguese colonies, and, secondly, because he fails to document any of his "evidence." Also, most observers do not place much faith in articles appearing in Tass, New Times, and International Affairs openly claiming Soviet credit for the Angolan uprising. See Kommunist (February, 1961), pp. 88-93. The theory of national liberation movements and their activities in Angola are carefully outlined in "Proxies for Communism," The Reporter (June 8, 1961), pp. 20-24, 39-41.

¹⁰⁷Lloyd Garrison, "Now Angola: A Study of a Rebel," The New York Times Magazine (February, 1964), p. 19.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

an effective popular revolutionary front in Angola. It consistently sought to bring the UPA into a united front and the UPA just as consistently resisted, apparently because Roberto feared that the purpose of the mulatto intellectual elite in the MPLA wanted to capture his organization from him, or because he possibly feared communist infiltration of the UPA. The controversy surrounding a united front was the strongest single divisive factor in the Angolan revolution, and it arose out of the complimentary strengths and weaknesses of the two major parties.

The UPA and the MPLA were complimentary bodies in a sense. The UPA had a mass following and a mass organization, but was short of leaders with formal training and wide prestige. If the UPA were to have taken over the functions of governing Angola in 1961 or 1962 it would have been pressed to find educated and trained people. The MPLA, on the other hand, was rich in leaders with technical qualifications, but the party lacked a mass following and a mass organization. The two could have realistically overlapped. But the MPLA possessed an element which not only gave it an entirely different character than the UPA, but which alienated it with the UPA. The element was the dominance of mulattos in the Movimento.

The extent of MPLA following was impossible to determine, as it had always been clandestine in Angola and had little following outside. Prior to the 1961 revolt, the party was known to have had an important following among the small educated groups in the cities, but the claim of 35,000 active members, mentioned by Mario Andrade, seems exaggerated. In any case, the strength of the MPLA lay with the

quality rather than the quantity of its members. The leaders and many of the members were mulattos, and the party reflected the discontents and talents of this group. The mulattos had long been accepted in law as Portuguese citizens, a status difficult for the black African to achieve, and it was a status of importance: it marked off the "civilized" from the "uncivilized" in Portuguese theory and practice. But if the mulattos were citizens in the eyes of the law, they were not sufficiently Portuguese in fact to gain entry to the ruling group in Angola. Their Portuguese citizenship tended to cut them off from the subordinate mass of Angolans, yet left them without any real status in Portuguese society. The only significant door that citizenship did open for them was in the area of education. Most of the Angolan intelligentsia is consequently mulatto. Whereas Holden Roberto of the UPA, who was not a mulatto, had the equivalent of a secondary education (acquired in the Congo, not Angola), the leaders of the MPLA were distinguished African intellectuals.

Since the bulk of the MPLA members were Portuguese citizens, including a few white Portuguese, the party had acted at times more like a Portuguese opposition party than an Angolan nationalist party. During the 1961 elections in the metropolis, for example, the MPLA announced its support of the Portuguese opposition seeking to oust Salazar. As the Angolan revolt was to progress in the colony, the leaders of the MPLA took up the call for the liberation of Angola from colonial rule, but there were valid grounds for the belief that the MPLA would have been equally happy with the overthrow of Salazar and his replacement by a more radical home government which might

have allowed the MPLA a share of power, notably dominance in Angola. The UPA always recognized this fact, and it was a reason for the latter's refusal to join a united front with the MPLA in 1960 and 1961.

The tactic of the united front is important in the evolution of the Angolan nationalist parties. Such a feature had marked the origins of the MPLA in 1956, and the initiative for a similar grouping was resumed at the Second All-African Peoples' Conference at Tunis during January, 1960. Andrade and Cruz undertook to form a front of four parties opposed to Portuguese rule in Angola, Guinea, and Goa. This new front was commonly known as FRAIN (from the initials of the French and Portuguese name for the group).¹⁰⁹ It replaced an earlier MPLA coalition known as MAC (Movimento Anticolonialista).¹¹⁰ With the support of Ghana, Morocco, and Guinea, FRAIN, with Andrade at its head, established its headquarters in Conakry. As set up, the front was "open to all organizations of the Portuguese colonies which are actively engaged in the struggle against colonialism."¹¹¹ But its more obvious purpose appears to have been to undermine Roberto's position -- either by drawing the UPA into the organization and thus establishing MPLA leadership over the UPA, or by so directing

¹⁰⁹The name of the front was The African Revolutionary Front for the National Independence of the Portuguese Colonies.

¹¹⁰The Anti-Colonialist Movement (MAC) had three aims: to study the needs of the nationalist organizations; to work for unity of action among the liberation movements of the colonies; and to train themselves as reserves for the struggle being carried on inside their countries. The Movement took part in the Second Conference of African Peoples until it was dissolved and replaced by FRAIN. In the MAC coalition with the MPLA was the nationalist party of Portuguese Guinea, the PAI -- Partido Africano de Independencia.

¹¹¹Pinheiro, loc. cit., p. 111.

international attention to FRAIN as the leaders of resistance to the Portuguese that a refusal of membership by Roberto would have weakened his prospects of obtaining international support.

The outbreak of the 1961 revolt temporarily caught MPLA and FRAIN on the sidelines. Within a month (April, 1961), FRAIN was replaced by a new coalition front, CONCP (Conferencia de Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas -- the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies), also under MPLA leadership. This coordinating committee grew out of the Casablanca Conference of ten revolutionary parties meeting April 18-20, 1961. Headquarters were established at Rabat under the official sponsorship of the King of Morocco, and CONCP laid down a program based on the principles of the various Afro-Asian Conferences that followed Bandung in 1955.¹¹² CONCP was to fall apart in 1963 when MPLA collapsed, but in 1961, it had been effective in securing diplomatic and moral support against the Portuguese. It reported some of the examples to a New Delhi meeting in October, 1961: Ghana had banned Portuguese ships and aircraft; Indonesia had recalled its ambassador to Lisbon; Senegal had broken diplomatic relations with Portugal; Dahomey had "liberated" the Portuguese fort of Sao Joao Baptista de Ajuda; and a voluntary corps, CVAAR, had been created to help Angolan refugees in the Congo.¹¹³

¹¹²It also decided: to struggle for the complete ending of Portuguese colonialism and all forms of oppression; to work for solidarity and unity between all nationalist organizations in the colonies; to work for a common front in each colony; and to secure international support for the struggle for national independence. See "Statement by CONCP," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, no. 6 (May, 1961), p. 10.

¹¹³"Statement by CONCP," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, no. 11 (October, 1961), p. 12.

The MPLA hoped to recapture the nationalist offensive with the creation of CONCP, but Roberto counterstroked with the announcement in November, 1961, that the UPA had received promises of support from Tunisia, Algeria, and the Congo Republic. Also, he was elected, with the sponsorship of Habib Bourguiba, to the steering committee of the Second All-African Peoples' Conference, he completed his alliance with ALIAZO by integrating the remainder of its personnel and field organization into the UPA, and he continued to resist MPLA attempts to divert his party's activities in Angola. The peasant-controlled UPA continued to harass the other parties in their drive for nationalist leadership, which Roberto denied that they should have because they were "not present on the scene of the battle." The failure to compromise angered the MPLA and made enemies among the other minor parties. Such tensions operated to the benefit of Portugal and made it more difficult for either the UPA and the MPLA to obtain open support from independent African governments. The transfer of MPLA headquarters to Leopoldville in 1961 also increased the already bitter rivalry. The revolutionary cause reached a stumbling block -- MPLA and UPA both continued to vie for a leadership which both denied that the other should possess. Throughout the remainder of 1961 and into 1962 the two parties continued to "best" each other. The nationalist movement floundered in indecision.

In 1962 the MPLA took its case to the United Nations. A spokesman for the party reminded the organization of UPA intransigence on the issue of a united front. He stated that "while coordination of nationalist efforts was necessary," the actions of the UPA, "constitu-

ted a 'maneuver to divide Angolan nationalists.'"114 The Sub-committee on Angola issued a statement that it recognized a strong demand for unity from various sources, but noted that "the two major organizations . . . are still at odds over the scope and political control of joint efforts."115 It was apparent to delegates in New York that there existed tribal, racial, linguistic, and personal factors preventing unity.

The program which the MPLA would have liked to have seen carried out by an independent Angola was published in March, 1961. It envisaged equality of various ethnic groups, the return of Angolan exiles, the right of each nationality of ethnic group to use its own language and preserve or renew its own cultural heritage, and the right to autonomy of national minorities with distinctive characteristics (a concession to the Angolan Portuguese). By assembly of the people of Angola, a coalition government would be formed. Women would be granted equal rights with men; foreign military bases would be abolished; forced labor would be ended; agrarian reforms instituted, single-crop cultivation ended, and personal rights guaranteed in accordance with the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. To implement this program, the MPLA apparently had ample money, its own camps, clinics, schools, and indoctrination program, and international support.

The MPLA had no active role in the fighting in Angola. But it was responsible for some internal flareups within the province, the

114 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola, 17th Session, A/5286 (November 14, 1962), p. 67.

115 Ibid.

the major incident being connected with the Santa Maria hijacking. In this, the MPLA played a major role in the attack upon a police station, a prison, and a military barracks in the city of Catete where a number of Portuguese Opposition leaders were held. They also were credited with the 1960 riots in the same city. This might have suggested a developed underground movement active within the province. The MPLA also possessed an advantage of being in an informal alliance with the Portuguese anti-Salazar forces. Neto, in fact, was the cell-mate of several members of the Opposition when he was imprisoned in Lisbon, and supposedly he made contacts in this way. The political thought of the Portuguese Opposition also had a continuing influence on the political philosophy of the MPLA. The Portuguese-educated mulatto in the MPLA shared the vision of Angola as a national entity; their political ideology in this respect can be defined as the African equivalent of white separatism. It was known that the MPLA had made overtures to the Revolutionary Directory of Liberation (DRIL) in 1962 on the possibilities of forming an Angolan-Opposition coalition. DRIL¹¹⁶ is a branch group of Galvao's now-defunct Portuguese Civic Organization, and apparently it is still active in the revolutionary underground in Angola.

Throughout 1962 and early 1963 there was a precarious quiet among the nationalist groups both inside and outside Angola. Efforts appeared to have reached a period of static activity. There were no new territorial or political gains by the National Liberation Army,

¹¹⁶United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola, 16th Session, Supplement No. 16, A/4978 (February, 1962), p. 12.

and at the same time, the Portuguese did not suffer any additional losses. Emphasis began to shift to other arenas: the nationalists looked to world opinion, the United Nations, and the other African nations for support, the Portuguese attempted to bolster their position with the use of old allies and the manipulation of new-found friends. Plans for another major revolt similar to that which broke out in March, 1961, failed to materialize by December, 1963.¹¹⁷

In May of 1963 Roberto's policy of concentrating on three basic goals -- building a military force, creating a mass political base, and securing the goodwill of the government of the Congo -- began to pay off. In that month the African summit gathering at Addis Ababa created a "Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa" with headquarters at Dar-es-Salaam. Through this committee, independent Africa was to henceforth channel all financial assistance to African liberation movements. A "Goodwill Mission" was created of representatives of Congo, Nigeria, Algeria, Guinea, Uganda, and Senegal, to go to Leopoldville with the intention of reconciling the major Angolan nationalist groups. Only Congo and Nigeria were known to be favorable to the UPA, but by the time the mission was starting, Roberto's party secured the de jure recognition of the Congolese Government, which announced its intention of giving the UPA and the GRAE "all aid and assistance."

The MPLA was busy negotiating a "cartel" agreement with the eleven other minor revolutionary parties at the same time. To the

¹¹⁷See "Angola Fighting Foreseen," The Edmonton Journal (November 11, 1963). Reprinted from a Times-Post dispatch from the United Nations.

surprise of the foreign press and African nations, this "cartel" initiative suddenly aggravated dissensions that had apparently been brewing within the MPLA for some months. On July 5, Viriato Cruz convoked a meeting of party dissidents, attacked Neto for "suspect relations" with Portugal, deposed him, and established a Provisional Executive Committee to run the party.¹¹⁸ Many of these dissidents were arrested two days later by Congolese police when they attempted to seize control of the MPLA offices in Leopoldville, and on July 12 they held a press conference following their release at which they proclaimed support for the Government-in-Exile and indicated their willingness to join Roberto's party. Later, however, they failed to commit themselves to the person of Holden Roberto or the program of his movement. They restricted themselves only to hailing Congolese diplomatic recognition as a tribute to the struggle of the Angolan people: "It is therefore evident that one of the historic tasks of the GRAE is to direct and control the resistance of the Angolan people and the armed liberation struggle."¹¹⁹ Cruz made it clear that the dissident MPLA wanted in the GRAE, but with a minimum of commitments.

On July 10, Dr. Neto announced the formation of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Angola, and declared that he wished to

¹¹⁸ Marcum, loc. cit., p. 6. The members of the Provisional Executive Committee were Viriato da Cruz, Matias Migueis, Jose Miguel, Jose Domingos, Georges Freitas, Antonio Alexandre. The Provisional Committee is still outside of the UPA-GRAE organization (1964), and prospects for its entry into the recognized government do not appear to be very good. Cruz still claims that his group is the only MPLA party.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

enter directly into the GRAE. He argued that only his participation would give Roberto's government a sufficiently "representative character" so as to enable it to command recognition from all African states and "to exercise authority over all Angolans."¹²⁰ He then retired with his faction to Rabat. The MPLA ceased to exist as an effective political organization. In its place there were now two rival factions, each claiming to be the "real" MPLA. Some MPLA leaders appeared to withdraw from active politics and others remained active in the pro-MPLA student organization, Uniao Geral Dos Estudantes da Africa Negra sob Dominacao Colonial Portuguesa (UGEAN), in Rabat. Neto's Angolan Democratic Front remains outside the Government-in-Exile.

The "Goodwill Commission" arrived in Leopoldville on July 13 and held closed hearings with Viriato da Cruz and visited the UPA's military base at Camp Kinkusu. They then endorsed the Exile Government as the only Angolan nationalist movement effectively fighting for independence, recommended that all African aid to Angolans be channeled through the Congolese Government and be earmarked for the GRAE, and requested African governments to recognize the Exile Government but "not to entertain or offer help to other [Angolan] organizations in their territory."¹²¹ A month later, the Commission's recommendations were unanimously accepted by the foreign ministers of the 32 independent states of the Organization of African Unity. Roberto's party and government emerged as the only Angolan nationalist

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 7.

movement after almost ten years of frustration.

By remaining in Leopoldville, and by adhering to the new policy of the Adoula Government that only one movement from each territory in Southern Africa be headquartered in that city, the GRAE now hopes to induce cooperation among all like-thinking groups dedicated to the liberation of Mozambique, South Africa, SouthWest Africa, and Angola. The former confusion, competition, and conflict between two or three groups that had dominated the Angolan nationalist cause has thus been submerged.

In Angola, there were a total of thirteen revolutionary parties. A word must be said about the other groups. They were all smaller and less-known movements, but they all shared the same objective of the UPA and the MPLA -- independence. As the United Nations Sub-committee said in 1962: "[The Portuguese Government] has so far failed to take into account that all Angolan political groups without exception . . . are in favor of the eventual establishment of an independent Angolan state."¹²² But all of them were working for it in different ways, dissipating their forces and reducing the chances of achieving the objective. Some of the minor parties were organized to counter MPLA and UPA, several wanted closer cooperation with Portugal, and a few were created as the basis of a hoped-for united front.

The MDIA (Le Mouvement de Defense des Interets Angolais), NTO-Abako, and NGWIZAKO were sponsored by the Portuguese with the objective

¹²²Report of the Sub-committee, 17th Session, p. 81.

of developing them as rivals to the main resistance movements. A fourth group, MLEC (Mouvement pour la Liberation de l'Enclave de Cabinda), authentically African, sought separate independence for Cabinda. All four parties had headquarters in Leopoldville (the MDIA had theirs in the Portuguese Embassy compound). MDIA was founded in 1961 and was another dissident group of the UPA -- the Mtala wing (after the name of its leader) of members of the Bazombo tribe who had constituted three-quarters of the Executive Committee of the UPA until 1955. They left the UPA because of Roberto's isolationism, his seizure of the party, and his nepotism. The party's purpose was the liberation of Angola through negotiation with Portugal, and Albert Matunda, its president, worked closely with the Portuguese to achieve this end. MDIA was willing to accept the Salazarist "community" idea as a temporary stage in the process, but later changed their views when Portugal refused to cooperate with them. The party's influence was almost non-existent outside Angola, and there was an attempt to correct this in late 1962 when MDIA opened an office in Luanda.

NTO-Abako, another of the minor parties recognized by the Portuguese as the only "valid" representatives of the Angolan people, was founded to drain off support from the Bakongo people in the north. It was against the nationalist cause, and advocated continued Portuguese rule. Its leader, Angelino Alberto, based the party on sole tribal lines and supported the Portuguese efforts to "pacify" the colony.

NGWIZAKO sought the restoration of a Bakongo kingdom centered on Sao Salvador, the center of UPA strength, and used the same "coop-

eration" tactics as the MDIA. The revival of the Kingdom of the Congo was viewed by NGWIZAKO as the only peaceful means to the achievement of Angolan independence, and for this reason, it was refused admittance to the UPA united front in 1962. However, the party continued to demonstrate its wish to collaborate closely with any other party "with the same ideology."

The Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC) operated in Leopoldville among exiles from Cabinda. Party leaders sought independence for the small enclave and opposed either its incorporation into the larger Congo or an association with an independent Angola. They protested the Portuguese annexation of Cabinda in the United Nations on the grounds that initial occupation was in violation of existing treaties signed in 1883 and 1885. MLEC was opposed by another group, the Action Committee for the National Union of Cabinda (CAUNC), which broke with the policy of MLEC in December, 1961. They advocated holding a United Nations-supervised referendum in the enclave on the question of integration of Cabinda with the Congo Republic. Not much was known about CAUNC other than it lacked mass support and was probably allied with tribal interests in the Congo.

MLEC was a moderate party but it was prepared for a defensive struggle with Portugal. It had hoped to start genuine negotiations with Salazar, but in a neutral country and under the auspices of the United Nations. In this respect, it was in sympathy with the MPLA and with ALIAZO, which both sent voluminous correspondence to Lisbon appealing to the government to reconsider its claim to be realistic

about Angolan problems and to start negotiations before the masses became exasperated and rebelled.

The policies of "cooperation" with Portugal practiced by the smaller parties (or "independence in reverse" as some irate nationalists called it) might have been genuine. There was never any outright intent at collaboration, but more of a desire to use Portugal as a leverage in the achievement of independence for Angola. But Salazar became more determined to maintain his hold on the province, and he also discovered that he was being "used." Some of the minor parties began to have second-thoughts on "cooperation" in 1962, as they found Portuguese officials in Leopoldville corrupting their followers. The MDIA, NGWIZAKO, NTO-Abako, and MLEC were subjected to increasing Portuguese pressures. The PIDE was active in arresting many of their members, and in 1962, they deported 250 Angolan university students in the colony. These had formed the intellectual core of groups such as MDIA.

The year 1963 saw the continued disintegration of the nationalist movement as additional splinter groups arose. The Angolan National Movement (MNA), The Angolan Unity Front (FUA), and the Union of Negro Laborers and Workers of Angola (UTONA) were all formed. The latter was an illegal trade union with underground headquarters in Angola, while the former two were located in the Congo. MNA was radical, professing violence as the only means for immediate independence. FUA claimed that it was working for "unity of all elements" favoring independence. Its unknown leaders were supposedly imprisoned in Angola and Portugal, and its membership originated

from "the national aspirations of the Angolan people." The UPA formed a new group in 1963 -- the General League of Angolan Workers (LTGA), now associated with the Government-in-Exile. LTGA is a trade-union movement with directors from the National Liberation Army. It became a political force in Angola and has received support from the AFL-CIO in the United States, from Israel and West Germany, from Tunisia, and from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Geneva. This support was in the form of scholarships, money, and technical assistance:

The youth groups of the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) have collected a sum of more than DM 15,000 to assist the LGTA, the Angola Trade Union Federation in Exile. In addition, they contributed a great deal of stationery; including more than 5,000 exercise books. With this action, the German Trade Union youth is lending support to the educational efforts of the Angola Trade Union Federation in Leopoldville, which are directed to providing elementary education for children and juveniles in the refugee camps who have no facilities for attending school.¹²³

As this confusion and proliferation of parties grew in 1962 and 1963, unity remained impossible, and Portugal seized an advantage. With so many scattered parties, Portugal initiated the tactics of division and retaliation in order to hold on to Angola. There were many ways to divide the Africans, but the most obvious was to play upon tribal loyalties. Portugal recruited Kimbundu tribesmen to fight the Bakongo rebels; instituted an internal spy network which resulted in Ganguelas reporting on the Ovimbundu, or the Ovimbundu

¹²³"DGB Youth Assists the Angola Trade Union Federation," DGB Newsletter, vol. 15, nos. 1-2 (Dusseldorf: January, 1964), p. 4.

turning in a Chokwe, or a Kimbundu capturing a Bakongo; bred dissension with the use of radio broadcasts; intensified the rivalry between Catholics and Protestants at the village level; and played up in the press tribal loyalties to the Government during rebel attacks. One heard news broadcasts in Umbundu preaching: "We are Portuguese and we must defend ourselves from these invaders who come from outside. Do you want to be like the Congo? This is stupidity on our part to think that we can live independently of the Portuguese."¹²⁴ One could read an article in O Lobito on the loyalty of the Bailundu:

Before us is a Bailundu, Pedro Jose, who has been wounded in both arms while in the north of Angola. It is of interest to hear of his loyalty and to hear also of other loyal Angolans, of whom there are many in this Portuguese province. At this moment our thoughts are with those who were massacred while defending our country where peace always reigned between blacks and whites without conflict. For the first time I present to the press of our country one of these humble and brave Portuguese of the black race. We know how he feels. We sympathize with him in his loss of his employer.¹²⁵

The police, of course, still play an important role in the suppression of nationalism. Since 1960, the PIDE in Angola has added six hundred guards to its ranks and has opened branches in all major cities; the army has been increased to approximately 40,000, and a Corpos de Voluntarios has been created by the whites to deal with dissident Africans. These tactics registered initial gains for the Portuguese when the Angolan nationalist effort was disunited and confused. But terrorism and repression have still prevented a re-

¹²⁴Okuma, op. cit., p. 89.

¹²⁵Ibid., pp. 87-88.

currence of the 1961 revolt, and have prevented the UPA-GRAE from seizing any great additional gains. There is a well-known dictum about the Portuguese character:

The Portuguese man is, above all, profoundly humane and kind-hearted, without being weak. He does not like to . . . make others suffer and he avoids conflict. But when ill-treated and hurt in his pride, he becomes violent, and in many cases, excessively cruel.¹²⁶

The Government-in-Exile, the National Liberation Army, and the Portuguese are all aware of this fact. The problem remains to mitigate or destroy this violence and cruelty.

Following the collapse of the MPLA in the summer of 1963 and the resurgence of the UPA at the same time, the minor parties either ceased to exist or went their own ways. MDIA, NGWIZAKO, NTO-Abako, MNA, and UTONA all split into factions on the announcement of the collapse of the MPLA. A faction of each announced their adhesion to Neto's Angolan Democratic Front, and the remaining faction of each declared itself to be outside and independent of the Rabat front. Thus, the Angolan nationalist movement, in the summer of 1963, was led by Holden Robert's UPA party and its shadow Government-in-Exile in Leopoldville, and contested by Agostinho Neto's isolated Angolan Democratic Front in Rabat, Morocco.

¹²⁶Shepherd, op. cit., p. 115.

CHAPTER IV

WHITE AGAINST BLACK:

PORTUGAL BEFORE THE WORLD

In the turmoil of revolution . . . the basis for peace and brotherhood in Africa is being restored by the resurrection of national sovereignty and independence, of equality and the dignity of man. . . . We do not demand these things for the people of African descent alone; we demand them for all Africans, black and white, . . . A free and independent Africa is in the making.¹

Angola is presently witnessing the clash of two nationalisms -- on the one hand, there is the historic, entrenched, and organized nationalism of the Portuguese; and on the other, the incipient and determined nationalism of the African. Only one must eventually survive. Both sides continue to seek support and alignment; both search for friends to bolster their cause.

There is considerable truth in the remark that Portugal has survived in Africa through its own inertia and the skill of its diplomats. Certainly part of Portugal's success until very recently in keeping the spotlight of publicity away from the African territories has been because of the friendly association Portugal has cultivated and maintained with the allies of the North Atlantic

¹Albert John Luthuli, quoted in Thomas P. Melady, The White Man's Future in Black Africa (New York: MacFadden Books, 1962), p. 209.

Treaty Organization, with Brazil, and with neighboring white governments in Africa. Even with the emergent African nations, Portugal has attempted to limit the argumentation to the United Nations forum. The nation continues to seek its objectives and to present its case both in New York and through other international agencies. The larger the forum, the better and louder the Portuguese argue. But, at the same time, Portugal has combined this technique of "open persuasion" with a covert diplomatic necessity. While keeping the enemies at arm's length in the United Nations, the Portuguese continue embracing their old allies in the halls of London, Washington, Madrid, Paris, and Pretoria. These diplomatic relationships between Portugal and its allies are still vitally important, in spite of recent stresses, because it is within this framework that persuasion may be brought on Portugal to change its policy in Africa. If, on the other hand, Portugal is adamant in its decision not to yield in Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa may play an important role in the events to come. If Portugal can also see to it that the attacks of the African nations are contained within the Security Council or the General Assembly, this, too, will be a diplomatic triumph.

Part I: "Our Oldest Ally"

On the face of it, the Portuguese would seem to possess the advantage in Angola: not only do they have the asset of force and coercion, but they are a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (having signed the Charter in 1949), and the United Nations

(having become a member on December 14, 1955). Through both Portugal can exert influence on world opinion. It also continues to maintain an historic alliance with the United Kingdom (the Treaty of Windsor, dating back to 1386); and through the accident of geography with the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Spain, it is within close proximity to political and military support. Portugal also is a sovereign government with the facilities necessary to enforce its policies and to isolate its opponents. Its troops are train and well-equipped, its secret police all too efficient. It controls communications, is friendly with some of the most powerful states of the world. The Angola guerrilla war is not itself enough to make it necessary for Portugal to come to terms with the "inevitable."

Portugal has never feared the use of force and violence in the preservation of the national patrimony, and Angola is no exception. Actions undertaken by the New State in the colony are a repetition of past experience: terror and mass murder have always been an effective counter to dissent and rebellion. Present estimates of the casualties growing out of the guerrilla war have been placed at anywhere between 20,000 and 35,000,² most of which are African. In northern Angola, the Portuguese attempt at pacification has involved the indiscriminate slaughter of men, women, and children. It is true that Angolan rebels began the massacres in

²This latter figure, supplied by the London Missionary Society, may well be too high; it is taken from "Our Job In Angola," The Economist (July 8, 1963), p. 118.

1961;³ because of this, the Portuguese Minister of Defence has regarded them not as human beings but as "savages and wild beasts."⁴ But this does not justify the bombing and machine-gunning of villages, the firing of jungle grass so that the Africans can be burned out as game, or the other evidences of atrocities carried out by the white community within Angola.⁵ The war is now in its third year; the Portuguese build-up of men and materiel continues. Forty thousand soldiers, a police constabulary of 8,000, a civilian Voluntary Corps of approximately 10,000 white settlers, and an increasing flow of NATO armaments to Angola (which averaged 5,000 rifles, 400 mortars, ten convoy trucks, and one fighter plane a month over a half-year period in 1962⁶) would indicate an over-balance in favor of Portugal.

³Evidence supporting this view, that the rebels initiated the terror, may be found in "Our Job in Angola" (quoted above); Clifford Parsons, "The Makings of a Revolt," Angola, A Symposium -- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 58-79; Basil Davidson, "Angola 1961: The Factual Record," The New Statesman (August 11, 1961), pp. 176-178; and United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola, 16th Session, Supplement no. 16 (A/4978), (February, 1962), p. 12.

⁴Quoted from "Our Job in Angola," p. 118.

⁵Valuable sources in this instance include: James Duffy, Portugal In Africa (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962), who labels the conflict as a "war of extermination" -- see especially the chapter entitled "The Death of the Dream," pp. 191-229; United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola, 16th Session (February, 1962), pp. 15-16; Robert Young, "Values in Revolt," Africa Today, vol. 8, no. 9 (November, 1961), pp. 4-7, 11; Parsons, loc. cit.; and Ronald Segal, "Begging Is Forbidden: Portuguese Africa," African Profiles (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962).

⁶"War In Angola," The London Daily-Telegraph (June 4, 1962), p. 3.

Also, the Portuguese possess a know-how in dealing with revolts. In 1914, and again in 1928, native revolts were "arrested" with losses of only 2,000 and 1,500 African lives respectively,⁷ and a 1953 uprising on Sao Tome Island witnessed the first use of a "psychosocial campaign" by the army. Incorporated into a special branch of the military, the "campaign" has been used as a tactical measure in Angola. It lays down the principle that

. . . the recuperation of populations constitutes the ultimate expression of the obligations connected with the military function. The military services no doubt have the responsibility or mission, once the objectives of warfare are reached, to bring back the elements to the state of tranquility and productiveness which prove necessary after the fighting and which make for the natural restoration of the material values and the spiritual grandeur that have been deeply affected.⁸

The application of the "psychosocial campaign" resulted in 1500 arrests in Lobito on May 20, 1961,⁹ and the death of seventeen American Methodist pastors at Portuguese hands.¹⁰ This action emphasizes that "those responsible for the military services do not neglect any detail from psychology, and they test in practice any-

⁷A. Duarte de Almeida, Colonial History of Portugal (Lisbon: SNI Books, 1930), pp. 227-228.

⁸Quoted from an article, "Military Forces Cooperate in Operations of a Psychological Nature," by Lieutenant-Colonel Aires Martins in The Affairs of Porto [O Comercio do Porto], August 8, 1962, and reproduced in: United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola, 17th Session, A/5286 (November 14, 1962), pp. 51-52.

⁹"Spotlight -- Angola," The London Sunday Telegraph (May 20, 1961), p. 4.

¹⁰See "Letter from Angola," Manchester Guardian (July 18, 1961), p. 8, from Clifford J. Parsons.

thing that may bring apprehensive individuals to a state of confidence and tranquility."¹¹ There is no doubt that the campaign continues as an important military function in the northern areas of the colony.

Militarily, as one example of the cooperation Portugal is receiving as benefits of an alliance, the actions of the Conservative Government in London might be illustrative. Needless to say, the actions of that government towards Portugal have proved embarrassing at home: the coincidental outbreak of the 1961 revolt in Angola with the sale of two frigates, Mounts Bay and Morecambe Bay to Portugal on June 17 of that year, plus a "goodwill" visit of the HMS Leopard to Luanda on May 15, the despatch of the 19th English Brigade to Portugal for "training" and the carrying out of joint exercises by six frigates of the English Home Fleet with units of the Portuguese navy and air force in the Tagus on June 16.¹² British arms supply to Portugal have continued, but have been justified by Harold MacMillan:

As I said to the House some days ago, the position is that no licenses for the export of arms or ammunition from Britain are, in fact, being made in respect of Angola and Mozambique. That does not effect certain large deliveries of equipment that are only suitable for Portugal in her place as a NATO ally.¹³

¹¹Quoted from Martins' article and reproduced in Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola, 17th Session, A/5286 (November 14, 1962), p. 52.

¹²These incidences are verified by Patrick Wall, "Britain and Angola: The Attitude of the British Government," and Basil Davidson, "The Oldest Alliance Faces a Crisis," both in Angola: A Symposium -- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 130-137, 138-159.

¹³Hansard (July 4, 1961), cols. 1256 onwards, quoted in Davidson, Ibid., p. 154.

But as is the case with the other NATO partners of Portugal, how do you draw the line between what is suitable for Portugal as a NATO ally and what is suitable for Portugal in the conduct of a colonial war? On which side of the line, for example, would napalm bombs fall? These are among the military consignments by Britain to Portugal; however, the stand of Britain on the Portuguese issue is not Britain's alone. There are other ramifications to be uncovered presently.

Therefore, it must appear as though the nationalist movement has little chance of success in a war against an adequately-equipped European power, possessing not only weapons, but also the not always intangible benefits of political association and alliance. One can wonder how a military victory could be won by the ill-armed and ill-equipped "National Liberation Army." In the political realm, up to the moment of the vote on Angola in the United Nations Security Council in March, 1961, Portugal could confidently count on the sympathetic, though often discreet, support of the major Western powers: England, France, and the United States, and of Spain, Brazil, and South Africa. Each of them supported Dr. Salazar out of political and economic considerations.

In attempting a brief answer to the English position vis-a-vis Portugal, it is useful to begin with old treaties. The oldest Anglo-Portuguese treaty of alliance and mutual aid is Plantagenet, and barely relevant; yet here it is worth noting that the characteristic limits of subsequent behavior were already defined. For example, when Captain Galvao was refused permission to visit the

United Kingdom in 1961, he was, in fact, suffering under Article 3 of the Treaty of Windsor of 1386:

Further, it is mutually agreed that it shall not be by any means permitted to the said Kings, or to any of their subjects, Lands, or Dominions, of whatsoever station, degree or condition, to give or afford to in any matter counsel, aid, or favor any Land, Dominion, or Nation, which shall be at enmity with or rebelling against either Party . . . or to give directly or indirectly, publicly or clandestinely, any countenance, of whatever nature or kind it may be, to such enemies or rebels . . . or to administer or extend to such enemies and rebels any succour that may redound to the prejudice of the other Party. . . .¹⁴

The general terms of this "oldest alliance" were confirmed by Charles I in 1642; but the corner-stone of Britain's modern relations with Portugal -- if the adjective be allowable in this connection -- was laid with Charles II's Marriage Treaty of 1661. Here one finds a full doctrine of "aid and protection" in formal detail. Thus Article 15: "The King of Great Britain doth profess and declare, with the consent and advice of his Council, that he will take the interest of Portugal and all its Dominions to heart, defending the same with his utmost power by sea and land even as England itself. . . ."¹⁵ This undertaking was defined more narrowly in a secret article appended to the Treaty:

It is by this Secret Article . . . that His Majesty of Great Britain . . . shall promise and oblige himself . . . to defend and protect all the Conquests and Colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal, against all his enemies, as well future as present In case peace ensue not, then His

¹⁴Quoted in Davidson, "The Oldest Alliance Faces a Crisis," p. 138.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 139.

Majesty of Great Britain shall be obliged to defend, with men and ships, the said Dominions and Conquests of the King of Portugal.¹⁶

There is no need to enlarge on the political reasons for this remarkably inclusive alliance at that time: if the Portuguese wished for protection, the English also desired a useful maritime ally against the sea-power of the Netherlands. By the treaty, Portugal ceded Tangier and Bombay to England, granted the English trading concessions in Brazil and India, and gave them the right to keep any former Portuguese possessions that they might recover from the Dutch. It was a heavy price for the Portuguese to pay for English protection, but they "felt that they had made a reasonably good bargain."¹⁷

The alliance persisted unchanged down to 1899 because neither side had reason to disrupt it. There were discords in the early 19th century when England attempted to suppress the overseas slave trade. Yet the dissonance was not serious as England's chief interest was to prevent traffic to the West Indies, and Portugal's trade was with Brazil. Respective interests did not clash. The change in 1899 was a Portuguese demand for a formal restatement of the alliance, and the Treaty of Windsor of this year confirmed the old agreements. The 1899 treaty is the present basis of agreement between the two in the 20th century. The alliance was invoked twice -- at the Berlin Conference of 1885 when English pressures were applied to Portugal to temper its claims to the Belgian Congo, and

¹⁶Ibid., p. 139.

¹⁷Charles E. Nowell, A History of Portugal (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1952), p. 156.

again in 1912, when England drew up a plan for the division of the Portuguese colonies between itself and Germany if Portugal could not manage to hold them.¹⁸

By the 1920's, the colonial pattern in Africa had settled down. The French and Belgians were busy in West Africa and the Congo; the Germans were no longer colonizers. It was in these years that the alliance took on more important aspects, and Angola had become politically convenient and economically useful to British interests. A railroad, diamonds, and oil came under English sway. In 1902, a British consortium headed by Sir Robert Williams had obtained a ninety-nine years' concession for the construction of a railway from Central Africa to the Atlantic, across Angola. Completed in 1928, with an additional connecting link opened to Katanga province in the Congo in 1931, this Benguela Railway has functioned since as a transporter of minerals from the Katanga and Northern Rhodesia, and at the same time, has acted as a "colonizing

¹⁸ Although England at this time had an overt contempt for Portuguese African administration, London looked forward to displacing France and Belgium from West Africa through the use of the Portuguese colonies. The 1912 plan was the second, and the last, effort to divide Portuguese Africa.

The idea was often accepted by Portugal itself that in times of national emergency, such as the frequent bankruptcy of the National Treasury, the African colonies could be sold or used as collateral to secure loans to recoup their own losses. During World War I, last minute intervention by England prevented such a transaction by Germany.

The 1912 action was the culmination of such a financial collapse in Portugal. By a convention in 1898 of which the terms were revealed to the Portuguese Government, Britain and Germany undertook to advance a loan to Portugal on the security of the customs revenue of Angola and Mozambique, with provision for taking over the administration in case of default. The northern part of the colonies was to go to Germany, and the southern part to England. By a further secret convention, they agreed at the same time to oppose the intervention of any third party, i.e., France or Belgium.

force" in Angola, making its contribution "with scores of small towns sprouting in the interior of the colony."¹⁹

Although the railway is now government-owned, it was initially financed by Williams' Tanganyika Concessions, which had received a grant from King Leopold II to exploit the Katanga area, and subsequently came to hold the majority share in Union Miniere. TANKS (Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd.) held five-sixths of the shares in the Benguela Company in 1921, valued at approximately \$40 million,²⁰ with Portugal controlling the remainder. Results since then have confirmed the long-held belief that the railway would have a golden future. "Net profits for 1960, for example, amounted to £994,247, or rather more than one-quarter of the total net profits of Tanganyika Concessions during that year."²¹

But diamonds have so far proven to be Angola's most profitable venture. Again, English economic interests are in the forefront. Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (The Angola Diamond Company), in which, despite its name, the Portuguese have only a minority holding, possesses sole diamond rights over 390,000 square miles of the colony. Authorized by official decree in 1913, Companhia has 1.7 million shares of stock in circulation at present with a value of

¹⁹James Duffy, Portugal In Africa (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962), p. 143.

²⁰The particulars on Tanganyika Concessions' interests in the Benguela Railway can be obtained from: Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 1594-1596.

²¹Davidson, "The Oldest Alliance Faces a Crisis," p. 146.

more than ten million dollars.²² Half the company's net profits are allocated to English stockholders and half to the colonial government of the territory. In 1959, Angola received about 106 million escudos²³ from this source; in 1961, total diamond production was 664,000 carats, an increase of 150,000 over 1960.

Other British enterprises include:²⁴ Companhia de Combustiveis in oil (which owns a bulk oil installation at Lobito and was the first company, in collaboration with "Petrofino" of Brussels, to discover oil in May, 1952); Walford Shipping Lines of Luanda; the Sociedad Nacional de Estudio y Financiamiento de Empresas Ultramarinos (SONEFE), a mixed capital corporation, with an initial capitalization of \$11 million, primarily involved in electrification, in which the Portuguese Government and English stockholders share joint ownership; the Lobito Mining Company, incorporated in 1957, now exporting a half-a-million metric tons of iron ore per year and with known reserves of 1,500 million tons; and other relatively small investments. These economic interests have lent the appearance of a useful commercial partnership to the pretensions of an old alliance. They have resulted in the virtual British defense of the Portuguese position in Africa.

²²Julio Garcia Lourdes, "Angola Diamond Company," Auge, Magazine of Mexico, no. 126 (1962), p. 204.

²³In December, 1963, the escudo was worth about \$0.04 (U.S.); one U.S. dollar buys 28.89 escudos. Quoted from International Financial Statistics, vol. 17, no. 2 (February, 1964), p. 21.

²⁴These facts and figures are compiled from Auge, Magazine of Mexico, no. 126 (1962), passim. See especially the section entitled "The Economic Development of Angola," pp. 168-207.

In addition, outside a narrow business circle, and the even narrower society of those who read consular reports, little or nothing was known or thought or written about Angola in Britain: until the early fifties, Britain knew little of the colony, and cared still less. When the English were finally awakened to the abuses of the labor system, by the publication of the Galvao Report in 1955, and by spokesmen from the London Missionary Society and other organizations, they found themselves in an embarrassedly defensive position, yet continued to stand firm on the policy of protecting Dr. Salazar. But governmental policy is divided along party lines on this issue. The Conservative Party, in power first under Harold Macmillan and presently under Sir Alec Douglas-Home, has seemed bent on smoothing Portugal's ruffled feelings and remaining resolutely loyal to the old alliance; the Labour Party, however, "is on open record as being flatly opposed to Portugal's policy in Africa."²⁵ One can merely wonder whether Portugal will be abandoned if, and when, Harold Wilson becomes Prime Minister. Under the Tories, Britain's voting record at the United Nations on the Angola question has also revealed a similar embarrassment.²⁶ Though unwilling to give the Portuguese any open protection, the British appear to have remained even more unwilling to join in any criticism: the result has been an equivocal abstention which appears tantamount to protection. In December, 1960, the General Assembly

²⁵James Duffy, Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 27.

²⁶See Appendix C, p. 271, for the voting record of the United Kingdom on resolutions pertaining to the Portuguese colonies.

passed a resolution calling upon colonial powers to end their dominance and to take immediate steps to transfer all powers to the people of their territories. This "Declaration on Colonialism" stated:

The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.

All peoples have the right to self-determination. . . .

Inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. Immediate steps shall be taken . . . to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations . . . without any distinction as to race, creed, or color. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations.²⁷

This resolution was passed overwhelmingly. Then, on March 15, 1961, a resolution calling upon Portugal to comply with the December resolution and urging reforms in the African territories, was defeated in the Security Council by England's dissenting vote. The 73-2 General Assembly vote on the creation of a sub-committee to investigate the crisis in Angola (April 20, 1961), witnessed England's abstention, as did the June 9, 1961 resolution calling upon Portugal "to desist from repressive measures in Angola." Outwardly, the English Government has given the impression that its attitude reflects its concern for Portugal's position within NATO, and several

²⁷Quoted from Thomas Okuma, Angola In Ferment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 122-123.

times, in an effort to appease particular members within the "Atlantic Alliance", Britain has urged Salazar to reconsider his policy implementation overseas. The latest example of this was the May, 1961 visit of the then-Lord Home to Lisbon to suggest to the Portuguese that they consider "following the British way in Africa."²⁸ There is little evidence that Salazar took his remarks very seriously. But the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, declared that his government refused to condone Portugal's actions "as Britain did." "Norway," he explained, "regards it as a burden for the whole western alliance that one member country seeks to retain colonies by use of armed force."²⁹

As England also continues to play up Portugal's "affiliation" with NATO, the suspicion is spreading in Africa and the Middle East that NATO, which was once believed to have been responsible for France's pursuit of the Algerian war, is similarly enabling Portugal to fight the Angolan war. The United Kingdom, itself a colonial power, recognizes the legitimacy of self-determination and is prepared to commend it to Portugal. England can and does cite its own history of retaining the goodwill of its former colonies; but, both within the United Nations, and at home, England has a special problem. Any precedents that might be created regarding the Portuguese territories can effect the remaining British colonies -- particularly Southern Rhodesia, which is sandwiched directly between Angola and Mozambique. It is important for Britain, and by exten-

²⁸Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 224.

²⁹"NATO Ministers Conference," The New York Times (June 22, 1962), p. 11.

sion for Portugal, to be able to carry out necessary changes in its own way at its own time.³⁰ As a result, England has tended to emphasize the "positive" aspects of Portuguese rule and to minimize the claims of certain states that actions in Angola constitute an "existing threat to international peace and security."³¹ The British do not believe it is good politics to "drive the Portuguese into isolation," although their formula for positive action is so mild as to amount, in the context of Portuguese recalcitrance, almost to inaction.³²

Britain has had an extra burden to bare in the Angolan issue in that Portugal's only sympathizers in Africa are to be found in the Central African Federation (and now with its break-up, the colony of Southern Rhodesia) and the Republic of South Africa -- to both of which England also supplies arms. While not a member of the United Nations, Southern Rhodesia has professed a sympathy with Salazar's efforts through other channels. In a policy speech at the start of the 1962 session of the Federal Parliament in Salisbury, Sir Roy Welensky had announced the re-equipping of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force with Hunter Mark IX jet fighters and a fleet of helicopters. Sir Roy noted that both of these were excellent "for con-

³⁰With reference to Southern Rhodesia, this point is dealt with in Patrick Keatley, The Politics of Partnership: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1963). See especially "Part Five: The Time of Decision," pp. 387-500, with covers the "Rho-Kat Lobby."

³¹United Nations, General Assembly, 17th Session, A/1807 (December 14, 1962), p. 10.

³²United Nations Document S/PV.1045 (July 26, 1963), p. 19.

trol of hostile ground forces,"³³ and at the same time, coupled this statement with the assertion that white Rhodesians were not prepared "to run out on our very good friends and neighbors, the South Africans and Portuguese."³⁴ Southern Rhodesia, like South Africa realizes that it is one of the last strongholds of white rule in Africa and must, of necessity, secure its position. Within the last twenty or thirty years, the Englishmen in Salisbury have come to respect Portugal's attitudes in Africa: racial attitudes and the encroachment of African nationalism have drawn the two together. But again, economic necessity has cemented relations; both Rhodesia and South Africa have benefitted. While this economic interest is primarily manifested more in Mozambique than in Angola, the Rhodesian and South African dependence on Portuguese East Africa has had the parallel effect of bolstering Portuguese policy in the western province at the same time. Because white southern Africa cannot afford to lose Portuguese Mozambique, it supports Salazar's policy in Angola.³⁵

In this century, Mozambique south of the Zambesi River has had a development roughly parallel with that of the neighboring areas. Historically, Portuguese influence was generally up the Zambesi and

³³Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, The Effects and Consequences of the New Defence Budget, Presented to the Federal Assembly on 26 March 1962 by the Prime Minister (Salisbury: The Government Printer, 1962), p. 23.

³⁴Ibid., p. 23.

³⁵Mozambique, in East Africa, forms the eastern flank of the South African "buffer zone" against African nationalism. If Mozambique were to be lost to Portugal, South Africa would have a black African nation on its immediate borders. South Africa has large economic interests in Mozambique, and intends to preserve them. To keep the interests and to keep Mozambique Portuguese, South Africa supports Salazar anywhere in Africa.

and at isolated points north of the river, and no real attention was given the lands to the south until 1890. Here Mozambique has become part of a southern African transportation, economic, and labor complex. Beira is the major port for the Rhodesias, and Lourenco Marques handles about 50 per cent of the traffic of the Transvaal.³⁶

Much of the plantation development in Mozambique's southern regions has been sustained by English and South African capital.³⁷ For the Rhodesias and South Africa, the southern half of Mozambique is also a vast reservoir of manpower, chiefly for work in the mines. "It is estimated that about 400,000 Africans, out of a total active male population of not much more than 600,000, is employed at least six months out of the year across the borders -- and in the last decade, an increasing number of laborers have been recruited from Angola";³⁸ about half of the labor force in the Transvaal mines come from Mozambique. Part of this labor migration is controlled by various conventions; part of it is clandestine. Although the sociological considerations of such a situation might be obvious, the economic considerations for colonial Mozambique are also impor-

³⁶In 1962, ships docking at Beira and Lourenco Marques totaled 3,654; total of tons transported was 21 million; and from harbor rentals and port tariffs, the two cities collected over fl8 million. Quoted from How to Invest in Mozambique (Lisbon: The Directorate of Services of Economy and General Statistics, 1963), p. 22.

³⁷English and South African interests control the Incomati Agricultural Corporation, producing sugar, and the Cassequel Agricultural Corporation, growing and marketing cotton. The former produced 52,000 long tons in 1961; cotton production is 30,000 long tons per year (1961). Figures are from the English translation of Agricultural Situation in Mozambique (Coane, Mozambique: The Institute of Scientific Investigations and the Southern Agricultural Experiment Station, 1962), p. 24.

³⁸Duffy, Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities, p. 31.

tant: the stability of the colony's budget depends on the transit traffic through its ports, the various fees the government collects for handling the migration, and the money which the laborers bring back from abroad into the colony. Up to the present, this revenue has obliged the authorities in Mozambique to favor the continuation of the system in spite of the very real disruptive influences it creates.

So it is that the bonds between Portugal and the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa have grown stronger. There is talk of forming an economic union in southern Africa of the three white states, and Rhodesia has called for the constitutional settlement of its own colonial status in London "so we can have military links with South Africa or whoever we please."³⁹ "Whoever" would imply Portugal. Ceremonial visits are constantly made back and forth by high officials of the two governments and in 1961 and 1962 the Federal Defence Minister, Caldicott, visited Lisbon and Luanda for talks with Governor-General Deslandes, and sent detachments from the Rhodesian Army to South Africa and Mozambique.⁴⁰ There is a view which persistently maintains that because of Britain's ties with Southern Rhodesia, and with the resultant attitude of condoning Portuguese colonial activities in Angola that must arise from these ties, England has made it appear that what is now thought vital in a Portuguese alliance is no longer any question concerning NATO in its global strategy, but rather the special contribution that Portugal could make to a particu-

³⁹Keatley, op. cit., p. 492.

⁴⁰Cited in ibid., p. 492.

lar concept of "strategic security" south of the Sahara.⁴¹ Here, England is criticized for supporting Portugal in order to bolster and confirm the pattern of white domination throughout central-southern Africa. Because of the eagerness of Southern Rhodesia to support Salazar, the view merits some interest: "Rhodesia considers Angola of great strategic and political significance to the future of both central and southern Africa. It feels that it is of the utmost importance that the territory should remain in friendly hands."⁴²

This, of course, echoes the line of Sir Roy Welensky's often expressed conviction that African nationalism is never more than a tool of Communist subversion: an argument which allowed the former Prime Minister to maintain that continued white supremacy was vital to Western interests in central-southern Africa. Although Welensky has temporarily left the political scene in Rhodesia, the government of Ian Smith remains suspect.⁴³ African nationalists in the area have tended to conclude that "London's stubborn defense of Salazar has owed an important part of its consistency to proddings from Salisbury, allied to pressure in the Conservative Party from those who have repeatedly assailed the whole policy of decolonization."⁴⁴

⁴¹This is the prevalent belief of both Nehru and Nkrumah. See "The Case Against Britain," The Economist (November 14, 1961), p. 6.

⁴²"Dispatch from Luanda," The New York Times (June 28, 1961), p. 14.

⁴³The Southern Rhodesian scene is constantly in flux. Winston Field was Prime Minister of the colony at the time of the dissolution of the Central African Federation. It was assumed that with the independence of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya, and the coming independence of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, much of the thinking of Welensky and the other white leaders in Southern Rhodesia became out-of-date. But in April of this year (1964), Ian Smith became Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, and the old Welensky line-of-thinking on colonialism and nationalism again became apparent.

⁴⁴Davidson, "The Oldest Alliance Faces A Crisis," p. 157.

It seems likely that some of the vehemence and conviction with which the British Government was formerly attacked in Africa for "upholding Tshombe in the Katanga" came from a belief that England, Portugal, South Africa, Belgium, and the Rhodesias were privately involved in a joint effort to save the substance of white domination throughout this region of the continent.

In back of the speeches and visits, there is presently a concerted determination to resist, despite Verwoerd's belief that "it is unlikely that white control will remain in the Portuguese territories."⁴⁵ South Africa and Portugal, it has been said, "made a common defense pact in 1959 which stated that in the event of trouble in either country, one would come to the aid of the other."⁴⁶ This pact involves the possibility of South Africa intervening militarily on behalf of Portugal in both Angola and Mozambique and the likelihood that should the Portuguese empire in Africa begin to fragment, a serious effort might be made to incorporate that part of Mozambique south of the Zambesi into some sort of federation with South Africa.

South Africa, next to Spain, is perhaps Portugal's most faithful ally before world opinion. At the United Nations, the Republic has consistently voted "no" to all the resolutions that would dilute Portuguese control over Angola.⁴⁷ In some respects, the South Africans realize that many of the attitudes of the white population of the Portuguese territories and South Africa and Rhodesia are not

⁴⁵ L.E. Neame, The History of Apartheid (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), p. 157.

⁴⁶ Duffy, Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities, p. 31.

⁴⁷ See the voting record in Appendix C on page 271.

strikingly different. (Apartheid and the Portuguese concept of assimilation both seemed to have been founded on an exaltation of peculiarly national values.) A remark made by the Governor-General of South Africa, Dr. Ernest Jansen, on a state visit to Lisbon in 1957 is often revived -- "By a happy accident we are neighbors; I believe that we should be grateful to history for the accident."⁴⁸ That statement was, and still is, more than diplomatic courtesy. It remains an expression of awareness that the governments of the African lands below the equator have for the moment a common cause -- survival. It also remains an expression of South African awareness that the Portuguese territories form an integral part of the northern "buffer zone" essential for the preservation of white supremacy in South Africa from the inroads of an outside African nationalism.

Spain, France, and the United States are also political friends of Portugal, but they have begun to break away from support of Salazar's policies. The attitude of Spain is hard to pin down. During the 1950's, Spain seemed to take the position that its overseas territories, like Portugal's, were integral parts of the State, but these statements, both inside and outside of the United Nations, were never entirely categorical. Spain has appeared more ready than Portugal to move with the times and has been responsive to United Nations' requests and proposals on its own African colonies. General Franco has made it clear to Salazar that he will not support Portugal's

⁴⁸ James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 339. The author is quoting from Noticias de Portugal for August 10, 1957.

cause abroad at the expense of good relations with the African states. He is reported to have urged Salazar to introduce extensive reforms,⁴⁹ but Spain, as of November 1963, still supported Portugal in every action of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council, and in diplomatic maneuvering outside those organs. This "understanding" between the two arises from a contemporary feeling of closeness. Salazar does not forget that Spain shares Iberia with Portugal; that Spain too was once an outcast from international society and during that time Portugal was its only friend. Both possess a similar history and similar institutions; both today have similar political institutions and orientations -- Franco and the Falange and Salazar and the National Union are practically cut from identical moulds.

France agrees with Portugal on at least one point: it has always taken as limited a view of the United Nations' powers in the colonial field as does Portugal; it has consistently held that the Charter "does not empower the United Nations to substitute itself for the Administering Power of dependent territories in the evolution of those territories."⁵⁰ Before 1958, French policy tended to be sympathetic to the goal of assimilation, in particular, and to Portugal in general. This resulted from a strong cultural liaison that had always existed between the two countries, the favorable press that Salazar and Portugal generally received in France, the large French tourist trade to Portugal, and a swelling Portuguese immigration to

⁴⁹The New York Times (August 14, 1963), p. 21.

⁵⁰United Nations Document S/PV.1045 (July 26, 1963), p. 11.

France.

There has indeed been a common spiritual bond between France and Portugal for many centuries, based on a common tradition and a friendship resting on common memories: the first dynasty of Portuguese monarchs had come from Burgundy (the House of Avis); the cathedral at Coimbra was built by two Frenchmen; the Church-of-St.-Louis-of-France, in the heart of Lisbon, is still considered to be on French soil; and an eleventh-century Seaman's Mission, founded to care for French sailors, continues to stand in Lisbon. These small momentos are overshadowed by the language tie. All educated Portuguese speak French fluently, and most laymen know at least a few words; high school students use French textbooks and are taught French as a second language. This tie is also bolstered by two institutes: the French Institute in Lisbon and the Portuguese Instituto para a alta cultura in Paris. Salazar has said of the relationship:

There is no doubt that our little country, which once upon a time carried the splendor of world supremacy even before France achieved this glory, is now trying to draw even closer to its European partner. French is the foreign language best known here, and French literature is more widely read than any other. France is the chosen country of the Portuguese tourists, the norm of fashion and good taste. No country is in a better position to establish with us a policy of exchange and cooperation.⁵¹

France's attitude has, of course, recently changed vis-a-vis Portugal. With the dissolution of its colonial empire, France's position on questions of self-determination and independence has become more

⁵¹Christine Garnier, Salazar: An Intimate Portrait, trans. from the French (New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 1954), p. 152.

benign; French spokesmen have implied that "should Portugal take the plunge [re: self-determination for its colonies], it might find the water not so bad after all."⁵² France has often voted with Portugal before the United Nations (see Appendix V); but now because it needs to placate the French-speaking states of Africa, it makes a somewhat less-than-reliable supporter. Like other permanent members of the Security Council, France has been unwilling to use its veto on Portugal's behalf, but the possibility of its doing so is enough to moderate the more extreme resolutions proposed. As the question of the Portuguese territories increasingly involves the matter of international peace and security, however, even France has countenanced more forceful measures. DeGaulle is not hindered in his actions by economic interests in the Portuguese territories, unlike England or the United States. France maintains such ties with its former African colonies, not with Angola or Mozambique.

The position of the United States on the question of Angola is becoming more important, and must be investigated. Portugal's relations with the United States have been based more on military necessity than on anything else, although former President Eisenhower and certain members of Congress have manifested what seemed to be genuine feelings of friendship for the small country:

My talks with President Tomas and with the President of the Council, Dr. Salazar, have been conducted in a spirit

⁵²Patricia Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations," International Conciliation, no. 545 (November, 1963), p. 37.

of complete mutual understanding. All of us realize that we are united in a common cause and that each of us, in his own way, shares a part of the responsibility of striving for a peaceful and better world. Moreover, our talks together have once again affirmed the spirit of friendship and good will that has always characterized the relations between Portugal and the United States.⁵³

Former Secretary of State Dulles expressed similar sentiments when queried on the United States' position in regard to the status of Goa: "All the world regards Goa as a Portuguese province. I do not think there is any particular controversy about the status of these areas under the constitution of Portugal."⁵⁴

Treaty agreements have brought the two nations close together. A bilateral agreement in connection with the European Recovery Program signed on September 28, 1948, was the first of several such agreements in a growing list. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed by both on April 4, 1949, and in accordance with the aims of NATO, the Azores Defense Agreement was signed on September 6, 1951. An agreement on surplus agricultural commodities followed on May 27, 1955, and then an agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy on July 21 of the same year. Finally, it was largely through United States initiative that Portugal became a member of the United Nations in 1955.

Trade has become an important factor in the relationship, both for Portugal and for Angola. During the period 1938-1942, the United States ranked third in volume of trade in the list of Angola's for-

⁵³United States, Department of State, Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 1960), p. 7. This is from a speech in Lisbon by President Eisenhower.

⁵⁴Quoted in Okuma, op. cit., p. 77.

oreign markets; in 1943-1947, the United States climbed to first place with 9.5 per cent of the volume; and this increased to 14.8 per cent in the period 1948-1952.⁵⁵ The approximate United States percentage of Angola's export market is now 26 per cent; and the percentage of the import market declined from 11.6 per cent in 1958 to 9.2 per cent.⁵⁶ Similarly, the other Portuguese territory with a comparable figure is Mozambique, which sent 4.0 per cent of its exports to the United States, and imported only 5.5 per cent of its goods from them in return. Practically all United States economic interest is concentrated in Angola, while trade figures would indicate that England and West Germany concentrate on Mozambique.⁵⁷

The United States interest has taken the form of loans or bond investment. Dr. Jose Nunes de Oliveira, former governor-general of Mozambique and inspector-general of overseas administration, stated in an address to the North American Assembly on African Affairs in 1952, that the United States had contributed a substantial, although unrevealed, sum to Portugal's Six-Year Development Program (1952-1958) of 600 million escudos for Angolan development.⁵⁸ Such aid continues.⁵⁹ The largest oil combine in the province,

⁵⁵ Overseas Trade of the Province of Angola (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional da Informacao, 1954), pp. 35-36.

⁵⁶ United Nations, General Assembly, General Policies in Territories Under Portuguese Administration, A/AC.108/L.7 (February 1, 1963), pp. 32-33.

⁵⁷ English capital investment in Angola is larger than that of the United States. The U.S.A. concentrates primarily on trade.

⁵⁸ The New York Times, (September 6, 1952), p. 6.

⁵⁹ Antonio de Figueiredo, Portugal and Its Empire: The Truth (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1961), passim; see especially pp. 57-67, 92-106, 121-138.

Sociedade Anonima Concessionaria de Refinacao de Petroleos em Portugal, was financed in 1961 by a \$10 million bond issue underwritten by the American law firm of Cleary, Gottlich, Steen, and Ball.⁶⁰ The Gulf Oil Company also maintains an oil installation at Cabinda; amount of the investment is unknown. Also, the key to the American alliance, the Azores air base, returns a dividend to Portugal: in 1960, it amounted to some \$17 million, part of which, directly or indirectly, went to support Portugal's military posture in Africa.

In addition, there is in the United States a small but vocal Portuguese community, generally sympathetic to the present regime. This perhaps wields a slight influence on United States policy. They were helped, however, by the fact that throughout the 1950's, Portuguese diplomats convincingly argued that as NATO was a shield against communism in Europe, so the African territories were bulwarks against communism in Africa. The United States accepted this evaluation, although it was evident that continuing repressions in the colonies were bound to create conditions which communism could exploit. The United States was aware of the realities of Portugal's African empire at the time, but only changed its attitude following the embarrassment of 1961 when the revolt in the colony became widely publicized. But, it was the earlier political and economic ties of the United States and Portugal that raised doubts in the minds of the Africans about the position of the United States on the question of Portuguese Africa. Eventually there was to be a general re-evaluation of United States policy in Africa.

⁶⁰The New York Times (January 11, 1961), p. 23.

As a colonial state with a long anti-colonial tradition, the United States has shared many of the ambivalences of the non-colonial states in the United Nations. It is always eager to assure the former colonies that it has "steadfastly supported the principle of self-determination" and has "publicly and privately and continuously urged Portugal to accept" it.⁶¹ But the United States also has obligations to support its NATO allies that cannot easily be divorced from an obligation to support their colonial policies, as Portugal often reminds it. Thus, in the United Nations, the United States, in a generally unsuccessful attempt to placate both sides, usually finds itself pleading for resolutions that amount to much less than what the majority and rather more than what Portugal felt able to accept. During debate, the United States might indicate "there is no conflict of principle before this house,"⁶² but it voted more often with France and the United Kingdom, than say, with Norway or Sweden.

The Santa Maria incident in 1961 was perhaps the beginning of the United States' reappraisal of its Portuguese position. This was combined with new policy trends emerging under the Kennedy Administration. The seizure of the Portuguese liner initiated a series of recriminations between Lisbon and Washington. The incident caused The New York Times to comment:

⁶¹United Nations Document S/PV.1045 (July 26, 1963), p. 22.

⁶²Ibid., p. 26.

Colonialism and racism are two features of contemporary life whose end is in sight. Where they persist unchanged, it is because of a refusal to recognize realities. No people are being more stubborn in rejecting the facts of twentieth-century life than the present regime of Portugal. . . . The Portuguese are defying all the rules of logic by calling Angola and Mozambique integral parts of Portuguese national territory, and therefore not colonies. Anything is possible when you do your own defining. This is no longer a world where the black man, because he is black, can be held in virtual servitude and in ignorance and disease.⁶³

The Portuguese were displeased with United States action in the affair, and let loose with this criticism:

The machine guns, false passports, and grenades [used by the rebels to seize the ship] were paid for with Communist funds. Portugal's allies have got to face squarely up to the international implications of the situation. The great powers cannot wash their hands of the affair like Pontius Pilate.⁶⁴

Changes in United States African policy were initiated as early as 1956, when a semi-autonomous unit of thirty-four officers for African Affairs under Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer II was established, and the slow process of bringing African matters out from the lower echelons to the top level of the President and his advisers in the National Security Council received a major boost in March, 1957, from the widely-publicized visit of Vice-President Nixon to Africa. By 1960, the Africa Bureau had a total of forty-four officers and added thirty more in 1961.⁶⁵ Sev-

⁶³"The Trouble With Angola," The New York Times (February 11, 1961), p. 4.

⁶⁴The New York Times (January 27, 1961), p. 1.

⁶⁵Vernon McKay, "The United States," Africa: A Handbook to the Continent (London: Anthony Blond, 1961), p. 400; also United States Foreign Policy: Africa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959).

eral other government departments were also increasing their Africa staff, and many new posts in Africa were opened.

Along with this expansion of the policy machine, new trends in policy began to emerge.⁶⁶ Firstly, warnings against the danger of "premature independence," which lingered on in most of the statements emanating from Washington in 1957 and 1958, had disappeared by the time of Kennedy. This was not necessarily a change in the substance of State Department thinking, but perhaps a recognition that, in an Africa soon to be full of independent states, it was hardly in the United States' interests to continue harping on this danger. By April 8, 1960, Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite was able to say: "As to their 'readiness', I believe history has shown that this is almost an academic question. Peoples tend to acquire independence, ready or not, according to a timetable of their own making."⁶⁷

There was also a move away from equivocation on the colonial issue to a more affirmative program of helpful activities in Africa. This was evidenced in Congress' approval of a 1960 Presidential request for a special program for tropical Africa with an initial appropriation of \$20 million.⁶⁸ At the same time, the Africa programs of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, to which the

⁶⁶These new policy changes are modeled largely after those put forth by McKay, ibid., pp. 400-401. See also A New American Policy Towards Africa (New York: The Africa League, 1960).

⁶⁷"New Policy Towards Africa," The New York Times (April 9, 1961), p. 4. Quoted at a National Press Club Banquet in Washington.

⁶⁸Vernon McKay, United States Foreign Policy, Africa, No. 5 (Washington: Committee Print, United States, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1960), p. 5.

United States was contributing the largest share of financial support, was similarly expanding.⁶⁹ A third alteration of the substance of the Africa policy was the abandonment of the earlier inclination to regard neutralism as "immoral." This was particularly evident in a United States proposal to the General Assembly on September 22, 1960, that all United Nations members pledge "to respect the African peoples' right to choose their own way of life and to determine for themselves the course they choose to follow," and "to refrain from intervening in the new nations' internal affairs . . . by subversion, force, propaganda, or any other means."⁷⁰

Finally, a new trend was emerging in the United States' attitude toward the expansion of the role of the United Nations in Africa. When Africa was largely colonial, the United States frequently joined the colonial powers in resisting the efforts of the anti-colonial members to expand United Nations' activities in Africa. But a major change in this policy was made possible by the attainment of independence in so many African territories.

What is the present attitude of the United States on the Angola question? Hoping not to push Portugal into precipitate actions, and determined to preserve both the existing political and economic alliance with Salazar, the United States has been particularly ac-

⁶⁹A concise source for information on United States aid policy in Africa during this period, both within and without the United Nations, is: John D. Montgomery, Aid to Africa: New Test for U.S. Policy (New York: Foreign Policy Association-World Affairs Center, 1961).

⁷⁰United Nations, General Assembly, 15th Session, A/1036 (September, 1960), p. 14.

tive in trying to reason with Portugal. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Angola, Carlos Salamanca of Bolivia, noted in 1962 that "both in the first and second stages of the Committee's work, the United States was actively cooperative in offering its good offices. . . ." ⁷¹ In one instance, this persuasion succeeded in convincing Portugal to accept a limited, fact-finding United Nations presence in Angola and Mozambique; it was unable, however, to obtain enough concessions from Portugal to meet the minimum requirements of the Assembly. ⁷² Under Secretary of State George Ball even visited Lisbon in 1963 to make another attempt. Salazar took the occasion to hint that some rich states have tried to use not only political, but monetary influence with Portugal; he claimed to possess "certain papers" containing offers, which he rejected, to "contribute towards compensating us for our losses." ⁷³

But all of this would appear unconvincing in the halls of the United Nations were it not for the fact that the new trend of United States policy began to be reflected in the vote tabulation. The effect on the Afro-Asian delegations became noticeable when, on March 15, 1961, the United States supported a Liberian resolution in the Security Council calling for reform in Angola, progress toward independence, and a U.N. Commission of Inquiry to look into

⁷¹United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Sub-committee on the Situation in Angola, A/5286, 17th Session, Agenda Item 29 (November 14, 1962), p. 12.

⁷²Ibid., p. 13.

⁷³Statement on Portuguese Overseas Policy made at Lisbon on August 12, 1963, Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations, Press Release No. 11/63 (August 13, 1963), p. 17. (Hereafter referred to as Salazar Statement.)

conditions in the colony. The resolution failed to pass by two votes, but the United States representative won the day when he said that the important thing was to ensure that similar conditions which existed in the former Belgian Congo did not reappear in Angola and that the best course of action was to promote the interests of the people of the Portuguese territories through cooperation with the United Nations.⁷⁴ The government newspaper, Diario de Manhã, immediately scored the United States' vote as "an act of stupidity" that it would repent.⁷⁵ The United States, however, can not go too far or too fast against Portugal. A box score of United Nations debates notes the "yea" vote on the March 15 resolution, and also the "yea" vote on April 24, 1963, on resolution 5293 (deploring any "incursion by Portuguese military forces into Senegalese territory"), but, at the same time, reveals United States support for Portugal on major resolutions such as 4835 of June 9, 1961 (the Security Council called upon Portugal to desist from repressive measures in Angola), resolution 5032 of December 18, 1961 (which considered the enclaves of Goa, Damao, and Diu as a threat to international peace and security and standing in the way of the unity of the Republic of India), resolution 5033 of December 18, 1961 (deploring the use of force by India in Goa, Damao, and Diu, calling for cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of India), and resolution 5380 of July 31, 1963 (rejecting Portugal's claim that its territories are "overseas provinces" and Portugal should recognize their right for self-determination and independence).

⁷⁴The New York Times (March 15, 1961), p. 2.

⁷⁵Ibid. (March 17, 1961), p. 4.

Besides the political and economic alliances, Portugal possesses a trump card against the United States -- the Azores military bases. Salazar can and has used this trump card with skill and persistence. United States defense officials appear to believe that these bases are vital to Western security. The agreement for the use of them has now expired -- having done so in December, 1962 -- and Portugal has refused to negotiate a renewal in the absence of more substantial United States support for its African policy.⁷⁶

As long as these bases remain a main consideration, Salazar can brandish his threat that Portugal cannot be opposed "without sacrificing beyond repair the defense of Europe."⁷⁷ Of course, there can be an alternative to this issue. Even if the military judgment that the bases are crucial is correct, would Portugal really be prepared to sacrifice the benefits it receives from NATO by throwing the United States out? Even if Portugal were to deprive the United States of the use of the Azores, is the political judgment correct that this is the overriding consideration?

Portugal is reacting to changes in American policy with the expected anguish. There has been violence against the American embassy in Lisbon and against the consulate in Luanda. There have been threats that Portugal will leave NATO. In Portugal there is both a regret and a deep resentment over what the Portuguese regard as United States abandonment. By August, 1963, this hit a new low when Salazar accused "both the United States and the Soviet Union

⁷⁶Since early 1963, the United States has been using the Azores on an ad hoc basis.

⁷⁷Salazar Statement, p. 14.

of pressing African liberation for their own individual advantage in control of African markets."⁷⁸ Salazar supported a government official who said: "Differences between governments are always unfortunate. But when they come between friends they are especially painful."⁷⁹ Portugal is now waging a campaign of abuse against the United States and renewing its requests for indiscriminating American support. What effect it will have is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that Portugal has traditionally been responsive to diplomatic pressures. Portugal cannot go it alone in Africa, and if United States diplomatic action can find the support of France, England, and Brazil, the problems Portugal faces in Africa may be solved. As for the other members of the NATO alliance, all have resisted African efforts to impose a ban on all shipments of military equipment to Portugal, although they by and large have been unwilling to do more than abstain in the United Nations on roll call votes. Some of them, particularly the Netherlands and Belgium, are reluctant to jeopardize growing investments, trade, or technical assistance programs in Africa; but, at the same time, they are prone to worry about evidences of racism in African and Asian statements in the U.N. These states all stress law and order; if change must come they want no bloodshed, lest it drag the NATO alliance into African warfare; if Portugal is given a little more time, they say, perhaps it will change its ways.

⁷⁸Phil Newsom, "Portugal Regrets Split with U.S.," The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (September 17, 1963), p. 4. This article is dated from Lisbon by United Press International.

⁷⁹Ibid.

As Salazar thus becomes isolated by some old and fast friends, he looks elsewhere for help. At the moment, he is casing Communist China, or "Continental China" as the Portuguese call it:

'If the Soviet Union and the African countries force us out of the United Nations, we may form our own club of U.N. outcasts, along with China,' one high Portuguese official quipped on the eve of the current [1963-64] U.N. General Assembly session, which is expected to make Portugal a major target of censure.

Moreover, Lisbon's goodwill towards Peking has been reciprocated, strangely enough. Communist China, while championing the African struggle against British and other colonialism, has on the whole left Portugal alone. This is particularly significant in view of the fact that one of Portugal's overseas provinces -- Macao -- is located on the China mainland.⁸⁰

Much has also been said about Brazil's cooperation with Portugal. As mentioned in Chapter III, however, this association has been subjected to pressures of late. Brazil has felt the greatest responsibility for playing an active role in the issue of Portuguese territories, and apparently still hopes to play the role of interlocuteur valable in the dispute. When the status of the territories was first questioned in 1957, Brazil faithfully supported Portugal's claims "in every respect."⁸¹ But with changes in its own government and in the international climate, Brazil has come around to the view that Portugal "must accept the natural course of history,"⁸² and loosen its political ties with the territories. In a signifi-

⁸⁰Marvin Howe, "Portugal Friendly to China," The Edmonton Journal (October 19, 1963), p. 4.

⁸¹United Nations, General Assembly, 11th Session, 4th Committee, 617th Meeting (January 30, 1957), paragraph 12.

⁸²United Nations, General Assembly, 16th Session, 1088th Plenary Meeting (January 15, 1962), paragraph 81.

cant statement to the Security Council in July, 1963, Brazil indicated that it might feel obliged to abandon Portugal's cause altogether if, "contrary to all our hopes, the Portuguese Government persists in its present colonial policy."⁸³

Part II: The Case in New York

Portugal has been a United Nations target for "colonialism" since 1955, the year it entered the organization. The introduction of the entire question was mild enough in the beginning: shortly after its admission, the Secretary-General sent a note to Portugal, among other members, asking it to list its "non-self-governing territories" as required under Article 73e of Chapter XI of the Charter. Since then the issue has illustrated "the many aspects of the United Nations' role in the decolonization process -- from quiet prodding of the administering power to firmer anticolonial pressure."⁸⁴ Evaluations of the activities of the United Nations with regard to colonialism vary,⁸⁵ but in the case of Angola, the United Nations has been persistent if nothing else. The question has been under almost constant review by organs of the world body since early 1961, and three of the six major organs of the United Nations have been heavily involved in the situation.⁸⁶ At one time, the case was in

⁸³United Nations Document S/PV.1043 (July 27, 1963), p. 7.

⁸⁴Wohlgemuth, op. cit., p. 3.

⁸⁵See Harold Karan Jacobson, "The United Nations and Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal," International Organization, vol. 16, no. 1 (Winter, 1962), pp. 37-56.

⁸⁶Exceptions are ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice.

the hands of "The Committee of 17,"⁸⁷ "The Committee of Seven,"⁸⁸ and "The Committee of Five."⁸⁹ The first was created in 1961, and was charged with studying the situations arising from the U.N.'s general declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1654); the "Committee of Seven" (or, officially, "The Special Committee for Territories Under Portuguese Administration") dealt with the respective Portuguese territories; and the last committee was specially appointed to investigate the position in Angola. "The Committee of Five" submitted one report, and the following year (1962), was charged with studying "ways and means" to obtain Portuguese compliance with United Nations resolutions; it was adjourned sine die by the Assembly after reporting on its several fruitless attempts to gain the cooperation of Portugal. "The Committee of Seven" and "The Committee of 17" were subsumed under that of the larger "Committee of 24," established to speed the implementation of the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" for all remaining colonies (resolution 1514). Of all these sub-organs, only the "Committee of 24" is now specifically reviewing affairs in the Portuguese territories.

⁸⁷ Australia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Syria, United Kingdom, United States, Tanganyika, Tunisia, U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

⁸⁸ Bulgaria, Ceylon, Colombia, Cyprus, Guatemala, Guinea, and Nigeria.

⁸⁹ Bolivia, Dahomey, Malaya, Finland, and Sudan.

Before 1960, Portugal's troubles at the United Nations were insignificant compared with those which came later with the growth of an anti-colonial majority in the General Assembly. Portugal managed to quell most arguments by invoking legalistic principles that were to be repeated frequently in the ensuing years -- namely, the unity of the Portuguese State and the nondiscriminatory character of its laws, the limitations of "constitutional considerations in Chapter XI" and the assertion that Article 73e was inapplicable because Portugal's Constitution proclaimed it a unitary state. In the long history of the question, the United Nations has taken several lines of approach. First, with the virtual consensus that the organization has a responsibility toward the territories under Chapter XI and resolution 1514, the Assembly has attempted to encourage amelioration of conditions in Portuguese Africa. Resolutions have variously "called upon," "urged," and "urgently invited" Portugal to undertake reforms. The Special Committee on the Portuguese Territories in effect performed the functions of the Committee on Information (with which Portugal refused to cooperate), calling attention to conditions in the territories and prodding Portugal to make improvements. Secondly, the Assembly and the Council have urged members "to use their influence" with Portugal to promote peaceful decolonization. The third approach, that of direct United Nations-Portuguese contact, and possible negotiation, has verged on failure. The Sub-committee on Angola made the most sustained effort to gain Portuguese cooperation and did succeed in eliciting some offers of "cooperation." But it completely failed to gain any acknowledgment by Portugal of

the legitimacy of the United Nations interest.

Parallel to these efforts at a peaceful solution have been efforts to impose various inhibitions or penalties on Portugal in the hope of forcing a change in policy. Under the influence of the African members of the United Nations, Portugal has been kept on the defensive whenever possible, in debates directly concerned with the subject, or in related general debates on subjects such as racial discrimination, dependent territories, or refugees. Secondly, the Assembly and the Council have attempted to weaken Portugal's capacity to wage extended war against the nationalist army. Dating from the Sixteenth Assembly in 1961, resolutions have included a request that members "deny Portugal any support and assistance which it may use for the suppression" of indigenous elements.⁹⁰ More recently, on the theory that any military aid helped Portugal to continue fighting in Africa, the Assembly has called flatly for states to "terminate the supply of arms to Portugal."⁹¹ These requests have met with limited response -- mostly from states that traditionally have few relations with Portugal anyway. Finally, the Assembly majority has attempted to isolate Portugal, to make of it an international pariah similar to the unwanted position which South Africa now possesses in the world organization. The debates themselves have shown Portugal's lack of support, and even friendly states speak less in terms of support for Portuguese policy than in the name of "realism," or

⁹⁰United Nations, General Assembly, A/1699 (XVI), 16th Session (December 19, 1961), p. 10.

⁹¹United Nations, General Assembly, A/1819 (XVII), 17th Session (December 18, 1962), p. 12.

of "not exacerbating" the situation by condemnation. The threat of expulsion from the United Nations itself has arisen: a 1962 resolution on Angola "reminded" Portugal that continued noncompliance with resolutions was "inconsistent with its membership,"⁹² thus paving the way for an attempt to expel Portugal under Article 6 of the Charter.⁹³

Portugal's legal case is involved, and probably well-known. All of it cannot be discussed here.⁹⁴ Simplified, Portuguese bitterness over what it regards as United Nations interference in its internal affairs centers on two main points: (1) Demands for Angolan independence do not come from within the province, but rather are pressed from the outside. At most, the Portuguese claim, the revolutionary movement receives support only from a small segment of tribesmen in the north who are related to others in the Congo. The continuing revolt could be suppressed instantly if it were not for the "privileged sanctuary" provided by the Congo republic to terrorists who cross back and forth. (2) The United Nations' stand favoring self-determination for Angola violates the organization's charter which specifically forbids United Nations interference in a

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³The article reads: "A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

⁹⁴An attempt to do so is presented in: Wohlgemuth, op. cit., pp. 21-38; Adriano Moreira, The Home Front (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1962); Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Portugal and the Anti-colonialist Campaign (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional de Informacao, 1960); and the following General Assembly proceedings:

11th Session, 656th Plenary Meeting (February 20, 1957), paragraph 82.

nation's internal affairs (Article 2(7) of Chapter I). Carried to a logical extreme, according to Portugal, the U.N. eventually could interfere in the smallest affairs of any nation. Portugal's arguments are both legal and political: by giving a strict interpretation to the United Nations Charter, Portugal claims that all resolutions directed at Angola are consequently "ultra vires" of the Charter under Article 2(7):⁹⁵

. . . the United Nations . . . [is] drifting away from the spirit that presided over that institution. The bilateral method of solving problems is being abandoned and there is now an inevitable tendency in the Committees and the Assembly to internationalize all questions and conflicts, even where these hold absolutely no interest for the rest of the world. The General Assembly does not possess competence to declare the territories of any power non-autonomous. This is the juridically accurate interpretation and the one that has always been given to the principles of the Charter.⁹⁶

The "domestic jurisdiction" principle that is contained in this Article 2 has been used before on a colonial question -- the independence of

12th Session, 4th Committee, 691st Meeting (November 4, 1957), paragraph 7.

15th Session, 4th Committee, 1041st Meeting (November 8, 1960), paragraph 19.

16th Session, 4th Committee, 1202 Meeting (November 8, 1961), paragraph 29; 1065th Plenary Meeting (November 27, 1961), paragraph 275; Annexes, Agenda Item 27 (A/5082, January 17, 1962), paragraph 38; and Agenda Item 27 (A/5087, January 27, 1962), paragraph 6.

United Nations Documents: A/5160 (August 15, 1962), A/PV.1155 (October 18, 1962), A/AC.109/36 (April 1, 1963), and A/PV.1183 (December 5, 1963).

⁹⁵The section of the Article reads: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."

⁹⁶Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Portugal and the Anti-colonialist Campaign (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional de Informacao, 1960), pp. 15-17.

Algeria from France, and the Indonesian issue in 1946 -- and Portugal often cites the precedent. As an overseas extension of the metropolitan area, Angola is only subject to the jurisdiction of Portugal. But the United Nations, too, can cite a precedent of its own: the organization has given its approval when a non-self-governing territory became fully integrated into the political structure of a metropolitan state. While this action with regard to Greenland, and Alaska and Hawaii may not have had too much significance, it established a standard. Having granted approval, the Assembly could presumably refuse not to do so in other cases.

The argument between Portugal and certain members of the United Nations hinges on an important semantical disagreement. In Portuguese terms, self-determination for Angola apparently means not a choice regarding the type of government, but "participation" in the administration and in the political organization of a given political structure, type of State and administrative organization.⁹⁷ As Portugal would make its case appear, the onus is on Portugal to decide whether the African territories come under Article 73,⁹⁸ even if they were considered to be non-self-governing. This is a logical assumption following from the Portuguese belief that the applicability of Article 73 is for the individual administering state itself

⁹⁷United Nations Document S/5448 (October 31, 1963), p. 22.

⁹⁸The section of Article 73 in question reads: "[Members of the United Nations administering non-self-governing territories assume the obligation] to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII (trust territories) apply."

to decide. They base this contention on the history of the General Assembly itself. For example, in 1946, the Assembly merely "took note" of the original list of such territories submitted by the colonial powers. Chapter XI itself appears merely as a "guide" to members, the term "non-self-governing" was not explicitly defined by either the Charter of the General Assembly, and the word "independence" was never inserted into Chapter XI. Because of these weaknesses, the Assembly virtually acquiesces in the practice, claim the Portuguese, of having states consider that "it is exclusively up to them to interpret their own laws and to determine which of their territories, even if non-self-governing, do not come under Article 73."⁹⁹

The United Nations conception of the Charter, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that it is a dynamic instrument consisting of the original document and the interpretations resulting from the Security Council and Assembly actions and resolutions. For example, resolution 1541 (principles which should guide members in determining whether or not obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73) laid the groundwork for asserting Portugal's obligations to the United Nations. It was the climax "of a long process on interpretation, explanation and application of Article 73."¹⁰⁰

Portugal, by accepting membership, had bound itself to submit to these rulings, and has no right whatsoever to come now before this very Assembly and either question its competence or

⁹⁹United Nations, General Assembly, 11th Session, 656th Plenary Meeting (February 20, 1957), paragraph 82.

¹⁰⁰Delegate of Ceylon. United Nations, General Assembly, 17th Session, 4th Committee, 1399th Meeting (November 27, 1962), paragraph 80.

argue that it has no power to lay down . . . principles for the purpose of carrying out its powers and duties under Chapter XI.¹⁰¹

Also, Article 2(7) does not protect Portugal. The United Nations views a fight between a nationalist movement and a colonial power as an international matter, different from an internal "security" problem. As the delegate of Ceylon has pointed out: "Matters dealt with in the Charter are matters of international concern and are no longer within the reserved domain of States."¹⁰² Subsidiary arguments of the failure in human terms of Portuguese administration, repression and censorship, and the failure to create a "multi-racial" society center around the charge that Portugal's African policies contribute a threat to peace and security, as was perhaps certain: the "last remnants of colonialism, no matter where they exist, are bound to create friction, danger, and unrest."¹⁰³

This legalistic interpretation of the principles and the powers of the United Nations in the Angola situation have found Portugal and the other members arguing at cross-purposes. Portugal, in its own way, believes that it is adhering to the Charter, while the United Nations believes that the implied interpretations are merely those of Portugal alone. All the other Portuguese theories, justifications, and beliefs which that nation has always put forth to substantiate its policies in Africa are all rehashed again in

¹⁰¹Ibid., paragraph 60.

¹⁰²Ibid., paragraph 77.

¹⁰³Delegate of Liberia. United Nations, Security Council, 16th Year, 987th Meeting (December 18, 1961), paragraph 90.

New York. But they are secondary to Portugal's legal interpretation of the issue. Although the blunt fact behind the issue in the United Nations is that colonialism is inappropriate and pernicious in the mid-twentieth century, the Portuguese persist in presenting their own defense both openly, and in some cases, quite logically. Perhaps Salazar feels more confident if Portugal keeps talking and the opposition keeps listening -- at least they are not acting. He must, of course, also realize that where a sovereign power does not even share the basic premises of the majority, discussion must become particularly pointless. However, Dr. Nogueira, until early 1964 the Portuguese delegate to the United Nations, was well-liked and respected by many of the delegations,¹⁰⁴ and he possessed a keen legal mind as perhaps one should who had chaired the Law Faculty at the University of Coimbra. He was particularly adept at putting his nation's accusers on the defensive when he would claim that there was nothing Portugal was criticized for that was not being done, and worse, by other members of the United Nations. In fact, he would claim that Portugal was "being accused of the very crimes of which its accusers are guilty."¹⁰⁵ Racial discrimination was as relevant to India as it was to Portugal, colonialism as relevant to the Soviet Union as to Portugal, and aggression as rel-

¹⁰⁴The correspondent of West Africa, for example, has noted: "One of the most remarkable features of the recent debate . . . was the importance -- and the friendliness -- of personal contacts between almost all the diplomats involved. . . . Dr. Nogueira is known and like by many African diplomats." (August 10, 1963), p. 891.

¹⁰⁵United Nations, General Assembly, 16th Session, 4th Committee, 1202nd Meeting (November 8, 1961), paragraph 29.

evant to Ghana as to Portugal.¹⁰⁶

The forces allied against Portugal in the United Nations appear to be headed by the African states. It was long believed that the dispute itself involved Portugal on the one hand and the independent African states on the other. But this is not completely so, as almost the entire membership of the U.N. has supported this African initiative in one degree or another. It is the United Nations, both as an entity and as a collection of many individual states, that has a case against Portugal. However, the question is one of a vital concern to the Africans as the case is a matter of redeeming their own continent and supporting other African peoples. The 1960 "Declaration on Colonialism" was merely the most explicit expression of the determination of Africans to wipe out the last remnant of colonialism on that continent. As they are the most intimately involved, the Africans have been the most impatient with Portugal. They have called its sovereign rights in Angola "irrelevant:" sovereignty acquired by colonial conquest is immoral and illegal. When faced with a similar problem in Goa in 1961, the Africans stated their position most clearly: "We cannot in the twentieth century accept that part of international law which was laid down by European jurists . . . specifying that colonies in Asia and Africa which were acquired by conquest conferred sovereignty on the colonial power."¹⁰⁷ In the General Assembly, where they carry more

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. Also: United Nations, General Assembly, 1065th Plenary Meeting (November 27, 1961), paragraph 277.

¹⁰⁷ Delegate of Liberia. United Nations, Security Council, 16th Year, 988th Meeting (December 18, 1961), paragraph 79.

numerical weight, they have pressed for more emphatic condemnation of Portuguese policies and have recommended increasingly stronger measures to force a change. They maintain that the recent economic and social reforms announced by Portugal merely serve to deflect world attention from the central issue of self-determination and independence. The Africans have come to feel that "radical surgery is required."¹⁰⁸ If Portuguese policy cannot be reversed by the United Nations, several African states have hinted that they may go further. The delegate of the Congo (Brazzaville) spoke for the rest of the Africans when he said: "The Security Council may one day be called upon . . . to discuss more serious . . . incidents that may threaten to pit Portuguese troops against the United African nations. . . ."¹⁰⁹ This in itself was a change in attitude for members of the Brazzaville Group. There is some indication that in the earlier years of Angolan debate, the Brazzaville Group, in deference to France, hesitated to favor militant action. For example, in 1961 a call for sanctions against Portugal was eliminated from an African draft resolution because of Brazzaville objections.¹¹⁰

In debate, the African states receive their strongest support from the communist bloc nations, for whom the nationalist cause represents an opportunity to weaken NATO. Soviet spokesmen devote much time to this thesis. This combination of forces hits hard at

¹⁰⁸ Delegate of Ghana. United Nations Document S/PV.1044 (July 26, 1963), p. 20.

¹⁰⁹ United Nations Document S/PV.1030 (April 19, 1963), p. 41.

¹¹⁰ Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 97.

the Portuguese, who come to regard Portugal as the victim of "a grand anti-Portuguese conspiracy on the international plane,"¹¹¹ with "Russia behind all the movements of pseudo-emancipation."¹¹² Moreira has said:

A characteristic quality of Afro-Asians -- our neighbors by the fortunes of history and with whom therefore we are bound to have dealings, friendly or otherwise -- is precisely their negative attitude to any form of dialogue. For that reason the isolationist campaign has been a marked success, though this was not difficult considering the set of myths invoked as arguments.¹¹³

What is the United Nations accomplishing in the Angola case? As Jacobson has said: ". . . it is hard to find many cases in which the correlation between U.N. recommendations and action by the administering authority was clear-cut. More often, the U.N.'s function, lacking all but moral sanctions, seems to have been to affect the climate of opinion: 'to create and support attitudes favoring change.'¹¹⁴ The organization has, however, exposed the actions of administering authorities and has made colonial officials of Portugal more aware of the implications of their actions; and progressive forces, both within and outside Portugal, have sometimes used the United Nations to buttress their case in arguing for liberal colonial policies. In these respects, the United Nations has occasionally been a counter-balance to settlers and old-style im-

¹¹¹United Nations Document S/PV.1030 (April 19, 1963), p. 22.

¹¹²Salazar Statement, p. 15.

¹¹³Moreira, The Home Front, p. 21.

¹¹⁴Jacobson, loc. cit., p. 48.

perialists. Finally, the United Nations has provided a measure of support and protection for indigenous nationalists by focusing attention upon them and by giving them a forum in which to expound their views. Under this latter category, Henrique Galvao has appeared before the United Nations, the most recent being an appearance in November, 1963, before the eleven-nation Trusteeship Committee, and Holden Roberto of the Government-in-Exile appeared in 1959 as "Jose Gilmore," a member of the Guinean delegation. The latter has visited the United Nations annually since then to press the General Assembly to accept responsibility for Angola under Article 73e of the Charter, later to seek support for his military campaign.

The strongest point in the United Nations' favor is the moral one: the confirmation of the issue as a nationalist struggle for self-determination. To appeal to world opinion in this instance places Portugal at a disadvantage, because to make its argument effective, Portugal would have to muster compelling arguments that its territories are exceptions to a general rule. This it has not been able to do. Defining the moral issue such -- as one of self-determination -- has long been decided. What effect this may have overseas or within Portugal itself is unknown. It may be that white opponents of Salazar will eventually be tempted to seek international favor by showing sympathy for the nationalists in an effort to counter the First Minister's strength in the metropolis. It may even be that individual Portuguese are now more aware of how their traditional "mission" looks to others and are therefore more ready to contemplate the prospect of change. What influence this

stand has had on the internal direction of the nationalist movement is also difficult to discern. Certainly, they are encouraged to demand nothing less than complete independence. This pattern, however, was established without reference to the United Nations and has merely been reinforced by U.N. action. There is also no evidence to suggest that any of the emotionalism generated at debates in New York has contributed to greater radicalism on the part of Roberto or the GRAE. But the moral stand can bring another element into play. Now that the nationalists have united behind the Government-in-Exile, the United Nations could urge Portugal to negotiate with Roberto. The naming of the GRAE in a resolution could make the procedure acceptable to many U.N. members who have so far been unwilling to recognize it. This half-way step would be similar to the one in which the Provisional Algerian Government was named in a resolution, although it was recognized by only fifteen U.N. members. The United Nations, in effect, would then act on behalf of the nationalists in dealing with Portugal.

The United Nations has also been carrying out a concrete program in its related agencies to deal with the humanitarian problems connected with the Angolan dispute. The refugee burden in the Congo (Leopoldville) has been placed under the United Nations Operation there (ONUC) with over-all coordination in the hands of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and an interim training program for Angolans in other African states was established in October, 1963. But within the chambers of the Assembly Building, certain members of the United Nations, particularly the Afro-Asian

and communist blocs, are taking action to further isolate Portugal.

That nation has already been expelled from the Economic Commission for Africa by the Economic and Social Council (1963), from the International Conference on Education (sponsored jointly by UNESCO and the International Bureau of Education) "in the name of humanity" (1963), and will probably be expelled from the World Health Organization shortly if persistent African requests are accepted. Individual sanctions by member states have been contemplated, but they are difficult to effect on a substantial scale. Without support from those states whose trade and friendship is of greater consequence to Portugal, limited diplomatic and economic sanctions are useless. As one Portuguese official remarked sarcastically, it was hardly necessary for Cameroons to close its ports; no Portuguese has stopped there since the period of exploration.¹¹⁵ The recent Goa incident has also raised interesting questions about the future United Nations course on the Angola question. In this case, the United Nations failed to take any action at all, largely because the non-aligned states on the Security Council were reluctant to condemn India for the use of military force against Goa. This they appeared to justify on the ground that Portugal's ouster from Goa did not constitute aggression as the Portuguese charged, but was a justifiable act taken in the name of anti-colonialism. It might have been that the retention by Portugal of a tiny enclave like Goa on Indian soil was an anachronism which should have passed with the age of colonialism. It might have been that Portugal should have made the nec-

¹¹⁵The New York Times (July 7, 1963), p. 10.

essary arrangements to depart peacefully while there was still time. Yet in the eyes of many people, the end did not justify the means. For a variety of reasons, perhaps Goa is not a good case to use in seeking motivations for the future. Bad cases do not ordinarily establish sound precedents. If the Assembly had been convened during the Goa incident, the Afro-Asian countries might have been pushed into an emotional reaction that did not respond to the legal and moral issues involved. At least the Assembly did not give status to what might yet have become a dubious precedent. However, the questions arising from it can still be asked of the United Nations. Are disputes arising from colonial issues, as Goa was and Angola is, to be treated differently from other types of disputes under the Charter? Are all colonial powers to be considered aggressive because (as Krishna Menon said) "colonialism is permanent aggression?"¹¹⁶ Are all new states in the United Nations, particularly those from Africa, free to resort to force in order to correct any evils of colonialism which, in their judgment, need to be rectified? This is not to say that Portugal is right; but there is a danger in the fact that the African states might pursue a policy against Portugal in Angola that could have many of the similarities of Goa. For with respect to Angola, the independent African states are determined to "accelerate the unconditional attainment of national independence by all African territories still under foreign domination."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶Francis O. Wilcox, UN and the Non-aligned Nations (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1962), p. 36.

¹¹⁷Resolution of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, Agenda Item II (May, 1963). Quoted in Wohlgemuth, op. cit., p. 57.

This very fact that ". . . all African countries are behind the nationalists . . . means a threat to international peace and security."¹¹⁸ Ambassador Stevenson of the United States put the issue bluntly when he said:

There can be only one law of the Charter, applying equally to all its members. Any effort to apply one law in one part of the world or towards one group of states and a different law to others will surely have the most serious consequences for the future of this organization. If the use of force against territory under the control of other states is to be condoned for anti-colonial reasons, it can be condoned for other reasons, and we will have opened a Pandora's box. The end of that road is chaos.¹¹⁹

There are alternatives to this course. Negotiation is the one being put forth with more frequency, and there is some evidence to suggest that Portugal may have to be satisfied with a Portuguese equivalent of Evians-les-Bains. The nationalists are becoming stronger -- largely as a result of their own efforts, but at least in part because of the opportunities inherent in the existence of the United Nations.

But, barring an international conflict or the effectiveness of international sanctions, it would appear that only time can achieve a settlement in Angola. The Security Council and the General Assembly demand that Portugal: cease all repression of indigenous inhabitants, withdraw its military forces from the territories, release unconditionally all political prisoners, and negotiate with the nationalist groups with a view to the transfer of power leading

¹¹⁸United Nations Document S/PV.1042 (July 24, 1963), p. 33.

¹¹⁹Wilcox, op. cit., p. 38.

to immediate independence.¹²⁰

Generally, it is evident that the United Nations has contributed to raising the standards of Portuguese colonial rule and to hastening the liquidation of their colonialism. For various reasons, the United Nations was constitutionally committed to becoming involved in the Angola struggle.¹²¹ On balance, the general colonial revolution, of which Angola is but a later part, has probably been more peaceful because of United Nations involvement, but it would probably be wrong, or going too far, to state that the United Nations has provided adequate substitutes for any colonial system or that it has devised wholly effective measures for bringing what some have termed "teen-age states" to responsible maturity, although the organization has made significant progress in these areas. However, following the United Nations course might be relatively better in many ways than maintaining any colonial regime.

The United Nations has generally favored modernizing over traditional elements. It has upheld the goal of racial equality and advanced the concept of the plebiscite. Some scholars and statesmen have decried the fact that in its activities on colonial issues, the United Nations has been more an arena for combat than a focal point for cooperation. This criticism may not be generally

¹²⁰United Nations, General Assembly, A/1807, 17th Session, (December 14, 1962), p. 12. and United Nations Document S/5380 (July 31, 1963), p. 17.

¹²¹See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 341-371; and, Ernest B. Haas, "The Attempts to Terminate Colonialism: Acceptance of the United Nations Trusteeship System," International Organization, vol. 7, no. 1 (February, 1953), pp. 1-21.

acknowledged, as peaceful cooperation does require consensus. The problem that the United Nations faces with Portugal is to convince the New State that some one-hundred-odd other nations constitute that consensus, and that Portugal is colonialist, is in the wrong, and is unrealistic in the modern world.

Portugal, however, has survived any number of crises in the past -- though none so serious as those of the present, to be sure -- and seems confident that the nation will again prevail. Premier Salazar has pledged to fight "to the limit of our human elements and of our resources" to hold the territories.¹²²

Part III: On the Side of Revolution: What Price Victory?

Arrayed against the preponderance of Portuguese power, the Angolan Government-in-Exile and the National Liberation Army possess the support of Africa and of international opinion, a united leadership, and the advantage of both Portugal's internal and overseas divisions. Outside the United Nations, the independent African states have already imposed sanctions on Portugal, and have aided the nationalists with money, materiel, and diplomatic support. At present, the GRAE possesses the outright diplomatic recognition of nine African nations -- the Congo (Leopoldville),¹²³ Tunisia, Ghana,

¹²²Salazar Statement, p. 10.

¹²³At the same time, the Congo maintains diplomatic relations with Portugal. This is both a political and economic necessity because of the Benguela Railway's monopoly position as outlet for the Katanga copper fields. The Congo's position vis-a-vis Portugal is precarious. Salazar has threatened several times to block the estuary of the Congo River in retaliation for Congo's support of the nationalists. The latest threat was in October, 1963. See "Congo Premier Charges Portugal Threatening to Sink Ships in River," The Edmonton Journal (October 15, 1963), p. 12.

Morocco, Algeria, Guinea, Egypt, Dahomey, and Ethiopia -- and the moral support of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), composed of all 32 independent African nations. The OAU, in addition, has provided the GRAE with over \$1.5 million in a military war-chest,¹²⁴ most of which comes from the personal treasury of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.¹²⁵ While the fund is also for use in Southern Rhodesia, SouthWest Africa, and South Africa, the most vulnerable target at the moment is Angola. Independent Africa has undertaken to use their resources "to accelerate the unconditional attainment of national independence"¹²⁶ of this priority target (Angola), and while the GRAE have concentrated on the military and organizational aspects of the campaign, the African states have provided diplomatic and propaganda support.

The military support for the rebels is perhaps well-known. The nationalist army stationed at Camp Kinkusu "is turning out 2200 men every eight weeks"¹²⁶ for service in the field. They are train-

¹²⁴See: "Angola Fighting Foreseen," The Edmonton Journal (November 11, 1963). Reprinted from a Times-Post dispatch from the U.N.

¹²⁵See Jay Walz, "An Emperor Tries to Unite Africa," The New York Times Magazine (March 8, 1964), pp. 18, 65-68, 70.

¹²⁶Resolution of the Summit Conference of Independent African States passed at Addis Ababa on May 25, 1963, Agenda Item I. For text see Africa Report, no. 6 (June, 1963), pp. 9 ff. A similar meeting in Tunis in 1960 produced a resolution that condemned the colonial policies of Portugal, reaffirmed the right of the people of Angola to national independence, demanded the immediate liberation of all political prisoners, and appealed to the Special Committee of the United Nations established to study the question of Angola. The Summit Conference noted that "it is preoccupied with the fact that Portugal is intensifying the repression." At the Cairo Conference in 1961, the African states reconsidered their diplomatic and commercial relations with Portugal. Texts of these resolutions are quoted in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 244, 251.

¹²⁷Lloyd Garrison, "Now Angola, A Study of a Rebel," The New York Times Magazine (February 16, 1964), p. 19.

ed in guerrilla tactics by the Algerians, Tunisians, and a few Portuguese officers who have deserted Salazar, have received equipment from the old Force Publique and the FLN in Algeria, and are clothed and supplied by Tunisia and the Congo. With the continuing demise of colonialism in central Africa, guerrilla bases might also be established in areas such as Northern Rhodesia, and coupled with attacks originating from the Congo, the Portuguese army might shortly find itself outflanked from the East. The continuance of a guerrilla war itself is an advantage for Roberto and the GRAE. The terrain of northern Angola is suited for this kind of offensive. Among the hills and valleys, the rebel army possesses a familiarity of towns and roads which the Portuguese lack. Salazar's forces were never very good at fighting, anyway, and the rebel areas of the province are virtually immune from Portuguese air and land tactics. The favorite method of concentrated air strikes result in few casualties. If one could judge by other guerrilla wars -- in China, Indochina, or Algeria -- the success of the Angolan nationalists could hinge on the prolongation of the conflict. Although the Portuguese would deny that the war has had any effect on the homeland, the continued war effort has crippled the economy.¹²⁸ "With the mounting cost of military operations -- now running at about £70 million a year and swallowing up over one-third of the budget -- it would seem that the least Portugal could hope for is a pyrrhic victory."¹²⁹ Also, the war is unpopular at home. Portuguese morale

¹²⁸Phil Newsom, "War Has Little Effect on Portugal," The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (September 18, 1963), p. 4.

¹²⁹Elizabeth Morris, "Gun-point Peace in Angola," The New Statesman, vol. 67, no. 1725 (April 3, 1964), p. 514.

is beginning to sag. There is open talk in Angola of having to fight for two or three more years; there is whispered talk of sabotage, of a refusal to go through with military plans which could involve serious casualties, and of gross inefficiency at the top.¹³⁰ The populace, according to The London Times, are against the war: "A Ministry statement said that at recent embarkations of troops, women on the dockside screamed their sorrow and revulsion. . . ." ¹³¹ Portugal cannot afford to wage an extended war, and recently a new factor has arisen.

Another advantage possessed by the nationalists is that of Portugal's troubles in its other colonies. In 1964, it was finally admitted that guerrilla forces controlled almost 15 per cent of the territory of Portuguese Guinea.¹³² Forces are gathering for a major offensive against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. Sukarno of Indonesia has cast covet glances at Timor, the small territory in the Far East, and eventually he may seize it much as India did Goa. The ancient Portuguese Empire is beginning to crumble at the feet of the New State. As it does, Portuguese strength will be weakened; Salazar will have to secure all the colonies. Military forces will become thinly-spread over impossible distances, the economy will

¹³⁰ Rumors of inefficiency were reinforced when Marshal Lopes, President of the Republic, and General Deslandes, Governor-General of Angola, were arrested in 1962. At the same time, Salazar assumed the additional duties of Minister of Defense and Minister for Overseas. Adriano Moreira, the replaced Overseas Minister, returned to the faculty of Coimbra University. See Anthony Verrier, "Portugal On the Brink," The New Statesman (October 19, 1962), pp. 518-519.

¹³¹ Quoted in Basil Davidson, "Angola 1961: The Factual Record," p. 176.

¹³² See "Africa's Unreported War," Africa Report, vol. 9, no. 2 (February, 1964), p. 8.

assume additional burdens, international opinion will continue to coalesce against Portugal, and some link in the imperial chain will weaken. Roberto, no doubt, hopes that weakspot will be Angola.

Before the world, Roberto and the GRAE possess moral strength. Portugal has failed to understand that colonialism is dead in the world of the 1960's:

Governments cannot stop clocks or turn them back. This is 1961, not 1861 or 1561. Portuguese policy has been based on a belief that nationalism would stop at the borders of Angola or Mozambique, or be stopped. King Canute had as much chance of stopping the tide from coming in.¹³³

The trend of the times is for self-determination and independence. Where that trend comes in conflict with a preservation of the status quo, the latter must give way. The United Nations, the world community in general, are behind Angola, not Portugal. In this respect, history is on the side of Angola. The national self-assertion of a suppressed people eventually becomes victorious. Using history as a judge may be taken lightly, but time and circumstance are with Angola. Portuguese policy for the future merely seems to be an intensification of past policies. Portugal does not have another hundred years to accomplish its "mission."

Racialism is one of the factors working against Portugal in the colony, and conversely, it is helping the nationalists. The continuing disturbance of war and the threat of international action have sharpened the temper of the white settlers and have increased

¹³³Okuma, op. cit., p. 110. Quoted from The New York Times.

the likelihood of further, racial, violence. The white Angolans might want token independence from the metropolis, and might be dissatisfied with the administration of overseas policy, but, at heart, their views are more conservative than those of Lisbon. In this respect they are similar to the former French colons in Algeria. They know that Africa is their only home, and they realize that native labor, land reserves, and the colonial economy are restrictive influences on the future development of Angola. But they also know that many of the aspects of the policy of assimilation, failure though they be, will always be an implicit threat to white political dominance. The importance of this sentiment grows from year to year. If one could look back at the outbreak of violence on March 15, 1961, it is noted that only after the arrival of the main body of the Portuguese army in Angola did the white settlers cease their campaign of retaliation against the Africans. The army had to control white radicals bent on revenge as well as fight a war. At present, whites in southern and central Africa are, after all, whites, and want to maintain whatever power and privilege they can associate with their color. Probably "the Salazar Government is perfectly aware that the direction of Angola . . . is toward a Rhodesian, if not a South African, way of life."¹³⁴ But this should not upset Portuguese colonialists. Independent or no, white colonialism hopes to control the colony.

Finally, the united leadership and following of a mass national rising has confronted the Portuguese with a situation that has

¹³⁴James Duffy, "Portugal In Africa," Foreign Affairs, vol. 39, no. 3 (1961), p. 191.

never before existed: the rise of a national awareness among Angolans which transcends the boundaries of tribalism. Through almost five centuries the Portuguese were not threatened by a mass uprising, and they cannot not understand why the Africans are against them. But they did not recognize that Portuguese colonial policy could not work as long as it remained paternalism at its best, and obscurantism at its worst. For centuries the African has usually witnessed the latter; he could not wait forever. Allied with world opinion and with weapons, the African did not choose to wait.

The Portuguese Government is preparing for whatever may come. Beneath the optimistic phrases about assimilation and brotherhood, there is determination to resist. President Americo Tomas has said: "We are not in Africa like so many others. We will continue as always our policy of integration. . . . To this end it is necessary for us to be what we have always been, and we will not change."¹³⁵ In the face of such an unyielding attitude, the areas of compromise are limited. Certainly the Portuguese are not following the example of the English and they looked upon Belgium's action in the Congo with a mixture of scorn and disbelief. Their words and deeds find a closer parallel with Afrikaner policy in South Africa. Perhaps a concert of international pressures inside and outside of the United Nations or the possibility of popular uprisings within Angola coupled with the guerrilla war now going on, would persuade Portugal to change its course in Africa. But all this is speculative, and the future of Angola must take its own course.

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 493.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: WHITHER ANGOLA?

The fact of a territory proclaiming its independence is a natural phenomenon in human societies, and therefore, it is a hypothesis that is always admissable, but indeed no one can or ought to set a time limit for it. What is being subjected to time-tables is the inconceivable politics of our time, which claims that States should set a time limit to destroy their unity and break up. This is absurd. But, even if absurd, such politics ought at least to have shown concern for the benefit of the peoples in question, with the problem of knowing whether or not conditions of demographic, economic, cultural, technical, and political development are fulfilled so that an independent State . . . can be based on them. Now these questions are not realized in the territories in question. . . .¹

Whatever its faults, colonialism in Africa has performed a number of useful functions.² It frequently provided the motive force for processes of social, economic, and political change. It was always a source of some technical assistance, and it was often a source of financial aid as well. Colonialism provided a system for managing relationships between the dependent territories and the metropolitan states and among the dependent territories themselves. Some of the benefits that the colonial system brought to

¹Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, Portuguese Problems in Africa (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional da Informacao, 1962), p. 4.

²See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960); Max F. Millikan and Donald L.M. Blackmer, The Emerging Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1961); Reinhold Neibuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1959); and Sir Alan Burns, In Defence of Colonies (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1957).

the African continent are incontestable. Perhaps much of what the whites did was selfish, since it was for the benefit of the white communities themselves; nevertheless, there is a record of partial accomplishment. While the Europeans ravaged a continent, they also opened it up to Western civilization. Colonialism made today's nationalism possible, it abolished slavery, ended tribal warfare, created communications, improved living standards, developed natural resources, introduced scientific agriculture, fought to control malaria and other diseases, established public health controls, gave the natives a stable administration and a regime based in theory at least on justice and law (the white man's law, of course). Also, it brought Christianity and education; not much of either, it is true, but at least some to areas where there had been practically none before. A report of the International Labor Organization states that:

. . . it is now almost universally recognized that, left to their own resources, indigenous peoples would have difficulty in overcoming their inferior economic and social situation, which inevitably leaves them open to exploitation.³

Some Portuguese freely admit that Portugal's colonialism, like all European colonialism in Africa, has faults, and that there are abuses in the system; but at the same time, they refuse to recognize that this might imply the failure of Portuguese colonialism. Many Portuguese look upon the material accomplishments of the New State in Angola as proof of the Portuguese success.

³Living and Working Conditions of Indigenous Populations in Independent Countries, Report VIII (1), (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 1955), p. 166.

They all quote various examples. In education, it is noted that Portugal spent an average of 65 million escudos per year (\$2.6 million) in the period 1954-1960, or 3.7 per cent of the ordinary budget of the colony; in health, Portugal spent almost 100 million escudos (\$4 million), or 5.8 per cent of the total budget, in the same 6-year period.⁴ Under the first Six Year National Development Plan (1952-1958), two billion escudos (\$80 million) was invested in Angola, and the second plan (1959-1964) called for an additional 4.6 billion (\$184 million). While the second plan was to concentrate on transport and communications (\$84 million), it is noted that educational expenditures were increased to \$6.2 million and health expenditures to \$6 million.⁵

Portugal emphasizes its hydroelectric projects, road construction, and building expansion when writing on Angola. But an equal pride of the regime are the recent "native cooperatives" in the interior. Small communities of two-or-three thousand (such as Montverde, Sanga, Caconda, and Chitembo) have been literally created from the wilderness, equipped with electricity, sewerage, running water, graveled roads, agricultural plots, and small two-family homes. These "coops" are primarily for the African, but racial intermingling within them has been encouraged.⁶ The second Six Year Plan has set aside \$1.5 million for their development.

⁴United Nations, General Assembly, General Policies in Territories Under Portuguese Administration, Document A/AC.108/L.7 (February 1, 1963), pp. 40, 43.

⁵Ibid., pp. 37-38.

⁶See Armindo Cortesao, Foundations of Progress (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1963), pp. 7-11.

The government is aided in this project by many of the companies within Angola. "State welfarism" has invaded the bush. The Angola Diamond Company, to cite but one example, maintains its own workers community of 1500 at Foz do Cunene at a \$100,000 annual expense,⁷ and SONEFE is preparing to erect towns for its employees. Within the foreseeable future, this program might become an honest attempt to raise the standards of the Angolan African. In the circumscription of Zavala, for example, there are about 1200 members whose individual income is reportedly about \$1000 a year.⁸

There are also other accomplishments: 2250 primary schools built and 12,000 parochial schools completed.⁹ There are 63 specilized schools to be finished this year, and plans are now materializing for the erection of 13 more in 1965. There are 235 hospitals and infirmaries, 57 maternity clinics, and a nearly-completed medical school at Luanda. The government erects almost 2500 new homes every month, and builds four power stations per year. If one can judge from these facts and figures alone, it would appear that Portugal is "investing more in the welfare of the overseas province than in the metropolis itself."¹⁰ However, there are quite a few variances to be reconciled.

⁷Felix Queiroz de Magalhaes, Foz do Cunene (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional da Informacao, 1963), p. 3.

⁸James Duffy, Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), p. 18.

⁹Adriano Moreira, Overseas Education (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1962), pp. 7-8; "The Battle Against Ignorance," Auge-Magazine of Mexico, no. 126 (1962), pp. 160-167.

¹⁰Adriano Moreira, Revision (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1962), p. 9.

In the educational system of Angola, student drop-outs among the Africans reveals the inadequacy of the Portuguese policy, no matter how many new schools are being built. Duffy¹¹ quotes one year -- 1954 -- when out of 35,361 African students in the ensino program (the first three years of the elementary schools), only 959 passed the third-year examinations entitling them to continue. There is a sharply progressive decline in the African student population from the basic to the secondary-school level. Of the total school enrollment, one African child out of 378 attends school, while every Portuguese child is educated. Also, by conservative estimate,¹² the illiteracy rate among the indigenous population remains around 95 per cent; but there is some indication that this figure is slowly declining. By contrast, the rate among the white population is less than 25 per cent, somewhat lower than Portugal's 35 to 40 per cent.¹³ Morris¹⁴ has said of the system:

The remark of a pro-government journalist recently in Angola, that in many of the new schools he saw 'as many black faces as white and sometimes more,' seems to damn with faint praise an educational policy for nearly five million, of which but 200,000 are Europeans.

Portugal talks frequently of the Angolans who have gone on to universities in Europe. But of those who go, very few return to

¹¹James Duffy, Portugal In Africa (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1962), p. 177.

¹²United Nations Document A/5160 (August 15, 1962), paragraph 132.

¹³Duffy, Portugal's African Territories, p. 16.

¹⁴Elizabeth Morris, "Gun-point Peace in Angola," The New Statesman, vol. 67, no. 1725 (April 3, 1964), p. 514.

Angola. Most remain in the metropolis and enter government service. The number of university candidates is small enough in the first instance (300 per year¹⁵), and by their not returning to the colony, the Angolans are deprived of the educated elite which would be necessary should the province become independent. However, the number who go on "does comprise a larger elite than the Belgian Congo possessed in June, 1960."¹⁶ This final stage of his education also works to the advantage of the regime. Many African students in the homeland become fully assimilated into Portuguese life, and remain in Lisbon to defend Portuguese policies. The nature of the educational system has always been intended to combat African nationalism in the first place.

While there has been the formation of an elite, the system is the clearest example of the intent of Portugal's over-all policy to convince the African it is better to be a Portuguese than an African. To pass upward through the system, the African progressively abandons his native way of life, leaves his village and people, and enters a world of different cultural values. (In the 1950's, the government was planning special schools and training centers for the children of chiefs in order to create a new generation of African village leaders, but the project was abandoned.¹⁷) Historically,

¹⁵Most of these students are in law, engineering, or medicine. See Genipro de Eca d'Almeida, "The 1961 Educational Reform," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 3 (February, 1963), pp. 10.

¹⁶Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 177. The figure of 17 is mentioned in J. King Gordon, UN in the Congo: A Quest for Peace (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), pp. 9-10.

¹⁷Duffy, Portugal's African Territories, p. 17.

a few have made this transition. Men like J. Pinto Bull, a former official of the Foreign Office,¹⁸ and Augusto dos Santos Lima, administrative inspector in the Overseas Ministry, have served on the Portuguese delegation to the United Nations. There are African businessmen and a few doctors and teachers in the colony who have gone through the system, and men like Holden Roberto and Mario de Andrade emerged from it to lead opposition groups. Other examples would be Pedro Vaal Hendrik Neto, a leader of the FLNA Youth in the Government-in-Exile, who graduated from a Luanda lycee, and Paul Touba, editor of the pro-FLNA student organ, A Voz do Estudante Angolano.¹⁹

There are also wide discrepancies in the health record in the colony. In 1960 there was one doctor for every 20,200 persons and one nurse for every 10,000.²⁰ "In a five-hundred-mile stretch from the Katanga border to Bela Vista in central Angola there are still only two doctors."²¹ The conditions in many hospitals and institutions have been decried as "totally inadequate" by the World Health Organization:²² the infant mortality rate exceeds 50 per cent, the

¹⁸Bull was the first African Governor-General, and his brother Benjamin is the leader of the Union of Citizens of Portuguese Guinea. Patricia Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations," International Conciliation, no. 545 (November, 1963), p. 49.

¹⁹John Marcum, "The Angola Rebellion: Status Report," Africa Report, vol. 9, no. 2 (February, 1964), p. 7.

²⁰United Nations, General Assembly, General Policies in Territories Under Portuguese Administration, Document A/AC.108/L.7 (February, 1963), p. 44.

²¹Jerry Boulton, "Report from Africa's Unreported War," Maclean's Magazine, vol. 77, no. 6 (March 21, 1964), p. 34.

²²United Nations Document A/5160 (August 15, 1962), paragraph 132.

government health service registered only 75,289 cases in 1960, and in the same year, the government spent only 80 cents per person on health expenditures. There seems to be no real campaigns to educate the African in matters of hygiene and sanitation, and "one may reasonably assume that the majority of the population suffers in unrecorded misery."²³

The total inadequacy of any precise government records makes Portuguese activity virtually meaningless. Granted, the regime is making gestures toward alleviating the physical and intellectual misery of the Africans. Some of the efforts already undertaken substantiate this. But actions directed toward the African are not preparatory steps to any contemplation of independence for the colony. There is no concerted effort to build for the day when Angola will be on its own. The hurried attempt to build schools or roads, to increase public welfare, are a direct result of the 1961 rebellion and an attempt to prevent another; foreign critics must also be allayed. One must realize additionally that "decisions made are more a response to local white pressure than to African demands."²⁴

There has been progress. All of it might be on the right lines, but (as even Salazar's apologists admit) "it has not been fast enough, and the Portuguese have got to do much more."²⁵ Spending 3.7 per cent of the budget for education is not enough, when Nigeria

²³Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 182.

²⁴Duffy, Portugal's African Territories, p. 16.

²⁵George Martelli, "The Future In Angola," African Affairs, vol. 61, no. 245 (October, 1962), p. 306.

spends almost 40 per cent on the same;²⁶ having one doctor for every 20,200 persons does not compare to the Congo's ratio of 1:3000 under the Belgians,²⁷ but it is better than the Cameroons, Ghana, Sierra Leone, or Ethiopia;²⁸ spending the sum of \$184 million over a six-year span for the economic well-being of the white and black "citizens" of Angola seems meager when compared to the £798 million (\$2.4 billion) invested in the neighboring Rhodesias within a comparable time period;²⁹ and raising the per capita income of the African in Angola to \$73 per year in 1962³⁰ is significantly below the £107 (\$351)³¹ figure for the same year among Africans in Rhodesia.

But if one can understand the fundamental character of Portuguese policy in Angola it would be apparent why the economic and social well-being of the African, "citizen" or no, will always remain static. If the principle that the African is a laborer is accepted as the cornerstone of a native policy, it is difficult for a colonial power to envisage, and virtually impossible for it to implement, any program of social and economic reform. This is the inherent contradiction of the Portuguese presence in Africa. Even

²⁶United Nations Document A/AC.96/189 (January 28, 1963), p. 5.

²⁷Ruth Slade, The Belgian Congo (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 9.

²⁸Hugh Kay, "The Portuguese Way in Africa," Fortune (February, 1964), p. 139.

²⁹Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Legacy of Progress: Achievements of the Years of Federation, 1953-1963 (Salisbury: The Government Printer, 1963), p. 3. (Pamphlet C. Fed. 269)

³⁰Adriano Moreira, The Home Front (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1962), p. 22.

³¹Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Legacy of Progress, p. 5.

if impoverished Portugal were to carry out in Angola the programs of health, education, housing, and technical assistance, which Salazar has not been able to establish at home, it is unlikely that Portugal would choose to do so. Not only does the rest of Africa provide an example of where such a course inevitably leads, but these proposals seem to have no serious place in the fundamental Portuguese colonial philosophy. To achieve the modest benefits of modern civilization, the African has to be a Portuguese in more than name only. Programs of social reform for an African mass could lead to the formation of an African identity, which is exactly what the Portuguese do not want. While the emergence of a substantial, satisfied, African elite is permitted under the system, Portugal's plans for the Portuguese "African" majority in Angola stop somewhat short of a projected formation of a literate and informed population. The distant goal of the government's policy still seems to be the creation of an assimilated African peasantry possessing roughly the virtues of religious devotion, dedication to working the land, and a political conservatism.

In comparison with neighboring territories like the Congo and the Rhodesias, Portugal's progress in Angola is perhaps not too impressive. But by standards of Portugal's previous performance in Africa, the New State is accomplishing something. But this accomplishment has also contributed to the destruction of Portuguese "multi-racialism" in Angola. It has strengthened the ethnocentric tendencies of the Portuguese; it has created a white world, or at least a Portuguese way of life, in the territory, presumably intend-

ing to inspire the African population with new desires to share in the triumph of Portuguese values. Success will continue to separate Portuguese and African societies, and will perpetuate the view that only the white Portuguese "citizen" is entitled to share in the profits of industry or the investments in welfare. The boasted "multi-racialism" must vanish in the process:

A Portuguese air force officer told me: 'I love the Africans like my brother. They are my friends; all Portuguese feel the same way.' I asked him why, then, Portuguese had killed Africans indiscriminately [in 1961]. He became red and angry. He shook a finger under my nose and shrilled: 'I'll kill Negroes brutally . . . if they ever try to kick me out. I'll knife them, I'll butcher them, I'll hang them from trees.'³²

In certain respects, the Portuguese effort in Angola within the last ten years resembles the Belgian activity in the Congo. This was suggested earlier in Chapter II, and can be explored further here. Portugal has adopted an economic paternalism in Angola, and a political system which roughly parallels that of Catholic Belgium overseas. Of course, the coincidental similarity of the respective colonial philosophies is probably as disconnected a thing as is the Portuguese experience in their own Angola. There is no evidence to support the idea that either of the two deliberately imitated the other. This author does not also assume that Belgian colonial philosophy and that of the Portuguese are one and the same thing. The former promulgated their policy as a deliberate program, while the Portuguese arrived at their colonial orientation through a series of

³²Boultbee, loc. cit., p. 34.

administrative experimentations and expedients. Nevertheless, both powers were remarkably alike in Africa. One case in point would be Inforcongo and the Secretariado Nacional da Informacao. The former is Belgian, and the latter is Portuguese, and the purpose of both was, and is, the same. Inforcongo encouraged the Belgians to believe -- and they honestly, if uncritically, did believe -- that their colonization of the Congo was a cause for national pride, and that the Africans loved and honored them for their civilizing mission. SNI has succeeded with an equal accomplishment to do the same for the Portuguese. Both were successful because they had a good story to tell -- of economic achievement, and of social development. Both had a consistent policy in which it believed -- Inforcongo in paternalism, SNI in assimilation. Both possessed a positive, practical, and high-minded tone. The former collapsed when the Congo fell apart, but SNI continues to preserve the Portuguese colonial story in Angola.

In race relations, the Congo and Angola progressed along similar lines -- only the terms were different. Belgian law in the Congo guaranteed equality between the races; in Portugal's case, this move has been relatively recent, with the assimilado system theoretically and legally abolished in 1953, and full citizenship granted to all Africans in 1961. Racial discrimination was punishable in the Congo, and an honest attempt was made to submerge any discrimination in Angola. The color bar was proscribed in both territories. But there was no social equality in the Congo, and there is none in Angola: segregation was the rule, not the exception.

Discrimination was practiced unofficially in the Congo, and reappears in Angola. Nevertheless, the Belgians and the Portuguese denied, and continue to deny, the existence of racial practices. Racial discrimination, however, was, and is, implicit in the official policies of "paternalism" and "assimilation": both postulated the doctrine of superiors and inferiors, superior equalling white, inferior equalling black. This equation conditioned all race relations.

The whites were increasingly pictured as the "tutors" of the Africans. They were made keenly aware of a civilizing mission which it was their duty to fulfill. The doctrine of Governor-General Ryckmans of the Congo is synonymous to Portuguese activity in Africa: "Rule in order to serve. . . . This is the sole excuse for colonial conquest; it is also its complete justification. To serve Africa -- that means to civilize her."³³ The underlying and prevailing opinions of the Africans on the part of the mass of Belgians in the Congo developed into one of superiority-inferiority. With the material success of the colony after World Wars I and II, a previously reasonable social distinction became instead an insupportable racial discrimination. The latter is becoming more apparent among the likewise successful white Angolan community. All had been well in the two colonies of Congo and Angola as long as the Africans had remained as children who were to be taught and encouraged and gradually persuaded to change what appeared to the European

³³Slade, op. cit., p. 2.

to be the more barbarous of their habits. But the limit was reached at the adolescent stage, when Africans began to want to be treated on terms of equality, as adults -- to be regarded as something other than little sons.

Much like the Portuguese, the Belgians too never held any rigid color prejudices. If they did appear, they did not result from any officially expressed opinions on the innate inferiority of colored peoples. Indeed the Belgian Government had always shown its desire to prevent explicit mention of color bars in legal and statutory documents relevant to the Congo. Intermarriage and social intercourse were never prohibited legally or tacitly; children of mixed parentage received a legal status as Europeans if they were legally recognized by a father who was himself of European status. No laws ever excluded Africans from employment as skilled workers, or created a statutory barrier against the advance of the most intelligent and enlightened of them.

The Belgian colonial attitude, and to a degree, the attitude also of the Portuguese, was a strange mixture of toleration and patronizing self-satisfaction when it came to race relations. The two believed that they possessed, in their own way, an effective antidote to what they regarded as the antics of power-drunk rabble-rousers in the rest of Africa: raising native standards, limiting concessions in education, and, in general, creating for the African an environment which would foster mental lethargy. Both paternalism and assimilation were steadily developed as a barrier to a growing sense of nationalism, and the Belgians and the Portuguese never

attempted to answer the charge that the African was kept at a lower human level than the whites.

Other similarities are striking. Leopold's personal rule in the Congo was ruthless, with forced labor and repression. To a degree, the Belgians did not do much about abolishing either when they took over the Congo. Portugal's rule in Angola, was and is, the same. Leopold's, and later Belgium's, native policy stressed the Africans "duty" to work -- a feature not too dissimilar from Angola. To bring the African up to European standards, the Belgians and the Portuguese both advocated a merit system -- an inferior who had achieved certain distinctions in education, religion, employment, or public service could qualify for the status of a superior. He was called an evolve in the Congo, entitled to all the privileges of the whites. The system by which this integration was to take place became immatriculation. The Portuguese likewise adopted a merit system, and only changed the words: evolve became assimilado, the system of integration became assimilation. The results in both colonies were identical; their only fault was that they would not and did not work. In the Congo, the majority of the 100,000 whites refused to absorb the evolues, and most of the evolues did not, in any case, want to be absorbed. By 1950, immatriculation had produced about 40,000 evolues out of a population of 14 million.³⁴ In the case of Angola, four hundred years of effort netted (in the same year -- 1950) only 30,000 assimilados out of 4 million Afri-

³⁴This figure is cited in Basil Davidson, The African Awakening (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), p. 177.

cans.³⁵ The criteria of success was lacking in both instances.

The remark to be made of the Belgian system, however, is that while their tenure in Africa was of a shorter duration than that of the Portuguese, they appeared to have perfected a form of colonial rule which was successful, despite its limitations. The Africans did well under the Belgians, who provided him with comfort and all the social necessities. The Portuguese appear to have imitated the Belgians in principle, but they refuse to admit it openly. The African does not do as well under Portugal, and he probably suffers more. Both systems did possess a virtue:

The Belgians gave the African food, clothing, medical care, and social amenities. They created an educational system for his children, provided him with entertainment, and assisted, insured, and pensioned him. It can be said that they gave everything to the Congolese except for one thing. They neglected to give him the title 'people.' The Portuguese are not so good in material things. However, we at least are 'citizens.' This still does not make us 'people.'³⁶

Finally, one aspect of Belgian policy was always determined. There was to be no encouragement of the strivings toward political

³⁵The Portuguese will do their best to deny this figure. The abolition of the status of assimilado in 1953 and the legislative hindsight which made all Angolans, black or white, citizens of Portugal following the 1961 revolt, would form an important part of their argument. The figure cited is also fourteen years old. But James Duffy, on page 165 of Portugal in Africa says: "Over the last ten years there has been no significant increase in these figures." He also had doubts about the sincerity of the 1953 move: "At the same time [as the abolition of the assimilado status], however, the new statute allowed for the revocation of citizenship granted to Africans should they fail to comport themselves in a manner deemed proper by the authorities. This left-handed gift naturally aroused many suspicions in the minds of would be assimilados."

³⁶Joseph Melton, "Letter From a Friend," Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 5 (April, 1963), p. 17. The author is quoting a native in the northern Angolan town of Santo Antonio do Zaire.

responsibility; nor was there to be any change of attitude which would suggest ultimate independence for the Congolese.³⁷ The Salazar regime, too, can see no reason to withdraw from Africa.

The much-talked-of reforms that Portugal is implementing in Angola are intended to strengthen the status quo, not alter it. If there must be independence, it is only in the future, and on Portuguese terms:

The day will come when Angola will become completely self-governing or independent, as happened to Brazil; but that will be only when the respective population has attained a social and political status enabling them to part from the Mother Country as a ripe fruit breaks away from the parent tree. When that stage is reached, Angola will be a multi-racial nation, as we are preparing it to be. In such matters no one should presume to tell us what to do or when.³⁸

Portugal has too much to lose if it leaves Africa: its history, its national consciousness, and its economy have been geared to the retention of Angola. It is the latter which will determine the progress toward independence in the coming years, despite all the peripheral talk and argument about "missions," "societies," and the like. That Portugal is resolved to stand firm against African nationalism is certain. The flag-showing visit of President Americo Tomas to Luanda in 1963 was only another manifestation of this: "A bold black-and-yellow sign greeted Thomaz [sic]: 'We are in Portugal -- dead or alive we will stay here.' Plastered on walls were

³⁷This, at least, was the Belgian attitude up until 1958. Events of that year were to lead to Congolese independence, but this author feels that Belgian, previous to that year, was always firm against independence for the colony.

³⁸Armando Cortesao, African Realities and Delusions (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1962), p. 50.

posters proclaiming: 'Angola -- ever bigger, ever richer, ever Portuguese.'"³⁹

The 1961 rebellion and the continuous attacks against Portugal in the United Nations, in NATO, and by former friends and allies, have made the Portuguese realize that they are virtually alone and isolated. If worse does come to worse, and they are forced to renounce part of their hold on the colony, there is the oft-repeated alternative of creating a Portuguese Commonwealth, modeled after the British innovation. This solution appeals to some of the best minds in Portugal and in Angola. While it has not received the endorsement of Salazar, the idea has been bantied about in the National Assembly in Lisbon as a possible short-run expedient.⁴⁰ One member from Oporto referred to present Portuguese policy as "constitutional sophistry,"⁴¹ and looked upon a Portuguese Commonwealth of Nations as "united in everything that the Portuguese mystique has to offer, with the fullest scope for an interracial cross-fertilization of cultures."⁴² Under the plan, each of the colonies in Africa, would enjoy nominal independence from the metropolis, which would loosen them economically from the tight leash now held by Lisbon (a concession to the colonists in Angola), and leave them free to tackle world markets on their own account. At the same time,

³⁹See "Portugal Reasserts Stand Against African Nationalism," The Edmonton Journal (October 7, 1963), p. 10.

⁴⁰See Terence Prittie, "Government in Portugal," The Edmonton Journal (November 16, 1963), p. 4; reprinted from the Manchester Guardian Service.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Kay, loc. cit., p. 140.

the colonies would grant to the metropolis the exercise of foreign relations and defense. A Governor-General would represent the President of the Republic (a situation now existent), and colonial assemblies would legislate internal affairs. This Portuguese commonwealth would depend for its success or failure upon the loyalties of the overseas Portuguese to the mother country. Would they continue, for example, to consider themselves as merely overseas Portuguese, or would they adopt the attitude that they enjoy a unique position as African Portuguese, possessing different traits and a different culture, and progressing in a different environment and under different circumstances from those Portuguese living in the metropolis? In short, if a commonwealth were created, would the Portuguese in Angola become like the original Dutch (or Boers) in South Africa -- isolated from Europe and evolving a culture more akin to their African circumstance than to that which they inherited from Europe? The commonwealth would grow or collapse on loyalty, and this is something that is difficult to gauge. For the time being, at least, the overseas Portuguese in Angola have never appeared more loyal. Though the 1961 announcement of impending administrative reforms leading to limited autonomy apparently convinced neither the African opposition nor critics abroad, it did arouse the white settlers in Angola and brought them to support whatever repressive measures the government is presently instituting in the colony.

Also, another problem arising out of this plan would be that of adequately guaranteeing whether the separatist element within the colony could be satisfied with anything less than complete inde-

pendence once this initial concession had been made. The creation of a commonwealth might start a chain reaction which could destroy the very intent of the plan. Likewise, would the Africans, and especially the Government-in-Exile, be satisfied? The answer would appear to be negative when it is remembered that nothing less than complete independence is the dedicated goal of Roberto.

Another speculative approach to the commonwealth idea is that perhaps it would be the first stage to the gradual development of a completely independent Angola. First, there might be limited autonomy, then the surrender of metropolitan control over external relations and defense, followed by a complete break with Portugal. This "step-by-step" idea is nothing new, of course; some of Salazar's remarks reveal a trend toward this form of thinking. The First Minister is quick to point out that European colonialism in Africa seeks "hasty" political solutions before "the solution of the innumerable and complex social, economic, technical, and cultural problems of Africa is assured."⁴³ The impression is that Portugal might seriously consider such a move provided Angola first solves its basic problems. Much, of course, depends on an intangible -- Dr. Salazar.

There has never been any certainty that Salazar himself really shares Portugal's mystical attachment to Africa, and he is too clever to believe that his country can successfully confront crisis after crisis forever. He also knows that alliances cannot always

⁴³Salazar, Portuguese Problems in Africa, p. 13.

be counted on. The First Minister is certainly no convert to democracy, and talk of democratic association of peoples in a Portuguese community is meaningless. Salazar is probably aware that his government can be brought down at home if the African situation gets out of hand. These are fairly serious considerations and they would seem to lead to a hardening of Portuguese policy in Africa, a flat refusal to bend before the demands of African nationalism or world opinion. Ultimately, however, this is an unrealistic dead-end policy, and it may be that Salazar is strengthening his position, much as General de Gaulle did in France, to deal directly and efficiently with any developing crisis. He must be secure in Portugal and he must re-establish order in Angola before a local war between the black and white inhabitants spreads, a contingency which could have sharp repercussions in Portugal. If these short-term goals can be attained, it is possible, though perhaps not likely, that Salazar will set about the task of turning the African colony loose, perhaps into some sort of amorphous federation, if this can be worked out, perhaps entirely free. If this happens, "the regime will try to drive a sharp bargain with its western allies to help cushion the economic and psychological reverses ensuing from such a decision."⁴⁴

There is another side to the economic ramifications, also. In Portugal, there is a school of thought, led by Economics Minister Dr. Teixeira de Pinto, which maintains that a reorientation of Sal-

⁴⁴Duffy, Portugal's African Territories, p. 26.

azar's economic philosophies in the homeland could shoulder the loss of Angola without shattering Portugal's own economy.⁴⁵ The minister points out that Portugal has not yet constructed a welfare society for itself, let alone the overseas territories. Logically, he claims, Portugal ought to be producing at home three times its present output. If this were attempted, if the common man's needs were ever accepted as paramount in a society still dominated by a small elite of disproportionately wealthy men with little social sense, the aid that the mother country could supply to the overseas provinces would then become so fractional as to become unimportant. Pinto would encourage direct investment into the homeland, not the colonies. If the colonies would then become free, Portugal itself would still have a solid and stable economic base. In another analysis,⁴⁶ it is argued that the strict bookkeeping approaches of Salazar do not commend themselves to countries like Portugal, which are desperately in need of multiplying production. The only solution would seem to lie, both for Portugal and for Angola, with an increase in exports and an expansion of foreign capital inflow. If this happened in Angola, independence would be the only reasonable outcome of both actions.

But the character of Salazar himself is a factor with which to reckon. Everything must hinge on him. He is ascetic, sincere, dedicated, and incorruptible. He has not, like Hitler, worshipped

⁴⁵Teixeira de Pinto, The Overseas Economy (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1963).

⁴⁶Richard J. Hammond, Portugal's African Problem: Some Economic Facets (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962).

power for power's sake, or like Goering, exploited it in order to amass wealth. He is a relatively poor man, who lives frugally and works hard. Though not robust, he has an iron will and could have another six or seven years in office ahead of him. His own words are: "I may not be tough, but I don't happen to get ill."⁴⁷ He left the teaching profession in 1928 with complete selflessness, and has since evolved a system of government which he considers best for Portugal. He is served by men who share his views, and, like him, wish to concentrate on what they call the real problems -- those of efficient administration, economic expansion, and the development of the overseas territories. It will be the decisions of Salazar which will influence events in Angola for the foreseeable future. Barring cataclysmic events, no reasonable progress is going to be made in Africa without his consent. Violence in Angola, political upheaval in the metropolis, or a concert of diplomatic pressures may influence his decisions, but if Salazar makes up his mind to hold on to the colony, to maintain it in its present state, then it will remain Portuguese for a good while longer; a continuing and deepening warfare by African forces against the Portuguese army would then seem to provide the only ultimate possibility for self-determination.

When dealing with great leaders, everyone loves to speculate on what might happen if that leader suddenly departed the political scene. For example, if Dr. Salazar died tomorrow, what would be

⁴⁷Christine Garnier, Salazar: An Intimate Portrait, trans. from the French (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1956), p. 92.

the fate of Portugal and its empire? Salazar is now in his late seventies and he has apparently designated no successor. The First Minister has always believed in his own immortality and has been a "loner" in politics -- he has governed Portugal by himself for 32 years, without the aid or comfort of any other individual Portuguese. Dr. Salazar also has never given any thought to who or what might come after him. He does not wish to see Portugal become a monarchy after his death, in contrast to General Franco's thinking in Spain, but, yet, no one wants to venture a guess as to what the future will hold. The National Union party and the Church are the only strong elements in Portuguese society; the army is weakened by internal jealousies and inefficiencies. There could be the likelihood of a civil war in Portugal itself. There could be the likelihood that in the political vacuum created by Dr. Salazar, communism might play a dominant part in the new Portugal.⁴⁸ However, both of these alternatives are not accepted by the majority of Portugal's critics.

What is possible is that the National Union will designate a First Minister in Salazar's place and Portugal will continue as always. This is in keeping with the Portuguese themselves and with the type of governmental system that Salazar has brought to Portugal. The Portuguese character worships leadership; in a sense, the Portuguese are simple peasants who ask nothing more than that they have a leader whom they can follow. Politics and affairs of state are not the concern of the average Portuguese; given a leader they will

⁴⁸This idea is put forth in Andrew Marshall, "The Two Faces of Portugal," Angola: A Symposium -- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 28.

support him and follow him to the death. The Portuguese, some sociologists might claim, are a "nation of sheep." Also, Salazar and the National Union have brought good government to the Republic. The majority of the Portuguese will not deny this fact. Despite hardships, poverty, and illiteracy, the Portuguese of today are content with their one-party State if for no other reason than that the government concerns itself with the "common man." It will be hard to convince the Portuguese that any other system can do a better job.

Portugal after Salazar will not become a democracy, despite the claims of dissident Portuguese abroad. It is not the Portuguese nature to be "democratic." Maybe after Salazar, liberalism will again take hold in the motherland. This has happened in the past, usually after dictatorships. But also, liberalism will not last long, because again, the average Portuguese possess no great fondness for an ideology that is alien to them. However, the death of someone like Salazar will most assuredly advance the cause of independence in the remaining Portuguese colonies. There would be immediate chaos in the homeland; the revolutionary movements would seize the initiative, and probably accomplish their objectives. But all this must await the course of history; it is difficult to imagine Portugal without Salazar, and even more difficult to foretell the future without him.

At present, there appears to be a chance of compromise in the Angolan conflict. But the initiative for such is one-sided. If one looks to Salazar's emotional speech of August, 1963, in which

he denied the existence of Angolans as a people separate from the Portuguese,⁴⁹ possibilities for a negotiated settlement appear slim. Also, the 1963 talks in the United Nations between Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira and representatives of the African nations again floundered on the unique Portuguese definition of self-determination -- participation in all levels of administration, rather than the right to determine for oneself whether one is African or Portuguese.⁵⁰ The proceedings seemed a long way from nationalist demands. Roberto, however, is prepared to undertake talks with Portugal at any time, and speaks of another "Evians style" meeting. The GRAE president has looked upon the 1963 Nogueira-African nations meeting as an indication of Portuguese willingness to at least discuss the issue. The issue of negotiation is not being taken seriously in Lisbon, and there is small chance in the homeland that Portugal will meet any of Roberto's conditions for ending the conflict: recognition of the right of self-determination, withdrawal of Portuguese troops, freeing of political prisoners, and general amnesty.

Portugal's allies appear to be uninterested in intervening to press for talks between the two. The GRAE leader has said of the United States in this regard: "While paying lip-service to self-determination, the United States supplies its North Atlantic treaty

⁴⁹See Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, The Stand in Africa (Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional da Informacao, 1963), p. 4, or Statement on Portuguese Overseas Policy made at Lisbon on August 12, 1963, Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations, Press Release No. 11/63 (August 13, 1963), p. 14.

⁵⁰United Nations Document A/5531/Rev. 1 (October 30, 1963).

ally, Portugal, with arms that are used to kill us."⁵¹ Thus, as far as the nationalists are concerned, independence would appear to be a goal that can only be won by force. The GRAE estimates that in two or three years that goal will be realized,⁵² but Roberto is less confident. Without sufficient arms and financing, he can foresee perhaps a 20-year struggle that might decimate the country.⁵³ In the meantime, active preparations must be undertaken by the Government-in-Exile for if and when they become the government of an independent Angolan republic. Roberto's greatest fear is that Angola will become another Congo. The rebels themselves have agreed that any post-independence Angola must not become another Congo. One officer in the National Liberation Army said: "The Congolese just stamped their feet a few times and they got independence. But now what have they got? Officials taking big bribes and driving big cars."⁵⁴ A sergeant said: "This war has taught us to respect three things -- hard work, discipline, sacrifice. Our leaders know if they don't live up to these things, they won't last long."⁵⁵

The Congolese example is the one most constantly flaunted by the Portuguese to the rebel supporters -- the idea being that even if they should secure their objective of independence for Angola, the country will rapidly deteriorate into tribal confusion, and

⁵¹Marcum, loc. cit., p. 7.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Lloyd Garrison, "Now Angola: A Study of a Rebel," The New York Times Magazine (February 16, 1954), p. 21.

⁵⁵Ibid.

eventually, civil war. Roberto has thus made it a particular point to assure his followers that such is untrue. One high army official has said: "What happened in the Congo was crazy. You know, the Belgians used to make matches in the Congo, but when the Belgians were all scared away, the Congolese had to bring matches all the way from Sweden at twice the price. That's crazy."⁵⁶

The Congolese example has led to the most significant change to come over the Angola rebels -- the feeling that their rebellion is no longer against everything 'Portuguese' but against the 'system'⁵⁷

Nevertheless, the GRAE is attempting to educate and discipline its membership in hopes of avoiding a chaotic turmoil. If Portugal would suddenly withdraw from Angola there probably would be temporary economic disintegration and dislocation, there might be the destruction of the unified complex of fragmented societies that Portugal created in the colony, and there might be the loss of urban societies composed of classes of European artisans and skilled workers. But there would not be irremediable chaos. No one seems to doubt the capabilities of Holden Roberto, and he has surrounded himself with men of like ability. Jonas Savimbi, the foreign minister of the GRAE, graduated from the University of Lausanne; Emmanuel Ziki, the finance minister, graduated with the highest honors in economics at Coimbra; Alberto Pires, the political commissioner of the National Liberation Army, was once an administrative aide de'camp to Governor-General Deslandes; and Rosario Neto, the information minister, was a

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

high-placed official in the Portuguese Ministry of Education in Luanda. Other members of the Government-in-Exile know Angola and the Portuguese well, either having worked in the colony for them, or having fought there against them. All are dedicated to the independence of the colony. But as Salazar himself has said: "It usually serves no purpose to have a small elite to form a government . . . if there is an insufficiency of administrative cadres."⁵⁸ There is no point, he would argue, in constructing schools if you are not preparing teachers, in building an economy if you do not have managers, technicians, and economists, or in demanding political responsibility if you do not have politicians trained in the lower echelons of administration.

Roberto, of course, realizes this also. His government has instituted a crash program to train the additional people needed, and it is also depending upon the cadre which already exists under the Portuguese in the province. The latter would furnish any administrative personnel that are bound to be lacking. The GRAE has stepped up efforts to place students in African, American, and European universities. Under the auspices of the Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA) in New York, forty Angolan university students are now in the United States. In addition, Roberto has expanded the primary school facilities for refugees in the Congo, and has increased the number of secondary and technical training scholarships that are available to them. In early 1964, the Government-in-Exile opened

⁵⁸Salazar, Portuguese Problems in Africa, p. 8.

an Angolan government cadre school to train administrative personnel. While this remains the priority outside Angola, an African administrative elite continues to function under the Portuguese inside the province. It was estimated in 1962 that "some forty per cent of the administrative officials in Angola were Africans."⁵⁹ Some were of high-standing -- two examples being an Inspector of Political Affairs, and a Chief of the Technical Section of the Public Works Department.⁶⁰ There are Africans "as district governors, presidents of municipalities, directors of departments, etc."⁶¹ Apparently, this cadre went beyond the police force or postal employees, if one can believe what Salazar says. Also, apparently this situation was not merely a hasty political expediency, but rather a long-term result of what the Portuguese call "joint social promotion."⁶² When queried on the African administrative cadre, Salazar said:

I think I can sum up your three questions in two: is there an Angolan administrative cadre? And, if it exists, is it sufficient? My answer to the first question is an unhesitating affirmative. As for the second question, it seems evident that we cannot regard the existing cadres as sufficient, the more so as Angola . . . is going through a period of extraordinary progress and we are busily engaged there in the vast development plans of all kinds.⁶³

The number of the cadre and their loyalties to the Portuguese are un-

⁵⁹Hugh Kay, "A Catholic View," Angola: A Symposium -- Views of a Revolt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 99.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Salazar, Portuguese Problems in Africa, p. 7.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 7-8.

known quantities. They were trained and groomed by the Portuguese, and depend for their economic and social survival upon them. What personal affiliations these people might therefore hold toward the nationalists is undecided. There is no substantial indication that the number of the cadre and their personal efficiency in administration are not sufficient to provide a properly-functioning governmental core for an independent Angola.

There is also the question of another loyalty. The MPLA still exists, if in a crippled state. The party continues to hold together many Africans and mulattos inside and outside of the colony. It has the support of at least the Moroccan Government. Many MPLA leaders appear to be withdrawing from active politics, and there remains the possibility that the MPLA could be incorporated into the Government-in-Exile and some of its leaders given official positions within the various ministries. How the party would react if Roberto took over an independent Angola is an unanswerable question. Some individuals⁶⁴ have hinted at the possibility of the MPLA becoming a leftist, almost communist, party would could continue to harass the GRAE for control of Angola. The communist orientations of the MPLA, when it was in Leopoldville, are still remembered, and the group has been repeatedly classified as "radical."⁶⁵ It was noted by Marcum that Angolan students continue to leave the Congo under MPLA auspices for study in

⁶⁴Pieter Lessing, Africa's Red Harvest (London: Michael Joseph, 1962); Armino Cortesao, African Realities and Delusions (Lisbon: Agencia-Geral do Ultramar, 1962); Elizabeth Morris, "Gun-point Peace in Angola," The New Statesman, vol. 67, no. 1725 (April 3, 1964).

⁶⁵Morris, loc. cit., p. 514.

eastern Europe. "Reportedly, 30 left via Brazzaville and Accra for communist states in October [1963] alone."⁶⁶ The possibilities which exist for the MPLA are all speculative, and must await further developments.

Economically and politically, an independent Angola can be viable. After a possible economic setback initially, Angola could fall back upon its immense material potential and on the investment and development which are already there -- American, German, Dutch, Belgian, Scandinavian, and Japanese. The colony is the world's third largest coffee producer,⁶⁷ has iron, coal, and oil reserves of inestimable worth, and a sound agricultural base of cotton, maize, potatoes, figs, tobacco, and citrus fruits. There are hydroelectric facilities, equipped railroads, and some roads. As George Martelli explained:

Angola does not strike one as a poor country compared with other African countries -- it is about average -- it is not perhaps as well equipped as the Belgian Congo, but better equipped in some ways than Rhodesia. It is really an economic problem, not a question of looking for good or bad will; it depends on what the economy can afford. Portugal itself is not rich, and considering the way in which many of her own people live, I think the impression of most visitors is one of surprise that Angola looks as prosperous as it does.⁶⁸

Angola's exports are valued at approximately £25 million,⁶⁹ its capital investment at about \$280 million,⁷⁰ and only 5 per cent of its

⁶⁶ Marcum, loc. cit., p. 7.

⁶⁷ Morris, loc. cit., p. 514, quotes this from the International Coffee Council.

⁶⁸ Martelli, loc. cit., p. 305.

⁶⁹ Morris, loc. cit., p. 514.

⁷⁰ Salazar, Portuguese Problems in Africa, p. 10.

capital facilities are held by external concerns.⁷¹ An independent government would probably institute the nationalization of major invested facilities, and continue some of the welfare programs instituted by the Portuguese. Angola could be one of the more prosperous African nations. Difficulties would, of course, be encountered in the early years, but a stable government with a planned economy could easily be created.

Politically, there is the above-average possibility of tribal unity. The Angolan Africans are far more homogeneous than the peoples of most African nations. Five tribes constitute nine-tenths of the whole population -- the Bakongo, the Kimbundu, the Ovimbundu, the Lunda, and the Ganguela. They are all savannah peoples with closely-related languages and cultures. All of them have also been brought closer together by the Portuguese presence. The compulsory use of the Portuguese language has given them a lingua franca for communication -- an advantage possessed by few other African tribal groupings -- and the historic Portuguese concentration on the coastal areas of Angola has meant that the tribes in the interior have witnessed a cultural infiltration that was denied the Congolese or the Rhodesians.

The revolt against Portuguese rule has also united the Angolan Africans. They have learned to fight and work together, and from this has grown a common understanding and brotherhood. In the Congo, the Bakongo and the Kimbundu are taking the same educational courses,

⁷¹Ibid.

the Bakongo and the Ovimbundu are fighting in the National Liberation Army, and the Government-in-Exile is broadening its base to take in all tribal representation.

The five major tribes also do not possess any economic dissimilarities. They were mostly pastoral peoples who ran their agricultural plots in the interior under Portuguese guidance and on land that was frequently owned by the Portuguese landholder. The signs for unity, therefore, are better than in most other African countries.

The one obvious problem that will need solution should independence come would be that of the Portuguese white settler. Evidence would suggest that it is this element which is most determined against handing over the reins of government to a black majority. Within the last ten years, the Angolan Portuguese have assumed the attitudes and characteristics of whites in the Rhodesias and in South Africa. They want to stay in Angola, but under their own conditions, and more than likely, with themselves in power. For independence of Angola from Portugal would not necessarily imply independence from the Portuguese. Roberto and the GRAE may find a second obstacle to their goal once they drive the New State from Angola -- the white settler obstacle.

EPILOGUE

The tragedy of Angola is three-fold. In the first instance, the massacres of 1961 and the continuing guerrilla war could have been avoided had the Salazar Government listened to the people themselves rather than to its own propaganda agency proclaiming a docile, contented indigenous population. If a program of change rather than force had been used, the situations which developed in 1961 could possibly have been saved. Perhaps with quick and drastic liberalizing action following the February riots in Luanda in 1961, further troubles could have been avoided. It now seems unlikely that any such action can be taken by the present regime. Secondly, a large percentage of those killed or imprisoned have been the better-trained Africans: the nurses, teachers, clerks, priests, and pastors -- the very people necessary for a stable Angola.

Thirdly, the real tragedy lies in the lack of any possibility for discussion and compromise within the Portuguese system of government. In Angola there are many Africans and Europeans who would like to see a quick end to the current war. Portugal's traditional policy of an integrated multiracial society has built up some good will during the previous decades. But moderate political leaders, both African and European, are in prison or in exile. The large spring of good will which could flow if given a chance will probably dry up. If it does, hatred and revenge seem certain to grow, pitting Africans and Europeans against each other in a war of extermination.

It has not been the object in this analysis to justify, to

defend, or to attack Portuguese colonial policy, but rather to lay the basis of an understanding as to its motivations, its objectives, and its manifestations, and to show how these have contributed to Portugal's present troubles in Angola. It is a peculiarity of Portuguese colonialism that inconsistencies are dominant. The Portuguese ideas and ideals of a colonial policy appear only as a surface gloss, betraying the truth beneath. Possibly it is a confusion of value judgments, and quite possible it is a failure to understand and to recognize the truth.

It is evident that Portuguese colonial dogma is shabby idealism -- no one can seriously believe the rationalizations emanating from Lisbon for over four centuries. But yet the average Portuguese believes all of it. They have grown up through the centuries with an undying devotion to a religious and fanatical faith in the truth of their cause, arising, no doubt, from a substitution of fervor for the evidence of accomplishment. One can not find fault with a people who consistently maintain a devotion to an idealism which, at least on paper, is perhaps the best colonial system that has yet existed. If one must place the blame for the failure of Portugal in Angola, it should be directed at those so deceived by their own theoretical concoctions that they must blatantly and naively exhibit them as a compensation for their own inadequacies.

The Portuguese conceive of their colonial undertaking in a different light than most peoples, as perhaps they have always done. The Iberian values of political and juridical processes were native to the particular area, and it was natural that these values should

be implanted abroad in the Portuguese colonies. A colonial policy comparable to others of the European continent does not exist in either the Portuguese, or the Spanish, mind. It is true that the same words, the same tenets exist in a more-or-less similar vein in English, in French, or in Portuguese overseas philosophies, but Iberian historical beginnings were not influenced by liberalism or democracy. Judging the Portuguese by standards prevalent in England or France or Belgium accomplishes nothing. The Portuguese, in the main, have been ignorant of and isolated from the mainstream of European change. In a sense, the same is true of its colonial system and its colonial philosophies.

Perhaps the Portuguese belief in his own unique brand of colonialism is correct; but more than likely only the Portuguese believes it. One is wont to criticize the Portuguese, as there seems sufficient ground for doing so; of late, attacks against Portugal have grown in volume and validity. They apparently presuppose a subjective analysis -- when one must choose between the theory and reality, evidence supports the latter.

Portuguese colonial policy is an adventure in polemics intended to justify its presence abroad; it is as valid, or perhaps as invalid, when applied to Brazil or Goa or Angola. It is the policy as practiced in the West African possession of Angola that has been the object of this study. Portugal has been in Africa for almost five centuries. During that period, its policy has become an effort to preserve the status quo. This effort is now being undermined by force, by persuasion, and by world opinion. History has caught up

with Portugal, and the nation of the 'empire-builders' cannot yet recognize this fact.

APPENDIX A

DECREE NUMBER 18:570, JULY 8, 1930

PORTUGUESE COLONIAL ACT, CHAPTER II

Article 15: The State shall guarantee the protection and defence of the natives in the colonies, in accordance with the principles of humanity and sovereignty, the provisions of this Chapter and the international conventions at present in force or which may come into force. The colonial authorities shall prevent and penalize all abuses against the person and possessions of natives in accordance with the law.

Article 16: The State shall establish public institutions and encourage the creation of private ones to support the rights of natives or render them assistance. The institutions in either case shall be Portuguese.

Article 17: The law shall guarantee to the natives, under the terms stated therein, ownership and possession of their lands and crops and this principle must be respected in all concessions granted by the State.

Article 18: The labor of natives in the service of the State or in that of administrative bodies shall be remunerated.

Article 19: The following shall be prohibited: (1) All regulations according to which the State undertakes to furnish native laborers to any enterprises working for their own economic development. (2) All regulations according to which the natives existing in any territorial circumscription may be compelled to furnish labor to the

said enterprises under any pretext whatever.

Article 20: The State may only compel natives to labor on public works of general benefit to the community, in occupations the results of which will be enjoyed by them, in execution of judicial decisions of a penal character or for the fulfilment of fiscal obligations.

Article 21: Regulations relating to the contracting of native labor shall be based on the liberty of the individual and on the right to a fair wage and assistance, the public authorities intervening only for purposes of supervision.

Article 22: Attention shall be paid in the colonies to the stage of evolution of the native populations, which, under the authority of Portuguese public and private law, shall lay down juridical regulations for them in keeping with their individual, domestic and social usages and customs, provided that these are not incompatible with morality and dictates of humanity.

Article 23: The State shall ensure to all its overseas territories liberty of conscience and the free exercise of the various religions, subject to the restrictions necessitated by the rights and interests of the sovereignty of Portugal and the maintenance of public order, and so long as they are in harmony with international treaties and conventions.

Article 24: Religious missions overseas, being instruments of civilization and national influence, and establishments for the training of personnel for service in them and in the Portuguese Padroado shall possess a juridical character and shall be protected and assisted by the State as institutions of learning.

APPENDIX B

EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT WRITTEN BY HENRIQUE GALVAO,
JANUARY, 1947, ON CONDITIONS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

Figures are mute, static. They do not shout, they do not tell of pain. One needs to go and see for oneself, and one needs to encourage those who want to see, instead of condemning them as "inconvenient" to places of exile. One needs to study the phenomena in loco across some thousands of miles normally visited by nobody; to gain the confidence of the natives and to listen to them; to hear from administrative officers, who are afraid to report truthfully, the things that only on special occasions they dare to say; to listen to missionaries expressing views in friendly conversation that they do not write in their records.

The following are some of the current facts and implications of the problem of labor resulting from the action of employers who dodge inspection, give bribes or take advantage of the passive attitudes of the authorities responsible for the protection of the natives:

(1) Resistance in all possible ways to a policy of paying wages that are economically or socially just.

(2) Bad treatment of workers -- corporal punishment and physical violence are still the current practice in Mozambique; the obligations of employers pertaining to clothing, food, and health are dodged in a great number of cases. The idea that the native is simply a beast of burden still prevails. Indifference to the physical and moral welfare of the laborers is evident. A division of employers

according to the treatment they mete out to their laborers would give a terrific percentage of bad employers.

(3) Wastage of labor. Labor is used as if it were plentiful. Everything is done by the arm-power of the native, from the pushing of trucks to the draining of marshes.

(4) The poor quality and moral character of those entrusted with the recruiting of native labor.

(5) The displacement of laborers from one area to another without regard to climatic conditions -- especially the hardships to which those coming from the interior to the coastal areas are subjected.

(6) Extortions practiced on the natives by merchants.

(7) Indifferent housing conditions.

(8) The vestiges of the exterminating spirit rooted in the last century and the beginnings of this century.

This, in a superficial summary, is the prevailing situation in the field of labor problems. The Government is informed of the full details.

Admittedly we have it recorded in official legislation that the problem is a very difficult one. No one denies it. Today it is more difficult than yesterday. Tomorrow will be more difficult than today. The fact is that we have known this for ten years and that in these ten years there has not been a single effective measure to solve the problem.

APPENDIX C

VOTING RECORD ON UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

RELATING TO THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES^a

Member States	General Assembly Resolution					Security Council Resolution	
	1514	1541	1542	1603	1819	4835	5380
Afro-Asian Group:							
Afghanistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Algeria							
Burma	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Burundi				Y	Y		
Cambodia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Cameroon	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Central African Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Ceylon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Chad	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Congo							
(Brazzaville)	Y		Y	Y	Y		
Congo							
(Leopoldville)	Y	Y	Y		Y		
Dahomey	Y			Y	Y		
Ethiopia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Federation of Malaya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Gabon	Y			Y			
Ghana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
India	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Indonesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Iran	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Iraq	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Ivory Coast	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Japan	Y	Y	A	Y	A		
Jordan	Y				Y		
Laos	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Lebanon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Liberia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Libya	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Madagascar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Mali	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Mauritania					Y		

^aThe specific resolutions will follow the vote compilation table.

Member States	General Assembly Resolutions					Security Council Resolution	
	1514	1541	1542	1603	1819	4835	5380
Morocco	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Nepal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Niger	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Nigeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Pakistan	Y	Y	A	Y	Y		
Philippines	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
Rwanda							
Saudi Arabia	Y			Y			
Senegal	Y	Y		Y			
Sierra Leone					Y		
Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Syria					Y		
Tanganyika					Y		
Thailand	Y	Y	Y	A	A		
Togo	Y	Y	Y				
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Uganda							
United Arab Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Upper Volta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Yemen	Y	Y	Y				
Communist Group:							
Albania	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		
Bulgaria	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		
Byelorussian	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		
Czechoslovakia	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		
Hungary	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		
Mongolia					Y		
Poland	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		
Romania	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		
Ukrainian	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		
USSR	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latin American Group:							
Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		
Bolivia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Brazil	Y	Y	N	A	A		Y
Chile	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	
Colombia	Y	Y	A				
Costa Rica	Y	Y					
Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Dominican Republic	A	A	A	A	A		

Member States	General Assembly Resolution					Security Council Resolution	
	1514	1541	1542	1603	1819	4835	5380
Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y		A	
El Salvador	Y	Y	Y	A			
Guatemala	Y	Y	Y				
Haiti	Y	Y	Y		Y		
Honduras	Y	Y	Y		A		
Mexico	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		
Nicaragua	Y	Y	A				
Panama	Y	Y	A		Y		
Paraguay	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Peru	Y	Y	Y		A		
Uruguay	Y			Y	A		
Venezuela	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
NATO Group:							
Belgium	A	A	N	A	N		
Canada	Y	Y	A	Y	N		
Denmark	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		
France	A	A	A	N	A	A	A
Greece	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		
Iceland	Y			Y			
Italy	Y	A	A	Y	N		
Luxembourg	Y	A	A		N		
Netherlands	Y	A	A	A	N		
Norway	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		Y
Portugal	A	N	N		N		
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
United Kingdom	A	A	A	A	N	N	A
United States	A	A	A	Y	N	N	A
Other States							
Australia	A	A	A	A	N		
Austria	Y	Y	A	Y	A		
China	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Y
Cyprus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Finland	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		
Ireland	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		
Israel	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Jamaica							
New Zealand	Y	A	A	Y	N		
South Africa	A	N	N	N	N		
Spain	A	A	N	N	N		
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		
Trinidad					Y		
Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		

Key to Resolutions:

General Assembly

Res. 1514 (December 14, 1960)

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Res. 1541 (December 15, 1960)

Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter.

Res. 1542 (December 15, 1960)

Transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter.

Res. 1603 (April 20, 1961)

The situation in Angola. The General Assembly called upon the government of Portugal "to consider urgently the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514"; decided to appoint a sub-committee of five members to conduct such inquiries concerning Angola as it deemed necessary.

Res. 1819 (December 18, 1962)

The situation in Angola. The General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Angola to self-determination and independence, and supported their demand for immediate independence; condemned the colonial war being carried on by Portugal against the people of Angola, and demanded that the government of Portugal put an end to it immediately; called upon Portugal to desist from armed action and repressive measures.

Security Council

S/4835 (June 9, 1961)

The situation in Angola. The Security Council called upon Portugal to desist from repressive measures and to extend every facility to the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola.

S/5380 (July 31, 1963)

The Security Council rejected Portugal's claim that its territories are "overseas provinces" of the metropole; determined that the situation in the territories was seriously disturbing peace and security in Africa; called upon Portugal to recognize the right of peoples of its territories to self-determination and independence; requested all states to refrain from offering the Portuguese government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the territories and to take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese government.

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